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ii 
 Political trust is indispensable for effective government operation and regime stability.  The 
endemic low levels of political trust observed in many democracies have raised some important 
questions: Why do people trust or distrust political institutions?  What are the sources of political 
trust?  Literature on political trust is extensive, but generally suffers from two common 
limitations.  First, most studies on trust have focused on either political culture or political 
economy as the main sources of political trust.  The real political sources of trust have been 
missing from current discussions.  Second, most research on political trust excludes non-
democratic societies.  The high levels of political trust in authoritarian societies have been 
treated as an anomaly.   
This dissertation attempts to address these two issues by studying the political sources of 
political trust in both democratic and authoritarian regimes.  I argue that people trust institutions 
when they perceive institutions trustworthy.  Trustworthiness arises from the commitment and 
capacity of institutions, and it is shaped by the political context of institutional arrangements.  In 
other words, citizens trust institutions when they believe that institutions are committed to and 
capable of fulfilling their trust, and their perceptions of institutions are conditioned by 
institutional arrangements.   
A POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST: 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS, POLITICAL PERFORMANCE,  
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Qing Yang, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2012
 
iii 
To explore the political sources of political trust, I have used multilevel analyses with 
comparative data from East Asian societies and other countries.  The statistical results highlight 
the significant effects of institutional settings and political performance.   On the one hand, 
institutional features such as regime types, party systems, executive systems, and party 
allegiance that individuals are embedded in shape the way they trust institutions.  On the other 
hand, institutional political performance consistently showed strong influence on the levels of 
political trust in different regimes and settings.  By bringing political factors back into equation, I 
hope my dissertation will help provide a more comprehensive understanding of political trust. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 THE PUZZLE: THE POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST 
 
Political trust in government and its institutions ensures that government operates effectively, 
making decisions without resorting to coercion and retaining leeway in times of insufficient 
short-time performance (Easton 1965; Gamson 1968).  Political trust is important to different 
types of regimes. As a multilevel concept, trust links macro-level outcomes with the micro-level 
attitude.  It is based on individual choices and affects institutional outcomes such as efficient 
government and political legitimacy (Levi & Stoker 2000).  For democratic countries, loss of 
trust, especially long-term distrust, can harden into cynicism and harm democratic governance 
and representation (Nye 1997; Hetherington 2005).  Lack of legitimacy may contribute to the 
breakdown of democratic systems (Finkel, Muller, and Seligson 1989).   For non-democratic 
systems, endemic distrust may threaten regime legitimacy and cause political turmoil or even 
regime change, as in the case of the soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s (Hardin 1998; Di Palma 
1991; He 1996).  
However, a “trust crisis” first became evident in the US in the 1960s and then spread to 
many advanced industrial countries.  Public trust and confidence in institutions, as well as 
politicians, declined across industrialized democracies (Putnam, Pharr, & Dalton 2000; Norris 
1999b).  Meanwhile, low levels of political trust have been observed in Latin America and 
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Central and Eastern Europe in the past decades (e.g. Catterberg & Moreno 2006; Mishler & Rose 
2001a).  Reports from these different areas of the world seem to draw very pessimistic 
conclusions about political trust.  As a result, numerous researches has been done to find out why 
the public have become disaffected and lost faith in the government and democratic institutions 
in these regions over the last few decades.  These studies all pointed to a central question: what 
determines the public trust in political institutions?   
To answer this important question, extensive researches have explored various economic 
and cultural sources of political trust.  Scholars have studied how social capital, post-materialist 
values, and subjective and objective economic performance may affect political trust.  While the 
existing literature greatly enhanced our understanding of the origins of political trust, it also 
produced some inconclusive or even contradictory findings.  Several reasons may have 
contributed to this inconsistency in the literature.  Theoretically, many studies failed to account 
for the effects of political factors such as political performance of institutions and institutional 
settings.  Among numerous studies on political trust, few researches have systematically 
examined the political sources of trust.  Methodologically, many studies have been limited to a 
certain group of countries and failed to take into account the institutional settings in which 
individuals are embedded.  Thus, to better understand the nature and sources of political trust, we 
need to look beyond the debate about the relative significance of political culture and political 
economy and focus on the sphere of real politics.  The following questions remained unanswered 
in the existing literature on trust:  Why do people trust political institutions?  Beyond political 
economy and political culture, what other political factors affect public trust in political 
institutions?  Specifically, what kinds of political performance influence people’s trust in 
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institutions and how?  Do people across countries trust institutions the same way?  Or do 
institutional settings play a role in the public trust in institutions?   
Meanwhile, research on political trust in East Asia has been surprisingly limited.  The 
region should not be left out from the current discussion.  East Asia presents a very interesting 
pattern of political trust compared with other regions in the world, and studies of trust in East 
Asia may contribute significantly to the current debate on the sources of political trust.  What are 
the levels of political trust in East Asian societies?  How is the pattern different from other parts 
of the world?  What are the sources of political trust in East Asia?  How do East Asian political 
systems retain a high level of public support while the rest of the world seems to be losing it?  
Do East Asians trust political institutions because of the traditional Confucian cultural values, or 
as a result of the economic miracles?  Or, is there something else about political trust that the 
current culture versus performance debate cannot adequately explain?  How does the study of 
trust in East Asia contribute to the existing literature of political trust?   
These are the questions that drive this dissertation.  With the continuing erosion of 
political trust across the world, answers to these questions becomes important both to democratic 
theories of political support and regime change, and to the comparative study of regime strengths 
and legitimacy.  To address these questions, I will study two political sources of political trust in 
this dissertation: institutional settings and political performance of institutions.  To maximize the 
institutional variance, I will first examine whether and how these political factors affect public 
trust in political institutions across the world.  Then, I will turn to the effects of political 
performance and institutional features in East Asia, an important region that should not have 
been left out from the existing discussions on political trust.  Using multi-level analysis, I will 
develop and test hypotheses of both the contextual and individual level sources of political trust.  
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This study hopes to advance our comprehension of the nature and political bases of institutional 
support.  
A review of the existing literature in the field shows that a cultural approach and 
performance approach have provided competing explanations for trust in institutions (Mishler & 
Rose 1997; 2001a; Campbell 2004; Newton 2006).  While there is no agreement on the origins 
of political trust, the existing literature attempting to explain political trust can generally be 
framed within the culture-performance debate.  On the one hand, the political cultural school 
argues that trust in institutions has its origins in political culture. Social capital and personal 
values play an independent role in shaping political trust (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; 
Inglehart 1999b).  On the other hand, institutional performance explanations hold that political 
trust is largely based on people’s calculations of the material gains and evaluations of the 
incumbent performance (Mishler and Rose 1997). The culture-performance debate has sparked 
many interesting and important discussions on the sources of political trust in democratic 
countries, both theoretically and empirically.  
However, while the two major theories have helped to improve our understanding of 
political trust, they predominantly focused on political culture and political economy.  Existing 
literature failed to give enough credits to the real politics sphere.  The political characters and 
political output of the institutions have not been addressed sufficiently in the extensive literature 
about trust despite their relevance to political trust.  First, although scholars were right about the 
role of institutional performance on political trust, most of them have failed to look beyond 
economic output of the government and study the political dimension of institutional 
performance.  Second, the effect of institutional settings on trust has been largely overlooked in 
most of the researches.  Among the very few studies that have taken this political factor into 
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considerations (Anderson & Guillory 1997; Norris 1999c), empirical results have been far from 
conclusive, pending further research.   Moreover, one important institutional feature that has 
been missing from the literature is regime type.  The existing literature has been largely limited 
to the democratic settings.  Although some scholars have claimed that regime types may make a 
difference in political trust, few have empirically examined the claim or specified how the 
regime types affect trust.  Comparative research and in-depth case studies on causal mechanism 
of political trust in non-democratic countries have been surprisingly limited.   
 
 
1.2. THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF & THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to reduce these gaps in the literature by studying the political 
sources of political trust at both country and individual levels.  I hope to contribute to the current 
discussion on political trust by bringing trust back to its political origins and advancing the 
studies on the political sources of political trust.  Specifically, I am interested in two political 
sources: the institutional arrangements of political systems, and the political performance of 
institutions and government.  The study aims to look beyond the current debate of culture versus 
performance, and draws attention to the important political sources of political trust that have 
been overlooked in the current literature.   
The central hypothesis of the dissertation is that political trust originates in the perceived 
trustworthiness of institutions, not only economic but also political trustworthiness.  The 
trustworthiness of institutions arises from commitment and capacity of the institutions, and it is 
shaped by the political context of institutional arrangements.  In other words, citizens trust 
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institutions when they believe that the institutions are committed to and capable of fulfilling their 
trust, and their perceptions of institutions are conditioned by the characteristics of the 
institutional arrangements.   
These political factors have not been sufficiently studied in the existing literature of 
political trust, and they have been particularly missing in East Asian context.  These political 
sources of political trust are of the key interest of this dissertation.  
This comparative research focuses on East Asia and China in particular for the following 
reasons.  First, East Asia presents a naturally heterogeneous setting of different institutional 
designs.  East Asia has an established democracy (Japan), many consolidating democracies (e.g. 
South Korea, Taiwan), semi-democracies like Singapore and Hong Kong, and non-democratic 
countries such as China and Vietnam.  The diverse institutional designs provide an exciting 
setting to examine the institutional effects on political trust.  Second, if political trustworthiness 
is important for political attitudes and behavior, Asian countries may present a hard case.  
Although corruption is generally regarded as an economic evil (Seligson 2002), the puzzling 
coexistence of corruption and economic growth in East Asia has raised the question of 
culpability of corruption in East Asian context (Wedeman 2002, 2012).  The level of corruption 
is the most important indicator of political trustworthiness, and its effect on political trust is of 
key interests for this research.  In this dissertation, I will examine the effect of political 
performance on political trust in the East Asian setting and see whether and how corruption 
affects people’s political trust.  Third, the study of effects of Confucian values in East Asia can 
contribute to the debate between culture and performance on the sources of political trust.  We 
can sort out the relative importance of the roles of the Confucian values that emphasize 
deference to authority and the economic miracles of East Asian governments in shaping political 
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trust.  Fourth, empirical studies on political trust are scarce in East Asia, as most studies have 
been limited to Western and Eastern Europe, and North and South America.  We can explore and 
test the hypothesis and generalize theories using this relatively new setting.   
China is a particularly interesting case.  Most research on political trust, either cross-
country analysis or comparative case studies, has largely excluded China and treated it as an 
anomaly (e.g. Norris 1999c; Chang & Chu 2002).  Some dismissed the Chinese case due to 
China’s authoritarian system, and others doubted the reliability of reports indicating a 
surprisingly high level of trust.  In contrast, I argue that not only should China be included, it 
also deserves serious attention to enhance our understanding of political trust.  First, studies on 
political trust have been limited to democratic settings, and the case of China provides a different 
and important institutional setting: the authoritarian arrangement.  Second, the surprisingly high 
level of political trust in a repressive authoritarian system goes against many theoretical 
predictions, and rather than simply dismiss it as anomaly, we need in-depth case studies to 
understand this puzzle.  Third, political trust is essential for societies under great transformation 
like China.  Sinologists have mainly attributed political support in China to either the very fast 
economic growth or the traditional Confucius culture.  Though political performance should 
theoretically contribute to political trust, explicit and clear political discussion has been missing 
from the current analysis of China.  I will examine the effects of specific authoritarian settings 
and political performance on political trust in China, both theoretically and empirically.  
In this dissertation, I am most interested in the roles of political factors in explaining 
political trust in East Asia.  The first three chapters discuss the theoretical framework and present 
the major arguments of the project.  After theoretical discussions, this dissertation will 
empirically examine the sources of political trust.  The empirical work will be carried out at both 
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the country level and the individual level.  In Chapter 4, replying on global data from the World 
Values Surveys, I will study the two political sources of political trust, focusing on the effects of 
institutional settings.  The chapter puts East Asia in a broader comparative framework and 
compares the patterns and trends of political trust in East Asia with other regions of the world.  
Chapter 5 and 6 will focus on the sources of political trust in East Asia and study the twelve East 
Asian societies using data from the Asian Barometer.  Specifically, I want to study how political 
performance and institutional characteristics affect East Asian citizens’ trust in political 
institutions.  Chapter 5 focuses on seven East Asian democracies, and Chapter 6 examines trust 
in five non-democratic societies, paying particular attention to the Chinese case – an “outlier 
case” identified by several studies of trust.  I want to examine whether Chinese people trust 
political institutions based on their perception of institutional trustworthiness and how 
authoritarian settings affect citizens’ political trust.  I will also study the sources of the high level 
of political trust and the large center-local trust gap in China.  Chapter 7 studies the 
consequences of political trust and summarizes the main findings of the dissertation.  
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2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
In this chapter, I will first discuss the meanings of the key concepts in this dissertation.  
Starting with the definitions, I will next review existing literature on both democratic and non-
democratic settings, and revisit the political culture versus economic performance debate vis-à-
vis the sources of political trust.  Next, I will focus on what has been overlooked by the current 
literature and propose the main argument of the dissertation.  By bringing political factors back 
into equation, I hope my dissertation will help reduce the gap in the existing literature and 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of political trust.   
 
 
2.1 DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS 
 
2.1.1 Trust and Trustworthiness: Trust as a Relational Concept 
 
Trust is a simple yet contested term.  We use the word in our daily conversations, yet there is no 
consensus on the exact meaning of trust (Levi & Stoker 2000).  One thing that theorists do agree 
on is the relational nature of trust.  Trust arises from social relations and it involves two parties: 
the truster and the trustee.  Trust is the truster’s belief that the trustee will contribute to the 
9 
truster’s well-being and refrain from causing damage upon the truster (Offe 1999).  Trust 
involves risky and uncertain outcomes.  
Becker (1996) summarizes the philosophical debate over the definition of trust into two 
major approaches: non-cognitive and cognitive account.   The non-cognitive school emphasizes 
the complexity of the modern world and focuses on the truster’s psychological dispositions 
(Luhmann 1979; Baier 1986; Dunn 1990).  In the non-cognitive account, trust is “fundamentally 
a matter of our having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, or motivational structures that are not 
focused on specific people, institutions, or groups” (Becker 1996: 44).    
In contrast, cognitive definition of trust focuses on the trustee’s side.  Hardin’s (1996; 
1998; 2002) encapsulated-interests definition of trust conceptualizes trust as a rational choice 
made on the basis of the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee.  In other words, trust is 
grounded in the truster’s evaluation of the trustee’s incentive to be trustworthy.  The cognitive 
approach of trust is more dominant and relevant in discussions in political sphere.  Following the 
cognitive and rational approach, the attributes of trustworthiness assure the truster that the trustee 
will not betray a trust.   
The objects of trust can be individuals or institutions.  Hardin’s (1996) encapsulated-
interests conception of trust can be generalized to fit political institutions.  Political scientists are 
more concerned with political trust, i.e. trust in political actors such as officials, political system, 
and political institutions.  Political trust, as compared to interpersonal or social trust, is the 
primary concern of this dissertation. 
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2.1.2 Alienation, Trust, and Political Support: Objects and Dimensions 
 
Sociological studies on alienation are a precursor to analysis of political trust.  Alienation refers 
to “an attitude of separation or estrangement between oneself and some salient aspect of the 
social environment” (Olsen 1965, 202). To explicate the concept, Seeman (1959) decomposed 
alienation into five essential component parts: normlessness, meaninglessness, powerlessness, 
social isolation, and self-estrangement.  Relating these modes of alienation to attitudes towards 
political systems, Finifter (1970) specified two dimensions of political alienation: political 
powerlessness and political normlessness, which are different terms to label efficacy and trust 
(see also Gamson 1968; Seligson 1980).  Together with powerlessness, and meaninglessness, 
Gilmour and Lamb (1975) treated distrust as a key dimension of political alienation.   
Easton’s (1965; 1975) analysis of political support is another catalyst for the political 
discussion of trust.  Social scientists discuss political support both as attitudes and as behavior.  
When discussing its attitudinal form, Easton distinguished between different dimensions and 
objects of political support.  In A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Easton (1965) identified 
three objects or levels of political support:  political community, the regime, and the authorities.  
Political community emphasizes the nation that bind people together in a common political 
enterprise, and support at this level shows a sense of belonging and willingness to cooperate in 
the community.  Political regime refers to the most basic aspects of the system: the underlying 
values of the political system and institutions of the government.  Political support for the regime 
is more fundamental in character.  Political support for authority includes support for both 
particular officials and for the entire leadership.  Following the Eastonian classification of 
political support, scholars have proposed some more specified ladders of political support (see 
Nye & Zelikow 1997; Norris 1999b; Dalton 1999).   These distinctions between different objects 
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of political support are necessary, as there are “significant theoretical and empirical gradations 
within different parts of the regime” (Norris 1999b: 9-13). For instance, a person can strongly 
identify with her political community but not with the current regime’s principles; or, a citizen 
may trust political institutions but not political actors.  
The different objects identified above fall into two dimensions of political support: 
specific support and diffuse support (Easton 1975).  This is a key distinction that shaped almost 
all of the following literature on political trust and support.  Specific support, or effectiveness, as 
Lipset (1960) put it, is sentiment toward the incumbent political authorities.  Specific support is 
more volatile, fluctuating with the evaluations of what the political authorities do and how they 
do it.  Diffuse support, or in Lipset’s (1960) term, legitimacy, is a much more durable and basic 
concept.  It is support for the regime and is “independent of outputs and performance in the short 
run” (Easton 1975: 444-5).  Diffuse support is the much more influential dimension (Easton 
1965).  As students of regime change, we are more concerned with diffuse support that 
fundamentally affects the regime strength.  
Political trust is a major indicator of political support, and the two terms often go hand in 
hand in the trust literature.  Like political support, political trust has different objects: trust in 
authorities, in institutions, and in the regime or system.  However, scholars use the same label 
“political trust” for different kinds of trust and research on different kinds of trust often produces 
contradictory results.  For instance, while some scholars treat political trust as synonymous with 
diffuse support (Gamson 1968; Miller 1974a; 1974b), others find it more sensitive to the 
incumbent performance (Citrin 1974; Muller & Jukam 1977).  In the following section, I argue 
that this disagreement is a result of measurement inconsistency as well as conceptual confusion.   
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 2.1.3 The Empirical Meaning of Political Trust 
 
Given its normative and empirical importance, it is no surprise that there is an explosion of work 
studying  the issue of the decline of political trust (e.g. Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997; 
Braithwaite & Levi 1998; Warren 1999; Norris 1999a; Pharr & Putnam 2000; Hibbing & Theiss-
Morse 2001; Hetherington 2005).  Yet what is unusual about this literature is a preoccupation 
with the measurement issue.  Normative discussions and theories about political support and trust 
are abundant, but the empirical research often reached different or even opposite conclusions (e.g. 
Miller 1974a; 1974b; Citrin 1974; Muller & Jukam 1977; Seligson 1983; Brehm & Rahn 1997; 
Hetherington 1998; Newton 1999).  A major reason for the divergence is the inconsistent and 
improper measurement of trust in the literature.  Thus, before we discuss and evaluate the 
contradictory generalizations and conclusions made in various studies of political trust, we need 
to address the measurement issue first.  As Easton (1975: 457) suggested, conceptual 
clarification and empirical explanation are intertwined in “a mutually nourishing feedback 
process”.  The empirical meaning of political trust is crucial for our understanding of its real 
extent, sources, and consequences.   
The Miller-Citrin debate (Miller 1974a; 1974b; Citrin 1974) is a good illustration of this 
intellectual disagreement:  it called the prevailing interpretations of political trust into question 
and discussed the real meaning of the observed declining trust in the US.  Borrowing Stokes’s 
(1962) American National Election Survey (ANES) trust-in-government questions to measure 
political trust 1 , Miller (1974a; 1974b) found declining trust in the US, and he argued that 
1 The ANES trust-in-government questions ask the respondents’ evaluations on the government “to do what is 
RIGHT”, “run by a few big INTERESTS”, “WASTEs a lot of money we pay in taxes”, and run by CROOKED 
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political trust is a meaningful measure of political discontent and it is important to democracy 
and the whole system of government.  However, Citrin held the opposite opinion.  Analyzing the 
same data to examine the behavioral consequences of trust, Citrin (1974) believed that political 
trust as measured by the ANES trust-in-government index taps more sentiments about 
incumbents than evaluations of the political system or regime.   The Miller-Citrin debate on the 
ANES trust-in-government measure also prompted numerous follow-up discussions (e.g. Muller 
& Jukam 1977; Abramson & Finiter 1981; Feldman 1983; Seligson 1983; Williams 1985; Citrin 
& Green 1986; Craig, Niemi, & Silver 1990; Nye, Zelikow, & King 1997; Citrin & Muste 1999; 
Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001; Owen & Dennis 2001).  Focusing around ANES trust-in-
government measure (and some also proposing new alternative measures), these researchers try 
to determine whether the decline of the so measured trust represents a decline in system support 
and whether trust influences political participation the way political theories suggest.   
The obsession with the measurement of political trust points to a more fundamental 
conceptual distinction.  As Levi & Stoker (2000: 480) observed, “(o)ne way to make sense of 
this emphasis in the measurement literature is that the system versus non-system focus was 
important no matter what concept the index was taken to represent”.   
Indeed, the real question raised by the debate concerns the two dimensions of political 
trust: system-based trust versus incumbent-based trust.  On the one hand, system-based political 
trust is reflective of diffuse support, i.e. public’s supportive attitudes for the regime (including 
the fundamental values, norms, and institutions of government).  On the other hand, incumbent-
based political trust is more concerned with specific support, i.e. the public sentiment directed at 
people.  Stokes (1962), however, when first adopting this measure, did not label it “political trust” but used it only to 
categorize whether respondents held favorable or unfavorable evaluations of the government.  Miller (1974a) first 
used this measurement for “political trust”, and the measurement is among the most popular measurements in the 
trust studies in the US (e.g. Aberbach 1969; Aberbach & Walker 1970; Citrin & Muste 1999; Hetherington 1998; 
2005).   
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incumbent leaders and political leadership in general.  As with the specific versus diffuse support 
distinction, we care more about system-based trust, as it is “more consequential for the stability 
of a political regime” (Muller & Jukam 1977: 1563).   
This incumbent versus system distinction seems very obvious, but in reality, many 
researchers simply use the term “political trust” without explicitly defining its specific 
dimensions, and they make easy generalizations regarding their results.  Unfortunately, this 
remains the case in many studies decades after the initial Miller-Citrin debate. 
In this dissertation, I am more concerned with system based political trust as opposed to 
incumbent based political trust.  I am less interested in the popular daily evaluations of specific 
leaders, as short-term ebbs and flows are assumed normal and healthy for a well-functioning 
political system (Pharr & Putnam 2000).  Within the dimension of system based political trust, I 
argue that it is necessary to further distinguish between trust in system principles and trust in 
institutions since the former is the most fundamental level and it usually changes most mildly 
and slowly.   
As Figure 2.1 shows, we can distinguish political trust by their levels and objects.  The 
bottom level of the trust ladder is trust in incumbent leadership, which corresponds to specific 
support according to Easton’s classification.  The upper two levels of trust correspond to political 
support directed at the regime, or diffuse support according to Easton’s classification.  The 
higher level political trust stands on the ladder, the more ideal and abstract it represents.  Trust in 
system principles and values is on the top of the ladder, as it is the most ideal level of political 
trust.  Trust in institutions is also system-level trust and is key to regime legitimacy.  It stands 
lower on the political trust ladder because compared with trust in system principles, it is less 
abstract and more related to the contemporary governments.   
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Figure 2.1 The Ladder of Political Trust 
 
A large body of existing literature has studied political support using the top and bottom 
levels of trust illustrated by the ladder.  For instance, the widely used ANES trust-in-government 
measure taps more of incumbency support, whereas questions about the democratic aspirations 
from the World Values Surveys (WVS) gauge the belief in democratic principles and values.2  
The democratic aspirations indicator emphasizes the abstract principles and ideals of democracy, 
and it taps what Mishler and Rose (2001b) called an “idealist” view of democracy.  It is often 
used in comparative studies of political support (e.g. Klingemann 1999; Dalton 2004; Dalton & 
2 A commonly used item from WVS asks respondents, “I am going to describe various types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country.  For each one, would you say it is a very good 
fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this country?”  The four options include “1. Having a strong 
leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; 2. Having experts, not government, make 
decisions according to what they think is best for the country; 3. Having the army rule; 4. Having a democratic 
political system”.    
A similar battery of examples from the WVS ask respondents’ opinions on four issues: “a) In democracy, the 
economic system runs badly; b) Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling; and c) Democracies aren't 
good at maintaining order; d) Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government”. 
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Shin 2006).  This idealist approach of democracy is suitable to the setting of established 
democracies, as it assumes that citizens have a basic understanding of the meaning and practice 
of democracy.   
However, for comparative studies involving transitional/new or non-democracies, belief 
in democratic principles, the top level of trust, is less appropriate for studying diffuse political 
support.  As the idealist approach of democracy, democratic aspiration indicator may have the 
following problems in incomplete democracies or non-democracies where citizens have little 
direct experience with democracy.  First, citizens may decline to answer the relevant questions or 
express “non-attitudes”, i.e. giving opinions that have never been held or thought of before 
answering the survey questions (Mishler and Rose 2001b).3  Second, the use of normatively-
loaded “D-word” in the survey questions runs the risk of social desirability effects, and citizens 
may show their support for democracy only as an abstract ideal or favored label (Chu, Diamond, 
Nathan, and Shin 2008).  Third, democracy is a contested concept and different societies 
understand it differently (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1997; Shin 1999; Norris 1999b).  For 
instance, while many East European citizens may associate democratization experience with 
market economic reform, many East Asian citizens equate democracy to populism (Chu, et al. 
2008). Thus interpretation of democratic aspiration may be ambiguous for transitional or non-
democracies.    
In contrast, trust in institutions is the most appropriate level of political trust measures for 
comparative studies.  Compared with the idealist approach to democracy, questions about trust in 
institutions have a much more “significant realist component” (Mishler & Rose 2001: 314).   
3 Take Dalton and Shin’s (2006: Chapter 4 and Chapter 7) book for instance, the conclusion about democratic 
support in East Asia was largely compromised by the exclusion of a large number of missing values (“don’t know” 
answers or no answer) of the key variables in China and Vietnam (ranging from 21% to 42%).  The results presented 
in the book are not an accurate reflection of the real popular support in Asia.  
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While citizens in new or non-democracies have only limited experience understanding of 
democracy, they have at least some experience with political institutions such as parliament and 
political parties.  Thus when investigating political support in new/transitional or non-
democracies, trust in institutions provides more useful information than questions of democratic 
aspirations.  Trust in institutions is intermediate between trust in system principles and trust in 
political authorities, and it is less volatile than incumbency support, and less abstract than belief 
in political principles and values.  As this dissertation aims to study political support in East Asia 
where types of political regimes are diverse and democratic transformation remains incomplete, I 
will focus on trust in institutions rather than democratic aspirations or incumbent support.   
So, the middle rung of the ladder, i.e. trust in institutions, is the primary focus of this 
dissertation.  I will study trust in political institutions and different levels of government.  Unless 
specified otherwise, by “political trust”, I am referring to trust in institutions.  As political trust is 
institution specific (Landry 2011), I will focus on the five key political institutions for 
comparative purposes.4  Specifically, I use the following question from the World Values Survey 
and Asian Barometers to measure the political trust in institutions:  
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence 
(2), not very much confidence (3) or none at all (4)?” 
I use the mean level of trust in five key political institutions: the national government, 
political parties, parliament, the legal system, and the civil service.  The index is converted to 0-
100 scale where 0 means no confidence at all in any institution and 100 means a great deal of 
4 The original survey questions asked about political trust in around 15 institutions, including the church, the armed 
forces, the press, television, labor unions, the police, the court, the government, political parties, parliament, the civil 
service, major companies, environment organizations, women’s organizations, charitable or humanitarian 
organizations, etc.  Trust in some of these institutions was not asked in all countries, but political trust in the five key 
political institutions was asked in almost all of the countries in the survey.  
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confidence in all five political institutions.  The five institutions I included for analysis as objects 
of political trust are highly inter-correlated.  The high Cronbach’s Alpha value suggested that 
they reflect an orientation towards political institutions in general and together they form a 
reliable scale (also see Norris 1999).  However, we should also notice that political trust is 
institution specific in terms of different functions of institutions.  For instance, trust in legal 
institutions, societal institutions, and political institutions may have different sources and 
consequences.  In the following analyses, I will study the respective level of political trust in 
each of the five institutions and compare their sources.  I will also examine trust in 15 different 
institutions in China.   
This section discussed the conceptual and empirical meanings of political trust.  In 
summary, I understand political trust as a relational concept.  It is grounded in the truster’s 
evaluation of the trustee’s incentive and capacity to be trustworthy.  I also emphasized the 
important distinction between incumbent versus system based trust.  However, although the 
existing studies have identified some partisan and incumbent-based characters of the ANES 
measure of political trust, they also noticed the long-term and continuing declining trend of trust 
despite the change of administrations and against alternative measures of political trust.  The 
next section will focus on the extent and reasons behind this decline.  
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW:  
THE CULTURE VERSUS PERFORMANCE DEBATE  
 
In this section, I will review the major theoretical approaches that have been provided to explain 
levels of political trust.  These two competing explanations are drawn from the political culture 
and political economy traditions.  The debate between political culture and economic 
performance schools has sparked interesting discussions and greatly enhanced our understanding 
of the sources of political trust.  
 
2.2.1 A Survey of the Literature: the Decline of Political Trust in Democracies 
 
The vast majority of the literature of political trust has focused on trust in democratic regimes.  
There seems to be a general belief that political trust is declining in the established democracies, 
but the extent varies across objects of trust and across different countries.   
The academic interest in political trust started in the US, and there have been ample 
studies to chart its longitudinal change.  Overall, political trust in both political leaders and the 
government has been on the slide in the US since the 1960s. 5  Comparable trends in other 
established democracies are more polychromatic.  However, the main message echoes the theme 
of declining trust.  Survey data from both individual countries and cross-national comparative 
5 Drawing on a collaborative poll by Washington Post, Henry Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University, 
Blendon et al. (1997) found that except for a very mild rebound in the early 1980s, the public trust in leaders of the 
executive branch and congress fell from a high 40% in the 1960s to only 10% in the late-1990s.  Trust in the US 
government has also declined dramatically.  Largely relying on ANES data, researchers found that despite 
fluctuations, the level of political trust in politicians and the government has demonstrated a general downward trend 
(Orren 1997; Norris 1999b; Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn 2000; King 2000; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2000; Alford 
2001; Hetherington 2005).  Between 1950s till the mid 1960s, people were still supportive of politicians and the 
government.  Then, the decline of political trust was first observed in the US between 1965 and 1980.  The trust 
level moved upward a bit and returned to a more favorable position in the 1980s, and it declined again through the 
1990s.  Trust in the major democratic institutions also fell (Lipset 1994; Dalton 1996; Putnam et al. 2000). 
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surveys like World Values Surveys confirmed the basic picture of the slide across countries with 
diverse backgrounds.6  Fortunately, unlike trust in political leaders and in democratic institutions, 
the levels of trust in democratic values and principles have not declined.  The trust crisis has not 
transformed into a “crisis of democracy” in established democracies (Kaase & Newton 1995; 
Norris 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000).  Meanwhile, the new democracies have continued to show 
very low level of public confidence in government and democratic institutions.   Scholars have 
reported low levels of political trust in Central and Eastern Europe (Mishler & Rose 1994; 1997; 
1999; 2001a) and Latin America (Seligson 1983; Moreno 2001; Catterberg & Moreno 2006).  
To understand the decline of political trust in democracies, much research has worked on 
the bases of political trust and hoped to find the reasons for variations in the levels of political 
trust.  Search for the origins of political trust started in the US, as Americans seem to have lost 
more faith in their government than people in other countries (King 2000).  A number of factors 
have been offered to explain this exceptional slide within the US.  Researches found the minimal 
influence of the social-psychological factors on political trust (Stokes 1962; Cole 1973; Craig 
1996; Citrin & Muste 1999; Newton & Norris 2000).  Different social groups in the US, 
including the disadvantaged groups, display similar patterns of political trust (Hetherington 
2005).  Thus, many concluded that political trust is a political phenomenon and is better 
explained by political factors than by personal or social factors.  
As a result, researchers turned to the dynamics of the domestic politics in the US for an 
answer.  Studies have examined various possible sources in the US, such as the US government’s 
policy outcomes, major traumatic political events, and the changing criteria of American 
6 The erosion of trust has happened in different countries, such as Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, Canada, Finland, 
and Japan, etc. (e.g. Lipset & Schneider 1987; Listhaug 1995; Hayward 1995; Cuitice and Jowell 1997; Pharr 1997; 
Patterson 1999).  Levels of political trust in politicians are sliding in most advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 
1999; Norris 1999b; Patterson 1999; Putnam et al. 2000); and political trust in democratic institutions fell less 
dramatically, but has also registered a modest decline in 19 OECD countries (McAllister 1999; Dalton 1999).   
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people.7  The menu of explanations for the declining trust in the US seems complete, and they 
pointed out many intriguing contributors for the decline of political trust in the US.  However, 
these researches generally suffer from two problems.  First, a large proportion of the researches 
rely on the controversial ANES measurement.  Though researchers have extensively discussed 
the possible problems with the ANES measurement, many US studies continue to use the 
measurement due to the data availability.8  Improper measurement of this key concept seriously 
compromised the validity of the researches’ conclusions, as the measurement may capture the 
incumbent government rather than the overall system and institutions.  Second, many studies 
tend to focus predominantly on the country-specific political factors such as Watergate and 
presidential approval.  We need to go beyond the particular circumstances in the US, examine 
trust in countries with different political settings, and develop theories that can travel a wider 
range.  
Comparative and cross-country studies help to achieve this goal.  A number of 
comparative researches have studied political trust in different settings other than the US. 9  
These comparative case studies greatly enhanced our understanding of political trust.  On the one 
hand, through historical studies and individual level analysis, they highlighted and confirmed the 
roles of government performance and political culture in shaping political trust.  On the other 
7 The list of explanations include the US government’s economic performance and policy outcomes (Citrin & Green 
1986; King 1997; Lawrence 1997; Alesina & Wzcziarg 2000), the higher expectations and different criteria 
American people use to evaluate the government nowadays (Nye 1997; Hetherington 2005), the major traumatic 
political events such as the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal (Weatherford 1984; Neustadt 1997; King 2000; 
Parker 1995; Chanley et al. 2000; Bowler & Karp 2004), the size and scope of the federal government (Mansbridge 
1997; Pew Research Center 1998), the changing role of the media and TV effects (Miller, Goldenberg, and Erbring. 
1979; Patterson 1993; Cappella & Jamieson 1997), and the evaluations of the congress and the president 
(Hetherington 1998; Chanley et al. 2000).   
8 The ANES data set provides rich and valuable information to explore the issue of trust both horizontally and 
longitudinally. Many researches, especially those using more sophisticated analyses (e.g. longitudinal and multilevel 
studies), rely on ANES data (e.g. Hetherington 1998; 1999; 2005)  
9 These studies have extended the research scope to West European countries (e.g. Hart 1978; Bowler & Karp 2004; 
Holmberrg 1999; Fuchs 1999; Campbell 2004), Japan (e.g. Pharr 1997; 2000; Otake 2000); Central and Eastern 
Europe (Sztompka 1996; Rose 1994; Mishler & Rose 1997; 2001a; Finkel, Humphries, an Opp 2001), and Latin 
America (Seligson 1983; Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis 2000; Moreno 2001; Catterberg & Moreno 2006). 
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hand, scholars started to employ cross-country surveys such as World Values surveys to explore 
the fundamental sources of political trust (e.g. Norris 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000).  Many of 
these cross-country studies study political trust at the macro level.   
So far, these studies in established and emerging democratic countries have produced 
interesting research on political trust.  Most explanations that account for political trust fall into 
two contending schools: the political culture school and the political economy school.  
 
2.2.2 Theories of Political Culture: Social Capital and Cultural Values 
 
The political culture school believes that political trust originates in cultural norms and personal 
values that are deeply rooted in societies and exogenous to the political sphere.  This school 
argues that political and social values gradually transform and affect the public’s philosophy 
towards government through childhood socialization and adulthood social experiences (Putnam 
1993; Inglehart 1999b; Newton & Norris 2000).  Specifically, three cultural explanations are 
most prevalent in explaining political trust: social capital arguments, cultural values hypothesis, 
and Asian values thesis.   
 
2.2.2.1 Social Capital Model 
The idea of social capital has long been developed and studied in social sciences.  For its 
modern usage, Coleman (1988) emphasized the public goods aspect of social capital to 
distinguish it from physical capital and human capital.  Putnam (1995: 664-665) defined social 
capital as “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared interests”.  Social capital facilitates coordination and 
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improves the efficiency of society (Putnam 1993).  According to social capital theories, high 
level of social capital is crucial for satisfactory government performance and collective well-
being such as good economic development and less social problems (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 
1995; Brehm & Rahn 1997).  Social trust and social network are two key factors of social capital, 
and they both affect political trust and democracy.   
Social trust, or interpersonal trust, refers to people’s trust in their fellow citizens.  Social 
capital theories often treat trust as one piece, taking social trust and political trust as two sides of 
the same coin (Newton 1999).  Trust in political authorities and institutions is a “specific 
instance of trust in mankind” and a reflection of social trust (Lane 1959: 164; Moore, Lare, and 
Wagner 1985).  Political trust is a generalized interpersonal trust (Brehm & Rahn 1997).  
According to Almond and Verba (1963), if people do not trust their fellow citizens, they cannot 
possibly trust the elites and institutions that are endowed with considerable power to affect their 
lives.  Interpersonal trust “spills over” into cooperation in social networks and associations, and 
“spills up” to trust in political institutions and authorities (Putnam 1993; 1995; Mishler & Rose 
2001a).  People who trust each other’s good intention also tend not to perceive others’ as 
political cheaters, and expect the system to work “even if left untended” (Gamson 1968:54).  
Thus social trust towards the fellow citizens tends to create or promote people’s trust in 
institutions (Newton & Norris 2000).    
Social network and voluntary associations is another aspect of social capital.  By 
engaging in community or social associations and participating in voluntary activities, citizens 
develop and reinforce social trust and civic mindedness (Williams 1988).  These associations 
help build trust and cooperation, and confidence in other institutions (Newton & Norris 2000). 
Keele (2007) argues that citizens not engaged in civic activity have a weak sense of political 
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influence, which in turn fuels distrust in political leaders and institutions. Besides, involvement 
in associations and social networks mediates between individuals and the distant world of 
politics, thus it is an important prerequisite of their political support (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955).   
Brehm and Rahn (1997) hold the opposite opinion.  They (1997: 1004) argue that the experience 
in associations teaches people the virtues of “self-interest rightly understood” and “combating 
the centralizing tendencies of equality.”  So people who participate in associations are more 
likely to resist the temptations of centralization and have low trust in institutions.   
The empirical support for the effect of social capital on political trust has been mixed.  
Using time-series analysis, Keele (2007) found that social capital provides the best evidence for 
the long-term slide in trust.  Denters, Gabriel, and Torcal (2007) found that social trust, but not 
civic engagement, contributes to political trust.  Brehm and Rahn (1997) not only found the 
effects of social capital on trust in institutions (though civic engagement is negatively associated 
with political trust), but also found that the causality flows back from political trust to social trust 
and civic engagement.  However, others failed to confirm the impact of social capital on political 
trust.  Using Eurobarometer and World Values Surveys, Newton (1999: 185) concluded that 
“there is not a close or consistent association between social and political trust”.  Similarly, 
Newton and Norris (2000) observed that while social trust and political trust are highly 
correlated at the aggregate level, they are only weakly associated at the individual level.   
 
2.2.2.2 Value Change and Post-Modernization Argument 
Another important cultural explanation for political trust focuses on modernization and a 
corresponding change in values.  According to modernization theories, economic development 
and technological advances bring about changes in public values and belief systems and 
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gradually transforms the culture of many societies (Inglehart 1990).   The process of value 
transformation, in turn, changes citizens’ relationship with the state (Norris 1999c).   
First, modernization gives rise to the modern state and a shrift in people’s worldviews 
towards materialist rationality.  As a result, one basic cultural change is a shift from respect for 
“traditional-religious authority” toward deference to “rational-bureaucratic authority” (Inglehart 
1999b: 238).  Religious and communal values are gradually replaced by a more rational 
perspective and people increasingly look to the state rather than a Supreme Being for security.   
The second phase of development is post-modernization, which happens when economic 
development yields “diminishing margining gains in material and subjective well-being” 
(Fournier 1998: 391).  Together with changes in economic conditions, there is another shift in 
values, changing from survival values to well-being values (Inglehart 1997a; 1997b; 1999a; 
1999b).  Following industrialization, the high level of security brought by economic well-being 
and the modern state is conductive to a fundamental cultural transformation with economic and 
political feedback.  People are increasingly concerned with subjective well-being, and this, again, 
shapes their attitudes towards authority.  With regard to attitudes towards the government, post-
modernization involves a shift from materialist rationality to post-materialist values.  Whereas 
materialist rationality emphasizes a respect to the modern state, post-materialist values are 
characterized by an de-emphasis of authority, whether religious and traditional or state 
bureaucratic.  Instead, individualist autonomy and subjective well-being are valued and pursued.  
Norris’s (1999a) “critical citizens” thesis vividly captures the characters of this new phase of 
value change.  Critical citizens tend to reject authority, which reduces support and confidence for 
political institutions and incumbent authorities.  The emergence of critical citizens with post-
materialist values contributes to the decline of political trust in advanced industrial countries.   
26 
Inglehart (1999b) and Dalton (2000: 259) both report “a clear link between post-material 
values and a lack of confidence in political institutions” for most industrialized democracies.  
However, many of these studies use simple correlations.  In order to establish the proposed 
relationship, we need stronger evidence with more sophisticated methods and systematic analysis.  
Besides, empirical evidence for post-modernization or “critical citizens” theory has been limited 
to World Values Surveys data at the aggregate level.  As Inglehart (1999b) argues, culture is 
deep-rooted, and value change is a gradual and slow process.  The focus in value change and 
socialization process also indicates that the political culture theories are most useful when 
explaining very long-term longitudinal or cross-national differences in political trust (Norris 
1999c).  To account for relatively short-term change, we may need to find other sources of 
explanation.  Moreover, more empirical evidence is needed at the individual level to explain 
individual level variations of political trust.  
 
2.2.2.3 the Asian Values Thesis 
The Confucian societies in East Asia have traditionally developed a system of belief and 
culture that emphasizes harmony and respect for authority.  Almond and Verba (1963) argue that 
values and norms play an independent role in the formation of political trust.  People may react 
to the same stimuli differently because of the different values they assign to events (Inglehart, 
1999; Shi, 2001).  This is likely to be the case in Asia, where traditional ideas still have a deep 
impact.   
Shi (2001, 2008) argues that the emphasis on deference to authority and hierarchy 
promotes people’s trust level as a whole.  At the aggregate level, these values and norms 
distinguish East Asia from other societies, influencing the level of political trust as a whole.  At 
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the individual level, people vary greatly in their personal values and orientations.  Different 
people identify with Confucianism to a different extent, contributing to the variation of trust in 
institutions between individuals. 
However, previous studies on Asian values have disagreed on the effect of the traditional 
hierarchical oriented Asian values on trust.  Using 1993 survey data from China and Taiwan, Shi 
(2001) concludes that compared with government performance, traditional political culture plays 
a more important role in shaping political trust in Taiwan, yet traditional values play an even 
stronger role in mainland China.  However, Wang and Tan (2006) failed to find any independent 
effect of Asian values on support for democratic ideals in six East Asian societies.   
 
2.2.3 Political Economy of Political Trust: Institutional Performance Approach 
 
Another predominant approach to study political trust is institutional performance explanations.  
In contrast to theories of cultural values, this strand of argument treats political trust as rationally 
based.  According to this approach, political trust mostly arises from satisfactory public 
evaluations of government performance (Hetherington 1998; McAllister 1999; Miller & Listhaug 
1999; Mishler & Rose 2001a; Campbell 2004).  This rationalist perspective traces back to 
Downs’s (1957) rational choice logic where voters assess the expected utility of voting 
(Campbell 2004).  Similarly, political trust can be viewed as the expected utility of the 
satisfactory government performance (Mishler & Rose 2001a; Hetherington 1998).  Thus, 
rational citizens believe in governments that are trustworthy, whereas governments seen as 
untrustworthy generate mistrust.  Following this argument, a key question for the institutional 
performance approach is which aspect of performance matters for political trust.  
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Most studies have focused on the economic performance of governments (Clarke, Dutt, 
and Kornberg 1993; Lawrence 1997; McAlister 1999; Alesina & Wacziarg 2000; Campbell 
2004).  Scholars of political economy have long examined the role of economic performance on 
political behavior and attitudes. For instance, studies on electoral outcomes have established the 
important role of economic management (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988).  Studies of economic 
voting have found that governing parties are more likely to win elections when national 
economic conditions are good (Clarke Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Cusack 1999).  Following the 
same logic, if government can successfully generate economic growth, control inflation and 
reduce unemployment rates, the public will recognize its satisfactory performance and respond 
with political trust and confidence.   
While economic performance has been the most widely studied facet of system 
performance in explaining political trust and legitimacy, researches often reach different or 
contradicting conclusions.  Some have found that economic performance is among the most 
important predictors for political trust (Lipset and Schneider 1983; Holmberg 1999; Listhaug & 
Wiberg 1995; McAllister 1999), whereas others reported minimal direct linkage between the two 
(Lawrence 1997).  If we only look at economic performance as measured by objective indicators 
like economic growth, the performance theory does not have sufficient explanatory power.  For 
instance, Japan’s rapid economic growth after WWII did not generate much political trust among 
citizens (Pharr 1997).  Similarly, the decline in political trust in the US actually happened before 
the slowdown of productivity growth and increasing inequality (Lawrence 1997).   
A key distinction to enlighten the scholarly disagreement regarding the role of economic 
performance is between subjective versus objective performance.  The effect of objective 
performance on trust is mediated by the public’s value-laden perceptions, which are generally 
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believed more important than actual government performance (Mishler & Rose 2001a).  When 
the public perceives satisfactory economic performance compared with expectations, they credit 
the government and political system and react with trust; when they perceive that the economic 
outcome does not meet their expectations, they hold government and political institutions 
responsible and register low trust.  Take the US for instance, the government’s wartime success 
led to over-expectations by the public, which resulted in changing levels of trust in the 
government (Nye 1997).  This emphasis on the side of the public’s expectation partly explains 
why political trust keeps falling in some advanced industrial countries even when real economic 
output remains good (Miller & Listhaug 1999; Hetherington 2005).  
The objective versus subjective distinction is consistent with two approaches of the 
political economy theories: the macro level and the micro levels (Mishler & Rose 2001a).  
Aggregate level analysis usually involves objective performance measures, such as the country’s 
economic growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate.  Cross-country studies have shown 
that objective performance is correlated with levels of confidence in government (Miller & 
Listhaug 1999; Newton 2006).  At the individual level, people’s perception of government 
economic performance influences their attitudes towards government.  These subjective 
measures of economic performance matter the most for individual citizens’ confidence in 
institutions and government (Mishler & Rose 2001a).  
Economic performance is increasingly recognized as a strong predictor of political trust.  
However, the political economy approach only captures the economic spheres of institutional 
performance, while different institutions have different responsibilities and people evaluate 
governments in multiple areas.  For instance, political performance is another important 
dimension of institutional performance, and it should also be included.   
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In this section, we reviewed two major competing theoretical approaches to political trust: 
theories of political culture and theories of political economy.  While both approaches offered 
important insights in our understanding of political trust, they do not adequately explain political 
trust.  To better understand political trust, we need to look beyond cultural and economic spheres 
and shift our focus to the real political origins of political trust.  In the next section, I will try to 
bring politics back into the equation and explore the political sources of trust.   
 
 
2.3 THIS DISSERTATION:  
THE OVERLOOKED POLITICAL STORY OF POLITICAL TRUST 
 
While it is logical to explain political trust in terms of political culture and political economy, the 
explanations leave open the specification of real political influences.  In this section, I will focus 
on this less studied aspect, and explore the political origins of political trust.  Specifically, I will 
discuss two political factors: political performance and institutional design.   
Institutional quality is important to understand political trust.  Generally speaking, 
institutions create trust in two ways:  first, they can inspire compliance with their “moral 
plausibility” and normative justification of rules; second, they can reduce the perceived risks for 
the truster by their formal protective and punishing apparatus (Offe 1999: 70).  In accordance 
with these two mechanisms, I will focus on two institutional and political factors that contribute 
to political trust: the institutional political performance and the institutional designs.   
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2.3.1 Political Performance of the Institutions and Authorities 
 
 
The public evaluations of political performance shape levels of political trust.  Political trust is a 
relational concept where citizens are trusters and political institutions are trustees.  Trust depends 
on both the truster and the trustee.  Citizens’ trust in political institutions arises from the 
relationship between citizens and political institutions, and it is a product of citizens’ belief in the 
trustworthiness of institutions.  Citizens trust political institutions when they believe that 
institutions are committed to and capable of fulfilling trust.  Political performance reflects 
commitment and capability of the institutions.  
Political performance matters for political trust not only in established democracies but 
also in new democracies and non-democratic countries where governments are not as 
accountable to the people.  To study the effects of political performance, we will return to the 
theoretical discussion of attributes of trustworthiness.  Following the cognitive and rational line, 
the attributes of trustworthiness assure the truster that the trustee will not betray a trust.  Scholars 
have identified different attributes of trustworthiness, such as integrity, competence, 
responsiveness, character, equity, fairness, honesty, intrinsic care, accountability, reliability, etc. 
(Abramson 1972; Weatherford 1984; Tyler 1990; Citrin & Muste 1999; Denters 2002; Li 2008; 
2010; Van der Meer 2010).  These attributes generally fall into two categories capacity and 
commitment.  Whereas capacity refers to trustee’s capability to gain trust, commitment 
emphasizes the trustees’ moral values to care about the trusters and keep their promises.   
Trustworthiness of political actors falls along two dimensions: capacity and commitment.  
On the one hand, political agents have the capacity to act on citizens’ interests and respond to 
their demands, thus making them trustworthy.  However, forces like internationalization and 
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interdependence decrease the citizens’ appraisal of government performance and undermine the 
ability and effectiveness of government (Scharpf 2000).  On the other hand, political 
commitment refers to political agents’ willingness and moral obligations to act in the interests of 
citizens.  A committed and competent institution equals a trustworthy institution that creates a 
higher level of political trust.  In this dissertation, I will study the effects of political performance 
following these two dimensions.  
 
2.3.1.1 Capacity 
On the capacity dimension, trustworthy governments and institutions should be able to 
deliver services as they promised and solve problems as people expected.  People would trust 
institutions and governments if they believe that institutions are competent to perform 
satisfactorily.  Capacity includes both economic and political competence.  Whereas economic 
competence has been discussed extensively, political competence deserves further emphasis as a 
basis of political trust.  One of the most important indicators for political competence or 
incompetence is the extent of political corruption.   
Corruption impairs institutions’ ability to fulfill citizens’ trust, thus reducing the levels of 
political trust.  Early functionalist research in political science has argued for the positive 
greasing effect of corruption, as corruption binds society together, promotes harmony, and 
redistributes public resources (Huntington 1968; Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine 1989; 
Goldsmith 1999).  However, corruption is now generally regarded as an economic and political 
evil (Seligson 2002; della Porta 2000; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Van der Meer 2010).  
Corruption also has detrimental effects on political trust because it violates the democratic 
principles of equality, openness, and democratic accountability.  As corruption distorts public 
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demand and elevates the costs, it results in malfunctioning of public administration and 
compromises institutional autonomy and credibility.  Meanwhile, corruption implies the 
government incompetence to deal with the problem and improve the government efficiency and 
accountability.  As a result, corrupted leaders and institutions produce distrust in citizens.   
Empirical works have partly confirmed the pernicious effects of corruption on political 
attitudes towards government and system.  For instance, Pharr (2000) has demonstrated that 
media reports of official’s misconduct in office can be a better predictor of political trust than 
economic policy performance in Japan.  Bowler & Karp (2004) have shown how political 
scandals like Watergate greatly eroded trust in government in the US and the UK.  Seligson 
(2002) reported that political corruption undermines democratic legitimacy in four Latin 
American countries.  Morris and Klesner (2010) also found that corruption leads to institutional 
distrust in Mexico.   
However, these studies have been limited to a small number of countries and limited 
geopolitical settings.  One problem with these studies is incomplete model specification.  Many 
studies failed to include important alternative explanations and suffer from potential omitted-
variable bias.  Indeed, as Anderson and Tverdova (2003: 93) observed, once alternative 
explanations were included in these studies, the effect of corruption may be “substantially 
attenuated or reduced to insignificance”.  To overcome these problems and study the real effects 
of corruption on political attitudes towards government, we need to control for other theoretically 
important sources of political trust, and test the effects of corruption against a wider range of 
countries.  
So far, the only good exception in the literature is Anderson and Tverdova (2003), who 
examined the detrimental effects of corruption in 16 established and new democratic countries.  
34 
However, their study has been limited to democratic settings.  Besides, the primary purpose of 
their study was to estimate the effect of corruption on the public evaluations of democratic 
performance and civil servants rather than on public trust in political institutions.  Nevertheless, 
if corruption negatively affects democratic support as Anderson and Tverdova (2003) reported, 
we should also systematically test its effects on political trust in institutions.  As argued earlier, 
corruption should also decrease the level of trust in political institutions.  Building on the 
previous research, I hope to study the effects of corruption on political trust while controlling for 
the established alternative explanations.  I will test its effects in both democratic and non-
democratic countries in this dissertation.  
 
2.3.1.2 Commitment 
On the commitment dimension, trusters believe that trustees will act in the interests of 
trusters.  This commitment may come in two ways: First, the trustee shares the same values or 
goals with the truster.  Second, the truster can punish the trustee by denying future trust (Offe 
1999).  For trustees, good quality and moral values imply the commitment from the truster.  With 
regard to political trust, fairness and responsiveness are two important qualities of the 
commitment of institutions.   
Fairness or social justice is an important criterion that people use to evaluate government 
benefits and outcomes (Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw 1985; Jennings 1991).  Trustworthy 
institutions ensure social justice not only in outcomes but also in procedures.  Outcome fairness 
and distributive justice influences political trust.  People evaluate government on its absolute 
output as well as on fairness of outcomes, both of which contribute to confidence in government 
(Katz, Gutek, Kahn, and Barton 1975).  Procedural fairness can be even more important to 
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political trust (Tyler et al. 1985).  Fair institutional procedures make sure that citizens involved 
are given equal access and opportunities, thus procedural fairness is considered a very important 
indicator for political performance. 
People assess fairness and justice not only on individual bases but on group or society 
bases.  For example, people may feel that an individual is unjustly treated by institutions, or a 
social group is unjustly deprived of government benefits.  Group-related criteria may be more 
important (Miller & Listhaug 1999).  However, as it is almost impossible to satisfy all groups in 
society, people understand that fairness also means that a society as a whole can benefit.   
Responsiveness is another important indicator of political performance.  Prompt 
government responsiveness to the equally weighted preferences of its citizens characterizes a 
democracy (Dahl 1971).  The responsiveness of government and institutions shows commitment 
to people, and it affects people’s confidence in the trustworthiness of institutions. 
Unfortunately, empirical evidence for the impact of political commitment on trust has 
been insufficient (Miller & Listhaug 1999).  The above mentioned studies have pointed out the 
important theoretical implications of fairness and responsiveness, but empirically, they have 
certain limitations.  The empirical examination has been limited to certain groups of people such 
as college students (e.g. Tyler et al. 1985), certain regions within the US (e.g. Tyler et al. 1985; 
Miller & Listhaug 1999), or a single country (e.g. Katz et al. 1975).  Further studies with 
“comparative data across time and across countries” are necessary to empirically test and 
establish the effect of political commitment on political trust (Miller & Listhaug 1999: 215)  
Political performance is usually measured subjectively.  While actual political 
performance influences the level of political trust, public perception mediates this effect 
(Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Hetherington & Rudolph 2008).  Unlike economic 
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performance, political performance is more difficult to measure and operationalize.  As a result, 
the public perception matters more than the objective political performance in shaping 
confidence in political institutions (Yang & Holzer 2006).  Perceived political performance and 
actual political performance are two measures of political performance and their effects on 
political trust are different.  Most researchers have studied the effect of perceived rather than 
actual political performance.  
As it is more difficult for the public to directly evaluate the political performance of the 
system, the media plays an important role in the priming process of public evaluation of political 
performance (Hetherington 2005).  Scholars have found that the media, especially television, has 
helped to shape political trust through public evaluations of political performance (Pharr 2000; 
Norris 2000).  Also, bureaucratic encounters, the personal experience with the government 
leaders or institutions, greatly shape individual evaluations of the system.  For instance, Latin 
American citizens who personally experienced corruption have less faith in regime legitimacy 
(Seligson 2002).   
In short, competence and commitment are two important aspects of political 
trustworthiness.  Citizens’ evaluations on these two aspects of political performance affect how 
much citizens trust political institutions.  They represent the first political source of political trust.  
The second political source of political trust is institutional settings, as I will discuss below. 
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2.3.2 Political Context: Institutional Designs and Political Trust  
 
Political context matters for political attitude and behavior.  People make political 
decisions and take political actions as individuals embedded in political context.  As new 
institutionalism school argues, structural factors and political context shape individual choices 
and behaviors.  Institutional designs approach focuses on the macro-political characters and 
structures and examines how these different arrangements affect political trust.  
Studies on institutional designs present a new approach to study political trust.  
Institutional features shape the structure of public attitudes and behaviors in coherent and 
predictable ways.  Through their influence on both the truster and the trustee, different 
institutional characteristics promote or depress the level of political trust in institutions.  In this 
section, I will first discuss what democratic political contexts affect political support and how, 
and then go beyond the democratic settings and study the effects of regime types on political 
trust. 
 
2.3.2.1 Review: Democratic Institutional Characteristics and Political Attitudes  
Institutional perspective has largely been neglected from the comparative studies of mass 
politics.  Discussions on political trust have been no exception.  Many studies have focused on 
the individual level variation in political trust in single or a small number of countries.  As 
Anderson (2009: 317) observed, many “studies were considered ‘comparative’ mostly because 
they were conducted outside of the United States or in a set of (relatively similar) countries, not 
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because there were strong theoretical reasons to believe that the individual-level relationships 
differed across countries.”  These case studies are important to deepen our understanding of the 
issue, yet the structural effects of macropolitics and the political context within which citizens 
are nested are often constant or hidden in these single country studies.  Availability of cross-
country survey data has shifted some attention to aggregate-level characteristics and their impact 
on aggregate political attitude and behavior.  However, cross-country research on political trust 
has mainly considered economic and cultural influences.  Although new institutionalism school 
has called for a better understanding of political attitudes within their structural context, few 
studies have systematically examined the role of institutional designs on political attitude 
towards the government and institutions.    
Studies on institutional effects on political attitudes and behavior have been limited.  
Only a few noticeable exceptions have studied whether and how certain institutional characters 
can affect the trustworthiness of institutions.  Miller and Listhaug (1990) were among the first to 
recognize the importance of the institutional focus of political support.  Comparing political trust 
in Norway, Sweden, and the US between 1964 and 1986, Miller and Listhaug discussed how the 
different features of party systems may influence the confidence in government.  Anderson and 
Guillory’s research (1997) represents another major breakthrough in the institutional effects on 
political support.  They examined how consensus and majoritarian systems may affect 
democratic satisfaction in eleven European democracies.  Norris (1999c) extended the research 
design to include 25 democracies from around the world.  Studying the direct effects of 
institutional features on political trust, her work has been the most comprehensive discussion on 
institutional effects on political support so far.   
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These studies showed that different institutional arrangements exert different influences 
on political support for democratic performance and institutions.  The researches are illuminating 
for trust studies.  They started to link the individual-level political attitudes and national-level 
political contexts, and brought the institutional settings that have been long ignored into analysis 
of political attitudes.  As Miller and Listhaug (1990: 384) put it,  
“Of primary importance to this concern is knowledge about how change in political 
attitudes at the mass level affects the structure of political institutions - or how institutional 
factors influence the development of political attitudes which subsequently have consequences 
for the system. This relationship has compelling implications for the stability of the political 
regime but it is also indicative of how adaptive the system is to social change. The ability of a 
polity to survive considerable conflict is crucial. But in a democracy it is equally important to 
determine the conditions under which institutional stability comes to be seen as rigidity and 
unresponsiveness.” 
 
However, there are some major problems with the existing discussions on institutional 
effects.  First, given the very limited number of research on the issue, there has been no clear 
evidence on the proposed relationships between institutional characters and political support. 
Scholars have reached inconsistent conclusions on the directions or even existence of several 
institutional effects, and further research is required to clarify on the nature of the relationships.  
Second, the research designs of existing institutional studies were targeted at democratic systems 
only, which left out one important institutional feature from the current discussion: the non-
democratic systems.  As Norris (1999c: 232) admitted, the relationships and effects might be 
“proven even more significant in a wider range of political systems, if we compared democratic 
and authoritarian regimes, and this is worth exploring further in future research”.  This has not 
been done yet.  Nonetheless, these studies stand a good starting point for further exploration into 
the relationship between institutional designs and political trust.   
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2.3.2.2 The Missing Piece of the puzzle: Regime Types and Political Trust  
In this dissertation, I hope to respond to Norris’s proposal, and compare and study 
political trust in different types of regimes.  Studies of political trust in non-democratic countries 
have been very limited in the current discussions, and it remains a question how authoritarian 
arrangements affect political trust.  Most comparative studies include only democratic regimes 
when analyzing the sources of political trust, and non-democratic cases are often treated as 
anomalous.  However, findings from non-democratic countries testify, supplement, and enrich 
the existing theories of political trust.  Thus non-democratic countries should be treated as a 
missing piece of the puzzle rather than outliers or anomalies.  
Democratic experience and regime types make a difference for trust in political 
institutions through their influence on both institutions’ performance and citizens’ perception of 
institutions.  If we return to the relational nature of political trust, we can study how regime types 
affect both trusters and trustees.  
Political context structures and shapes citizens’ attitudes and behaviors.  Institutional 
characteristics can affect political trust through both trustees and trusters.  As political trust is 
relational, it is shaped by both the trustworthiness of institutions and citizens’ belief.  First, 
institutional designs can affect the trustworthiness of the trustee.  Institutions come with a set of 
rules.  Through institutional rules such as protective and punishment mechanism and precedent 
following, institutions help guarantee the trustworthiness of political institutions.  Different 
institutional characteristics have different impacts on citizens’ perception of trustworthiness of 
institutions.  Some institutional designs ensure more efficient and responsive functioning of 
institutions and promote political trustworthiness. With these institutional designs, people tend to 
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have higher level of political trust.  Other institutional settings may decrease the level of political 
trust as they lack effective assurance mechanism for fulfillment of trust.   
Second, institutional arrangements can also shape trusters’ perception of trustees’ 
trustworthiness.  For instance, certain institutional characters provide citizens with rosier picture 
of institutions and promote citizens’ perception of institutional trustworthiness.  As a result, 
citizens show higher level of public confidence in institutions with these institutional designs.  In 
contrast, citizens in some institutional designs are exposed to more diverse or even negative 
information of trustworthiness of institutions, and they tend to trust political institutions less.   
We can understand the effects of regime types from the above two aspects.  From the 
trustee’s side, democratic principles such as democratic accountability and democratic 
representation provide institutions and authorities with incentives to attract more support from 
voters.  Thus, democratic systems tend to foster citizens’ trust and confidence in political 
institutions.  In non-democratic regimes, however, decision-making process is less representative 
and institutions less accountable, providing less ground for their citizens to trust them.  Besides, 
the repressive nature of authoritarian regimes makes it harder for people to trust the government.  
As Hardin (1998: 21) commented, “…trust must be harder in China now than it was shortly 
before the June 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square”.  Similarly, established democracies 
should invite higher level of political trust than new and consolidating democracies.  In general, 
we should expect that citizens present higher level of political trust in democratic regimes than in 
non-democratic regimes.   
However, we may have different expectations when we consider the trusters’ side.  Non-
democratic regimes tend to mobilize regime support and public confidence through mechanisms 
like media control and political education (Geddes & Zaller 1989; Kennedy 2009; Yang & Tang 
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2010).  These mechanisms in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes boost citizens’ evaluations and 
confidence in trustworthiness of political institutions.  In contrast, citizens in democratic regimes 
are usually less exposed to such mechanisms.  As a result, we may expect lower level of political 
trust from citizens in democratic regimes than in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.  We will 
examine these two opposite hypotheses in the following chapters of this dissertation.   
We should note that institutional features work at both macro and micro levels.  At the 
macro levels, the duration and levels of democracies are associated with different levels of 
political trust.  Democratic societies may present different patterns of political trust than the non-
democratic societies.  At the individual level, citizens are exposed to different levels of 
mobilization and control mechanism, and they have different levels of political trust in 
institutions.   
East Asia is an ideal location to study the effect of regime types on political trust.  At the 
aggregate level, East Asia includes societies with different levels of democracy: the established 
democracies, consolidating democracies, semi-authoritarian societies, and authoritarian countries. 
The great variation in institutional settings and levels of political trust provides a good 
opportunity to examine and compare the different institutional effects on political trust.  At the 
micro level, we can study how authoritarian arrangements such as political education and media 
control affect citizens’ trust in political institutions in case studies.  To compare and study 
political trust in different types of regimes, I will study political trust in authoritarian systems 
through both cross-country analysis and in-depth case study.  First, I will include authoritarian 
countries in my cross-country analysis of political trust.  Second, as this dissertation focuses on 
political trust in East Asia, I am most interested in the case of China.  As the world’s largest 
authoritarian regime today, China presents a good case study to explore the relationship between 
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political trust and authoritarian arrangements.  I will examine which and how authoritarian 
settings affect Chinese people’s political trust and support.   
The level of trust in institutions is perplexingly high in China (Chen 2004).  Studies on 
political support in China have basically followed the cultural theories or economic performance 
theories (Shi 2001; Wang 2005b; Yang & Tang 2010).  The traditional Confucian culture and 
satisfactory economic performance have been identified as the major contributors to high level of 
political trust in china.  The political bases of trust in institutions in China have not been 
explored in the literature.  In this dissertation, I will study whether and how political 
performance and institutional features affect Chinese people’s levels of political trust.  I am not 
denying the roles of political culture and economic performance in trust, but I argue that political 
corruption and authoritarian arrangements should also contribute to the high level of political 
trust in China.  The case study of authoritarian China tests and complements the existing theories, 
and contributes to the current discussions of political trust.  Sorting out the common and 
distinctive features of political trust in China and their sources and consequences should 
illuminate the larger inquiry of sources of political trust.   
After laying out the theoretical framework of this research, I will explain the data sources 
and analytical methods for empirical testing in the next chapter.  I will also present my research 
plan and outline the following chapters.  
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3.0 ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
 
 
3.1 ARGUMENT IN BRIEF AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
This dissertation studies the sources of political trust in East Asia.  I reviewed the two major 
competing explanations for political trust in the existing literature, and discussed their 
contributions and limitations.  The primary purpose of this dissertation is to go beyond these two 
theories and bring politics back as origins of political trust.  I will study the political bases of 
political trust in East Asia, and I am most interested in the effects of political performance and 
institutional features on political trust.  I argue that political trust lies in the perceived 
institutional trustworthiness that is determined by political performance of institutions and 
shaped by institutional settings.   
Specifically, if the theories about the sources of politi\cal trust that I discussed earlier are 
right, I expect to find the following relationships:   
 
3.1.1 Political Performance and Political Trust 
 
First, unsatisfactory political performance such as corruption and unfairness reduces political 
trust.  Political institutions that are more capable and more committed to act in citizens’ interests 
and respond to their demands will gain more public trust.  Corruption reflects both institutional 
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capacity and commitment.  It distorts public demands, increases political and economic costs, 
and compromises political accountability, resulting in lost political trust.  Fairness reflects 
institutional commitment. It ensures social justice in both institutional outcomes and procedures, 
making institutions trustworthy.  Corruption and fairness are two most important indicators of 
political performance, and they should significantly affect political trust.   
For cross-national analyses, I expect that  
H1a. Levels of political trust are lower in countries where institutions are more corrupt 
and less fair; and on average, countries with fairer and less corrupt institutions will demonstrate 
higher levels of political trust at the national level.   
At the individual level, I expect that  
H1b. People who perceive institutions in their countries more corrupt and unfair will be 
less likely to trust and support institutions; and those who perceive institutions less corrupt and 
unfair will trust institutions more.   
At the aggregate level, corruption will be measured by Corruption Perception Index from 
Transparency International, an international civil society organization against corruption.  It 
measures the perceived levels of corruption in public sector in nearly 200 countries around the 
world.  At the individual level, we use citizens’ perceived corruption as a measure.  The question 
from the East Asian Barometer surveys that measures perceived corruption is “How widespread 
do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your national government? Would you say hardly 
anyone is involved (1), not a lot of officials are corrupt (2), most officials are corrupt (3), or 
almost everyone is corrupt (4)?”   
To measure perceived fairness, we use this question from the East Asian Barometer 
surveys: “We would like you now to compare the present system of government with the one our 
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country had earlier. In the following areas, would you say that today things are much better than 
before (1), somewhat better (2), much the same (3), somewhat worse (4), or much worse (5)?” 
The item under consideration is “everyone is treated equally by the government”.     
 
3.1.2 Institutional Designs and Political Trust 
 
H2.1. Level of Democratization and Political Trust 
Second, institutions matter.  Institutional designs exert an independent effect on political trust, 
and different institutional settings have different effects on political trust.  Different structural 
arrangements have different advantages and political behavior characteristics, and their 
performance shapes public satisfaction and support for political systems and government.  The 
“new institutionalism” school suggests that we should turn to institutions and understand public 
attitudes within their structural context.  On the one hand, we need to examine how institutional 
features affect people’s political attitudes at the individual level.  On the other hand, to examine 
the institutional effects, we should also employ the cross-national level analysis where variance 
of institutional arrangements is maximized.     
Level of democratization is an important institutional feature.  In this dissertation, I am 
most concerned about the effects of democratic experience and regime types on political trust.  I 
expect that the regime types and democratic experience affect the average levels of trust in 
institutions.10   
At the macro level, I expect that  
10 First, democratic and non-democratic regimes may present different levels of political trust.  Second, within 
democracies, democratic history also matters, as the quality and duration of democracy may affect the level of 
political trust.  Besides, new democracies with communist past may behave differently than those without. This will 
be discussed further in the next section.  
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H2.1a. Non-democratic regimes may demonstrate higher levels of political trust because 
their governments often use media control and political education to mobilize regime support 
and public political confidence.  
At the individual level, I expect that  
H2.1b. Individuals exposed to different levels of authoritarian control demonstrate 
different levels of political trust.  Media control and political education are both examples of 
authoritarian mechanisms that affect individual’s political trust. 
Using comparative survey data, I will test these hypotheses of regime types and 
democratic experience in the following chapters.  Specifically, I use Freedom in the World Index 
from the Freedom House to measure levels of democratization in different societies.  The index 
is the mean score of political rights and civil liberties.  Political rights are measured by questions 
such as open election, right to organize competing parties, and minorities’ participation in 
decision-making process.  Civil liberties are measured by questions such as free media, freedom 
of religion, and protection from political terror.  
Two variables of passive politicization are used as individual level variables of 
authoritarian arrangements in our case study. The first one is media exposure. Respondents are 
asked about the frequency of using conventional media channels, including newspaper, 
television and radio.  The other relevant variable is political interest, measured by the 
respondent’s self-evaluation of their concern for government affairs, since it subjects people to 
more political propaganda in authoritarian societies.  
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H2.2. Democratic Institutional Designs and Political Trust 
Within the democratic regimes, different institutional features may have different effects on trust 
in institutions.  Political trust studies using institutional approach have been very limited and 
inconclusive.  Studying institutional effects in different countries, scholars have reached different 
or even conflicting conclusions.  In this research, I hope to respond to this discrepancy, and 
examine the institutional effects on political trust at different levels.   
As the institutional arrangements usually change slowly, the best setting to examine the 
institutional effects on political trust is comparative researches that maximize the number of 
countries included and institutional variations.  Thus, the global level analysis is the most 
important part to capture institutional effects on political support.   
Specifically, with the global level analysis, I will use the World Values Surveys to study 
five democratic institutional arrangements that have been hypothesized to exert some effects on 
the level of political trust: party systems, democratic duration, electoral systems, executive-
legislative dynamics, and party allegiance.   
H2.2a. Two-party and moderate multi-party systems are expected to have higher levels of 
political trust than fragmented party systems.   
Political parties are “the most important mediating institutions between citizens and the 
state” (Anderson 1998: 572).  The different party systems influence the level of political trust.  
Norris (1999c) argued that predominantly one-party governments and fragmented party systems 
are both less likely to have high level of political trust since neither allows effective channeling 
and translation of the public opinion into government policy.11   The Democracy Cross-National 
11 Alternatively, Miller and Listhaug (1990) found that the number of political parties corresponds to higher level of 
system support because the fragmentation of party systems reflects the meaningful issue representation which 
contributes to political support.   
49 
                                               
Dataset compiled by Norris in 2009 provides complete information on types of party system 
classified from effective number of parliamentary parties for countries across the world.  
H2.2b. The levels of political trust should be higher among countries with higher levels of 
democracy.   
The duration of democratic experience affects political trust.  Torcal (2006: 157) argued 
that unlike established democracies, new democracies do not have a “recent and prolonged” 
democratic experience that could serve as reference when evaluating democratic performance.  
Citizens in older democracies, on the other hand, tend to use the democratic ideal as reference 
point and “evaluate the present with a future perspective”.  Thus, democratic institutions usually 
present higher levels of confidence in older democracies.  I will use the average Freedom House 
rating for each democratic country since 1972.  Freedom House monitors countries across the 
world on an annual basis and rate the countries’ levels of democracy each year.  The average 
Freedom House rating since 1972 captures both quality and tradition of democracy.  
H2.2c. On average, democracies with proportional representation systems tend to 
demonstrate higher levels of political trust.   
Democracies with proportional representation systems optimize democratic 
representation function (and arguably accountability function as well), promoting political trust 
(Aarts & Thomassen 2008).  Proportional representation systems are associated with more 
flexible party system and more electoral volatility that are correlated with higher level of 
political trust (Miller & Listhaug 1990).  The most important factor of electoral formula is the 
way votes are counted to allocate seats, and accordingly, we can identify different formulas of 
electoral systems: majoritarian, proportional, and mixed systems.  For a classification of electoral 
systems, I will refer to the Electoral System Design Database published by International Institute 
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for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA 2004).  The database divides the 
electoral systems into different categories: proportional representation, plurality/majority, and 
mixed.  
H2.2d. Parliamentary systems tend to have higher levels of political support than 
presidential systems on average.   
Different executive-legislative relationships shape political trust.  Linz (1990a, 1990b, 
1994) argued that compared with parliamentary systems, some presidential systems are more 
likely to suffer from structural problems such as executive–legislative deadlock, 
disproportionality, and temporal rigidity.  In contrast, several advantages of parliamentary 
systems help attract more political trust: a united executive and legislature that enables efficient 
decision-making, collegial executives with fused powers that encourage diversity, and a more 
flexible institutional context for democratic consolidation.  Moreover, parliamentary 
governments are more likely to use proportional representation (rather than single member 
district method) which is associated with more equality and better minority representation 
(Anderson & Guillory 1997; Lijphart 1999), and people are expected to show more support for 
democracy in proportional representation.  Thus we should expect higher level of political trust 
in parliamentary systems.  I will refer to the Democracy Cross-National Dataset for a 
classification of the executive types.  
H2.2e. Party allegiance affects the level of political trust.  Specifically, winners in 
electoral contests tend to have higher levels of political trust than losers.  
In democratic societies, popular influence in government is mainly achieved through 
elections.  Winning and losing electoral outcomes matter for political institutions because “the 
stability and continued functioning of political system depends on actors’ incentives for 
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institutional change” (Anderson & Tverdova 2001: 323).  On the one hand, losers, i.e. voters 
whose preferred parties are not in the ruling circle, are more likely to challenge the maintenance 
of the current political systems.  Winners, i.e. voters who identify with and endorsed the party 
that form (part of) the government, on the other hand, face a more friendly political system and 
have more incentives to avoid these changes and maintain the status quo.  We expect that 
winners and losers of electoral contests may have different expectations and values towards 
government.  As “home team hypothesis” or “winners effect” suggested, winners have more 
confidence in the existing government and institutions than losers (Holmberg 1999; Anderson & 
Guillory 1997).  To examine the effect of party allegiance on political trust, I will check the 
winning parties in each country at the time of the survey and compare that with respondents’ 
reply to the question “in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or 
presidential] held in [year], which parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race) 
did you vote for?”.12   
There are also some cross level interactions between party allegiance and other 
institutional settings.  In other words, the effects of party allegiance would be context dependent.  
Country level institutional designs help explain why the effects of party allegiance on trust 
differs cross countries.  Specifically, we can develop the following hypothesis to capture these 
cross-level interaction effects.  
H2.2f_1.  The trust gap between winners and losers is larger in countries with two party 
or moderate multi-party systems than in fragmented party systems.  Winners would be more 
trusting of political institutions in countries with two party or moderate multi-party systems.    
12 A similar question was asked in the World Values Surveys – “If there were a national election tomorrow, for 
which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If you are uncertain, which party 
appeals to you most?” 
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H2.2f_2.  Levels of democracy increase the trust gap between winners and losers.  In 
more mature democracies, winners would be more trusting of political institutions than in 
winners in less democratic countries.   
 
After examining these hypotheses at the global level, I will study the features of 
democratic institutional arrangements in East Asian context.  This part of analysis will focus on 
institutional effects that have been proven significant from the global analysis, and go into the 
details of East Asian politics.  As some institutional features identified above are relatively stable 
across East Asian democracies, while some other East Asia specific institutional arrangements 
deserve more discussion in the context of political support, we need to modify some of our 
original hypotheses.  
A major difference from the original hypotheses is electoral systems.  The electoral 
systems in almost all East Asia democracies are mixed-member electoral system.  Besides, as 
Reilly (2007: 192) observed, unlike the international norm of mixed systems that feature an 
equal split between the district and list components, “all the East Asian mixed systems … are 
highly majoritarian in practice”.  Instead of the difference between majoritarian versus 
proportional electoral systems, the major institutional variation in electoral systems across East 
Asia democracies is personalistic voting.  Democratic elections are more candidate-centered and 
personalistic in East Asia.  Candidate centered voting may have some mediating effects on the 
role political and economic performance played on political support, as voters in personalistic 
electoral system tend to sympathize or even support the politicians and political institutions even 
if their performances are not most satisfactory (Chang & Chu 2006).   
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To capture the conditional effects of institutional designs on political performance, I will 
use interaction analysis to examine the potential mediating effects of personalist electoral 
systems.  Specifically, we can modify and develop the new hypothesis:  
H2.2g. Personalism mediates the influence of corruption on the level of political trust.  
Specifically, in non-personalistic electoral systems, people are less likely to show political trust 
when they perceive political institutions corrupt than they are in candidate centered electoral 
systems.  
To measure personalism, I will refer to Hicken & Kasuya’s (2002) survey for coding of 
candidate centered electoral systems where they compiled a dataset of constitutional structures 
and electoral systems of seventeen Asian-Pacific countries since 1945.  Compared with separate 
votes for both candidates and parties, a single vote for candidates is considered as more 
candidate centered and personalistic.   
 
3.1.3 Control: Other Sources of Political Trust 
 
While political performance and institutional settings are the primary focus of this dissertation, I 
will include other important sources of political trust for control purposes.  Specifically, I will 
control for the major explanations discussed in the existing literature.  
First, economic performance, the other dimension of institutional performance, also 
influences political trust.  At the macro level, countries with satisfactory economic performance 
are likely to have higher level of political trust, and countries with poor economic performance 
are associated with low level of political trust distrust.  At the micro level, individuals who are 
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satisfied with economic performance of institutions have higher level of political trust than those 
who are not. 13   
Second, social capital affects political trust.  On the one hand, interpersonal trust is a 
prerequisite of political trust, as social trust can spill over to social networks and political 
institutions.  On the other hand, participation in voluntary activities and social associations help 
citizens build social trust and cooperation and develop a sense of political influence, thus 
promoting their level of political trust.14   
Meanwhile, we should also notice that the proposed analyses have assumed the effect of 
social capital on political trust to be exogenous.  However, some researchers proposed that the 
effect of social capital may be endogenous to trust in institutions and there may be a two-way 
reciprocal causality between social capital and political trust (Brehm & Rahn, 1997).  Indeed, if 
the reciprocal causality does exist, our analyses will suffer from endogeneity bias – social capital 
variables including social trust and associational activism are reversely influenced by political 
trust variable and are thus correlated with the disturbance term in the regression.   
Thus, we need to investigate the possibility of endogeneity bias.  Helping sort out the 
causes and consequences and capture the over-time dynamics of trust, longitudinal research in 
the trust study has been most valuable but scarce.  Data from the five waves of WVS provide 
valuable panel data at the aggregate level.  To best examine the trust sources at the aggregate 
level, I will study the dynamics between social trust, associational activism, and political trust at 
the country level using panel data from the World Values Surveys in Chapter 4.  Specifically, I 
13 I will measure economic performance with standard macro economic indicators such as GDP per capita (PPP) and 
economic growth rate.  I use the following question to measure individual satisfaction with the financial situation of 
the household: “How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was five years 
ago? Is it much better now (1), a little better now (2), about the same (3), a little worse now (4), or much worse now 
(5)?”  
14 Interpersonal trust is measured by the following question: “In general, when you interact with people, do you 
believe that most people are trustworthy or do you think that one should be wary of being cheated?”  Civic 
engagement is measured by respondents’ voluntary memberships in social and political organizations.   
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will build a three-wave reciprocal-effects causal model with country-level panel data from World 
Value Surveys between 1990 and 2000.  I hope to capture the over time change in social capital 
and political trust, and to sort out the cause and effects between social trust, associations, and 
political trust.  
Third, cultural values also play a role in shaping political trust.  Post-modernization 
brings a shift in values from materialist rationality to post-materialist individualism.  The 
emerging critical citizens tend to reject authority and value individual autonomy, which reduces 
political support.   In contrast, the Confucian Asian values emphasize deference to authority and 
hierarchy, which promotes the public support for institutions and government.  So post-
materialist values and Asian values work at the opposite directions towards political trust.15   
 
In the following chapters, I will empirically test the political performance hypotheses and 
institutional designs hypotheses at different levels and study the different sources of political 
trust in East Asia.  First, I will compare the levels of political trust across countries and across 
time.  This will put Asia and China in a comparative framework.  The second part will focus on 
the East Asia and examine the different explanations in the Asian context.  I will not only study 
political trust at both macro and micro levels, but also try to combine the two levels of analyses 
into multi-level analyses.  In the last part of the dissertation, I will particularly study the patterns 
of political trust in China, and seek to explain the high national trust and low local trust from its 
political sources.  I will also study the behavioral consequences of political trust and examine its 
15 Post-materialist values are measured by citizen’s priority of liberty (freedom of speech, participation in national 
and local governments) as compared to material and physical security (economic status, national defense, crime 
fighting) (Inglehart 1997).   The Confucian Asian values are measured by four questions. Respondents were asked to 
what extent they agree with the following statement: (1) “Even if unreasonable, parents’ demands must be heeded 
by children.” (2) “An older person should be asked to adjudicate when there are arguments.” (3) “Even if the wrong 
is on the mother-in-law, the son should ask the daughter-in-law to concede.” (4) “For the sake of the family, the 
individual should put his personal interests second.” Scores were added together and form a single index.   
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impact in both democratic and non-democratic countries.  Throughout the dissertation, I am most 
interested in the political bases of political trust.   
 
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN: DATA AND OUTLINE 
In order to test the different hypotheses of political trust, we need survey data from different 
sources and at different levels.  I will discuss the data sources and the outline of the dissertation 
in this section.  
 
3.2.1 Data 
 
This dissertation is a comparative research.  I will assess different explanations and make 
comparisons at different levels.  As this dissertation aims to explore the sources of political trust 
at different levels and compare political trust across countries and across individuals, we need 
comparative data at both aggregate and individual levels.   
Part of the aggregate level data comes from the World Values Survey (WVS), an 
international collaborative project studying a wide range of political and social topics.  The WVS 
is suitable for the macro level analysis of political trust.  First, the WVS is the world’s largest 
cross-cultural surveys covering 87 societies across the world, presenting the broadest range of 
variation for both cross-sectional and cross-level analysis.  The WVS provides an ideal 
opportunity to examine the sources of political trust at the country level.  I will use the WVS to 
compare the political trust in East Asia with other regions in the world (e.g. Latin America, 
Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, and Africa).  Second, the WVS 
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has also offered rich longitudinal information.  To date, the WVS has been conducted with a 
time-span of over twenty years.  The five waves of the WVS, carried out in 1981, 1990-1991, 
1995-1996, 1999-2001 and 2005-2007, provide valuable aggregate level data across time.   
Another major source of data is the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS).  Part of the Global 
Barometer Survey (GBS), the ABS is a joint survey research conducted in thirteen East Asian 
societies (Japan, Mongolia, South Koreas, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia) and five South Asian countries (India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal).  The project is headquartered in Taiwan and it is 
conducted by leading research institutes in different political systems in Asia.  The ABS contains 
useful information including political attitudes, democracy, governance, and economic reforms.  
So far, two waves of surveys have been conducted in 2001-2003 and 2004-2008.  Like the WVS, 
the data in the ABS were gathered through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected 
national samples.  As the ABS specifically focuses on the Asian countries, it interviewed more 
respondents in each society and asked many Asian-specific questions to gauge the regional 
political and cultural context such as “Asian values”.  I will mainly use the ABS for analysis of 
political trust in Asia and in China.  The societies included in the analysis are Japan, Mongolia, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Indonesia.  To explore the effects of institutional context, multilevel analysis at 
both individual level and country level will be employed.  This dissertation mainly relies on 
WVS and the ABS.  I will also gather some aggregate-level data from various sources such as 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Unite Nations.  
The China part of the WVS survey was conducted by the Research Center for 
Contemporary China (RCCC) of Peking University.  The China part of the ABS was conducted 
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by Institute of Sociology of Chinese Social Science Academy (CSSA) for the first wave and 
RCCC for the second.  Besides the WVS and ABS, I will use some national surveys for the 
analysis of political trust in China.  These include the 2004 Chinese Value and Ethics Survey by 
RCCC and the 2008 China Survey conducted by College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M 
University and RCCC.  All of these surveys employed stratified multistage random sampling 
including both rural and urban residents in China.  These surveys contain batteries of information 
gauging Chinese people’s political attitudes and behavior, and they enabled us to study and 
compare citizens’ political trust at different levels and across time.  Chapter 6 of the dissertation 
will draw heavily on these individual-level data from China.  
 
 
3.2.2 Research Plan 
 
The first three chapters lay out the theoretical framework of this dissertation.  I reviewed the 
existing literature regarding sources of political trust, and I proposed that political performance 
and institutional settings also play important roles in shaping citizens’ trust in political 
institutions.  The emphasis of this dissertation is the political bases of political trust.  I will focus 
on East Asia and pay particular attention to the authoritarian Chinese case.  The following 
chapters will examine these theories empirically and test the relevant hypotheses at different 
levels.   
Chapter 4 will study East Asia in global perspective, comparing the levels and trends of 
political trust in East Asia with different groups of the countries in the world.  I will conduct 
some country level descriptive analyses to map the patterns and trend of political trust across 
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countries and across time. This chapter aims to draw a big picture and put East Asia in a 
comparative setting. I will compare the levels of political trust in East Asia with other regions 
like Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, North America, and West Europe.  Controlling 
for individual level explanations, the multilevel analysis in this chapter aims to examine the key 
political sources of political trust (i.e. the political institutional performance and institutional 
designs) at the country level with global data.  These require both comparative and aggregate 
level data as well as individual level data from the WVS.   
 Chapter 5 goes into the details of East Asia.  This chapter focuses on the East Asian 
democracies.  I will compare and investigate East Asian societies and study the political sources 
of political trust at different levels.  First, I will explore the relationships at the individual level, 
and focus on the roles of citizens’ perceptions of political performance and personal experience 
with corruption.  Then I will add contextual factors into analysis, and highlight the effects of 
aggregate political performance and regime types on the public trust in political institutions.  The 
chapter also studies the impact of political performance and institutional settings with multilevel 
analysis that integrates the two levels of analysis.  The EAB provides very rich and timely data 
of political trust in the region at both country and individual levels, and it will be the main source 
of data in these two chapters.  I expect to find independent and significant effects of political 
performance and institutional designs on political trust in East Asian societies.  
Chapter 6 goes a step further and studies political trust in non-democratic countries.  
Specifically, I focus on China, the largest non-democratic regime in the world.  The chapter 
investigates the sources of the exceptionally high level of political trust in China: whether it is a 
result of authoritarian mobilization, an artifact of political fear, a product of traditional Chinese 
culture, or a rational response to the institutional performance.  In this chapter, I will also study 
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the two characters of political trust in China: the high level of political trust in institutions in the 
center, and the low trust in local government in China.  I will examine whether and to what 
extent do authoritarian settings contribute to political trust in China, noticeably the effect of 
authoritarian mobilization process involving political education and media control.  I expect to 
find that Chinese people trust institutions not only basing on the economic performance and 
Confucian values; they are also greatly concerned with the political performance.  In addition, 
public trust in China is shaped by authoritarian features as well.  
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter of the dissertation.  I will study the implications of 
political trust on citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors in East Asia.  This chapter examines 
the consequences of trust in two areas: the democratic values, and the political participation.  
Both dimensions have serious implications for the future of democratization in East Asia.   In 
this chapter, I will also review the major theories and empirical findings from previous chapters.  
The political story of political trust will be reiterated and summarized to emphasize the theme of 
the dissertation, i.e. the roles of political performance and political context in explaining political 
trust.  This last chapter will also discuss the policy implications and directions for future research.  
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4.0 PATTERNS AND SOURCES:  
EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL DATA 
 
 
This dissertation studies the political sources of political trust.  In the previous chapters, I 
reviewed the existing literature relating to this project, emphasized the relational nature of 
political trust, and highlighted the roles of political performance and institutional designs in 
shaping political trust.  In this chapter, I will examine these political factors and test the 
hypotheses proposed in the last chapter at the global level.  Specifically, this chapter aims to 
address the following questions:  How do the levels of political trust vary across countries and 
across time?  How does the level of political trust in East Asia compare with other regions in the 
world?  What explains the variations of political trust across countries?  In particular, how do 
political factors, including institutional settings and political performance, affect political trust?   
As the first step to address these questions, I will use an extensive body of comparative 
survey data from the World Values Surveys and chart the general patterns and trends of political 
trust across the world.  This not only allows comparisons across regions and time and puts East 
Asia in the global setting, but also sets the stage for the empirical testing of the key hypotheses 
proposed in the previous chapter.  To examine the possible explanations for the variations across 
countries, I will review the main hypotheses, empirically test them, and present the statistical 
results.  Institutional designs and political corruption at the country level are the primary interests 
in this chapter.  To maximize the institutional variance and best capture the institutional effects 
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on political trust, this chapter focuses on the global level and includes as many countries as 
possible in the analyses. 
 
 
4.1 PATTERNS OF THE LEVELS OF POLITICAL TRUST ACROSS THE WORLD  
 
Since the 1960s, it has been reported that the levels of political trust have declined continuously.  
Most of these studies have been limited to democratic regimes, and many have focused on cross-
time comparisons instead of cross-country comparisons due to data availabilities.  Data from five 
waves of the WVS allow me to examine the levels of political trust across 53 countries for over 
twenty years.  This will draw a bigger picture of the development of political trust across the 
world, and put East Asia in a larger comparative setting.  The WVS covers industrialized 
Western Europe and North America, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia.  
Moreover, both democratic and non-democratic regimes are included in the analysis.   
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Table 4.1 Political Trust Mean across the World (2005) 
 
                Region 
Country 
C & E  
Europe 
Western 
Europe 
South 
America 
N & C 
America 
Asia Oceania Africa 
Vietnam     86   
China     71   
Jordan     64   
Malaysia     62   
Ghana       57 
Mali       55 
South Africa       54 
India     54   
Norway  54      
Turkey 54       
Switzerland  54      
Finland  53      
Cyprus  52      
Hong Kong     51   
Sweden  51      
Morocco       50 
Indonesia     48   
Thailand     47   
Iran     47   
Canada    47    
Spain  46      
Zambia       45 
Burkina Faso       45 
South Korea     44   
Uruguay   44     
Australia      43  
United States    43    
New Zealand      43  
Great Britain  43      
Japan     42   
Italy  40      
Russia 39       
Brazil   39     
Ethiopia       39 
Netherlands  38      
France  38      
Germany  37      
Colombia   37     
Georgia 36       
Ukraine 36       
Chile   36     
Trinidad &Tobago    36    
Bulgaria 36       
Mexico    35    
Taiwan     34   
Slovenia 33       
Moldova 33       
Romania 32       
Serbia 32       
Poland 32       
Guatemala    28    
Argentina   27     
Peru   22     
Mean 36 46 34 38 55 43 49 
Source: World Values Surveys, 2005. 
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As I discussed in Chapter 2, trust in political institutions is the most appropriate level of 
analysis for comparative studies of political trust.  It is less volatile than incumbency trust, and it 
is more realistic and travels better than trust in political values.  To operationalize the concept of 
political trust and compare it across countries, I use the following questions from the WVS: “I 
am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very 
much confidence or none at all?”.  As discussed earlier, I use the mean of five key political 
institutions for comparative purposes: the national government, political parties, parliament, the 
legal system, and the civil service.  The index is converted to a 0-100 scale where 0 means none 
at all and 100 means a great deal of confidence in all five institutions.  
Table 4.1 shows the levels of political trust in 53 countries in 2005.  The countries are 
listed in the order of their levels of political trust and by their geographical locations.   Two 
patterns emerge from Table 4.1.  First, differences in the levels of political trust in institutions 
across regions are relatively modest but still obvious.  Asia maintains the highest level of trust 
(55), Central and Eastern Europe and South America demonstrate the lowest levels of trust (36 
and 34 respectively), and the levels of trust in the rest of the continents stand in the middle.  In 
Chapter 5 and 6, I will focus on Asia, particularly East Asia, to explore why Asian countries 
constantly present high levels of political trust while the other parts of the world are losing it.  
Second, variations in the levels of political trust across countries are great.  The actual political 
trust levels range from 22 (Peru) to 86 (Vietnam), and the average trust level of all the 53 
countries from the World Values Survey is 44 out of 100.  Within each region, there are sharp 
differences in political trust between countries as well.  
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Why do people trust political institutions more in some countries than in others?   Why 
do some countries demonstrate lower levels of political trust on average?  How do we explain the 
sharp variance in the levels of political trust between countries?  What has been missing from the 
existing discussions on the sources of political trust?  In the next section, I will examine these 
questions and attempt to shed some light with data from the WVS.  
 
 
4.2 SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST – EVIDENCE FROM THE TWO MAJOR 
THEORETICAL TRADITIONS 
 
4.2.1 Two Major Theoretical Traditions 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the major existing explanations of differences in political trust can be 
framed within the economy versus culture debate.  While I aim to study the political sources of 
political trust in this dissertation, I will also take into account the major hypotheses from the 
cultural and economic schools.  To study the complicated relationship between social and 
political trust, we also have an excellent opportunity to revisit the two major theoretical 
traditions.  This part of analysis not only aims to sort out the relationships between the key 
concepts, but also helps to reexamine the identified sources of political trust and to compare 
them with the political explanations, the key hypotheses of this dissertation.   In the next section, 
I will turn to the political explanations of political trust, and empirically examine my key 
hypotheses while controlling for cultural and economic factors.   
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One major school of explanations emphasizes the role of economic development on the 
level of political trust.  At the country level, countries with more satisfactory economic 
performance are expected to demonstrate higher levels of political trust on average.  In this study, 
I will use standard indicators from the World Bank to measure economic performance, such as 
the GDP per capita and the growth rate of the GDP per capita.   
The political culture school offers another important perspective on sources of political 
trust.  According to the political culture arguments, political trust originated in cultural norms 
and personal values deeply rooted in societies.  People’s trust towards their fellow citizens or 
institutions is shaped by the prevalent values and norms in their society.  Social capital theory, a 
prominent argument proposed by the political culture school, holds that social capital, including 
civic engagement and social trust, has great impact on political trust (Cole 1973; Keele 2004).  
However, evidence for social capital theory has been mixed and the relationship between social 
trust and political trust is far from conclusive.  Before we anchor our analysis of the political 
explanations of political trust in the next section, we need to first revisit the political culture 
arguments, address these inconsistencies, and sort out the entangled relationship between social 
and political trust.    
 
4.2.2 Social Trust and Political Trust – Revisit Political Cultural Explanations 
 
There have been heated discussions on the relationship between the two types of trust (e.g. Cole 
1973; Levi 1996; Brehm & Rahn 1997; Kaase 1999; Newton 1999; Keele 2004).  Are they 
different sides of the same coin?  Is social trust exogenous to political trust or do they affect each 
other?  How does the causality flow between them, if at all?  Unfortunately, the answers to these 
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questions remain inconclusive in the literature.  However, the answers are important to our 
understanding of political trust.  They not only clarify some unresolved issues of the political 
culture school, but also shed light on the relative importance of different explanations of political 
trust.   
To address these questions and study the dynamics between social trust and political trust, 
I will use panel analysis with data from the different waves of the WVS.  Specifically, I will 
build a three-wave reciprocal-effects causal model with country-level panel data from the WVS 
between 1990 and 2000.  I hope to capture the over time change in social capital and political 
trust, and to sort out the cause and effects between social trust, associations, and political trust. 
 
4.2.2.1 Hypotheses and Theoretical Links between Social Trust and Political Trust  
Following Paxton’s definition (2002), social capital contains two dimensions: civic 
engagement (or, participation in voluntary associations), and the trusting and positive 
relationships (of which interpersonal trust is an important indicator).  On the one hand, 
participation in voluntary associations in a society bridges social cleavages and creates a tight 
web of social interaction and cooperation, and people become more trusting in this environment 
(Putnam 1993).  On the other hand, in a trusting society, people are more confident in others’ 
benevolence and are more likely to cooperate and participate in the associations (Wrightsman 
1992).  Thus, I expect that the two dimensions of social capital promote and reinforce each other.  
Many theoretical perspectives claim causation from social capital to political trust.  If 
people do not trust their fellow citizens, they cannot possibly trust the elites and institutions that 
are endowed with considerable power to affect their lives (Almond and Verba 1963).  Brehm and 
Rahn (1997) also pointed out that trusting people expect others to comply with authorities and 
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find it easier to follow the rules from authority. Therefore, in a society with a high level of social 
trust, people should have high levels of confidence in the political institutions.  Civic 
engagement can also exert a positive impact on political trust, as citizens not engaged in civic 
activity have a weak sense of political influence, which in turn fuels distrust in political leaders 
and institutions (Keele 2004).  
Some researchers argue that the causation flow can reverse as well.  Institutions, by 
providing reassurance that defectors will not go unpunished, can potentially promote a general 
level of social trust (Levi 1996).  Meanwhile, it may require some level of trust in government to 
participate in activities that engage political associations, thus political trust can also promote 
participation in associations (Brehm and Rahn 1997).  If these arguments hold, we may expect 
that in a society where trust in institutions is high, people are more likely to have high levels of 
interpersonal trust and participate in associations.  The measurement of the key variables can be 
found in the footnote.16 
 
16 The measure for interpersonal trust comes from a simple but standard question: “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The percentage of 
individuals who answered yes in a country is used to measure interpersonal trust, which is a more refined measure 
than the simple zero-one dichotomy in most individual level studies (Delhey and Newton 2005).  
Associations are measured by the summation of the mean number of voluntary associations in which individuals in a 
country have membership and for which individuals do unpaid voluntary work in the past year. The combined 
measure shows both the breadth and the depth of association membership in a country (Paxton 2002). 
Institutional trust is measured by the country mean of individuals’ trust across five political institutions: the armed 
forces, the legal system, the police, the parliament, and the civil service. This question produces a 0-3 (high) scale 
indicator: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence 
you have in them?” 
Besides the three key variables, we also need to control for some exogenous variables that have been shown to be 
linked with the variables of interest. First, I include three variables of social forces with theoretical merits: ethnic 
homogeneity, secondary school enrollment, and protestant tradition (Alesina et. al. 2003; CIA World Fact Book 
2005; World Development Indicators 2002). Previous works on trust and social capital have identified them as 
important predictors and they are likely to correlate with both social capital and institutional trust (Brehm and Rahn 
1997; Paxton 2002; Delly and Newton 2005). Second, I include the GDP per capita to control for the level of 
economic development in each country (United Nations 1990-2000). Third, literature has long identified economic 
performance as the most important contributor to institutional trust, and Lishaug and Wiberg (1995) particularly 
emphasize the effects of government stability and rate of unemployment (Rogowski 1974; Jennings 1998; Mishler 
and Rose 2001). Thus I include the rate of unemployment to account for the impact of government performance on 
institutional trust (World Development Indicators 2002).   
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4.2.2.2 Model Specification 
The causal model aims to empirically test the above hypotheses and deal with the indeterminacy 
problem of the relationship between social and political trust.  The analysis follows a cross-
lagged design as specified in Figure 4.1.  The control variables on the left are exogenous to the 
key causal process between social capital and political trust.  All of the exogenous variables 
except the rate of unemployment are hypothesized to affect social capital and political trust in 
institutions at all three waves.  As discussed earlier, the rate of unemployment should affect the 
political trust to control for the government performance.  The exogenous variables are 
correlated with each other. 
The three key variables of interest at time (t-1) are hypothesized to influence both 
themselves at time t (stability effects) and the other two variables at time t (cross-lagged effects).  
For instance, political trust in 1995 is a function of political trust in 1990 as well as interpersonal 
trust and associations in 1990.  The stability effects of interpersonal trust controls for the 
influence of the trust level in the past (the same are for associations and institutional trust), thus 
we have stability effects from 1990 to 1995 and from 1995 to 2000.  Both trust and social capital 
reflect a subtle and gradual social process at the macro level.  Given the delay built into the 
movement of civic engagement and trust in a society, both trust and social capital should not 
react immediately to each other (Keele 2004).  Therefore, in this macro-level analysis, I did not 
include the synchronous effects, as the effects are expected to be long-term, if any.  
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Figure 4.1 Three-Wave Cross-Lagged Model of Social Trust (ST), Associational Activism (AS), 
and Institutional Trust (IT) 
 
Note: UNEM = unemployment rate; GDP = GDP per capita (logged); ETH = ethnic homogeneity;  
          EDU = secondary school enrollment ratio; PRO = protestant tradition. 
            All of the exogenous variables are correlated with each other (blue lines). 
          Errors of each equation at the same time point are correlated with each other (purple lines). 
 
 
 
The error terms of the interpersonal trust, associations, and institutional trust are assumed 
to be correlated with each other at each time point to reflect the covariation that has not been 
captured by the causal effects (i.e. stability effects, cross-lagged effects, and effects of the control 
variables) specified in the model.  Finally, as the time lags between the three waves are the same, 
i.e. five years, I impose equality constraints to the model. Specifically, I equate the cross-lagged 
effects and stability effects across waves (as shown and discussed in Table 4.1 in the next 
section). The model also assumes the equal disturbance covariances between endogenous 
variables at the last two waves. 
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4.2.2.3 Statistical Results: Unidirectional Causality from Social Trust to Political Trust 
This three-wave cross-lagged model was estimated in LISREL and the results are 
reported in Table 4.2.  Each part in the table summarizes the estimation for one of the three 
dependent variables.   
A high level of participation in voluntary associations nurtures a favorable environment 
for interpersonal trust in a society.  However, the causality is unidirectional. Interpersonal trust 
does not exert a significant influence on civic engagement in voluntary associations, which 
seems to contradict Brehm and Rahn’s (1997) earlier findings at the individual level.  While the 
relationship between interpersonal trust and associations is regarded as the most direct 
representation of the social capital idea by Brehm and Rahn, it does not show a reciprocal pattern 
in this aggregated-level cross-lagged causal model.   
The primary interest of the paper is the causal mechanism between social capital and 
political trust, and they show a very clear unidirectional pattern.  Social capital, as predicted, 
does have a positive and significant impact on trust in institutions. The cross-lagged effects from 
both interpersonal trust and associations to political trust are significant, confirming the 
hypotheses that they promote political trust in a society.  A ten percentage increase in the 
participation level in associations induces a one percent increase in trust towards the political 
institutions in a society. Social trust has an even stronger impact on political trust. The 
standardized effect is twice the size of that of associations.  
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 Table 4.2 Coefficients from a Three-Wave Cross-Lagged Model of Social Capital and Political 
Trust 
 
 Political Trust Social Capital 
 IN IP  AS 
 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 
Interpersonal 
Trust 
         
1990 (η1)  .10+J 
(.06) 
  .37***A 
(.10) 
  .04F 
(.05) 
 
1995 (η2)   .10+J 
(.06) 
  .37***A 
(.10) 
  .04F 
(.05) 
Institutional 
Trust 
         
1990 (η4)  .34***K 
(.09) 
  -.13B 
(.17) 
  -.03G 
(.07) 
 
1995 (η5)   .34***K 
(.09) 
  -.13B 
(.17) 
  -.03G 
(.07) 
Associations          
1990 (η7)  .11*L 
(.05) 
  .24+C 
(.13) 
  .33***H 
(.05) 
 
1995 (η8)   .11*L 
(.05) 
  .24+C 
(.13) 
  .33***H 
(.05) 
Control 
Variables 
         
GDP pc (ln) 
(ξ1) 
-1.09+ 
(.67) 
-.40 
(.84) 
-2.51** 
(.92) 
.19 
(1.17) 
.24 
(1.20) 
3.37+ 
(2.03) 
-1.85*** 
(.45) 
-6.06*** 
(1.51) 
-.22 
(.65) 
Homogeneity 
(ξ2) 
4.13 
(3.00) 
1.44 
(3.78) 
9.39* 
(3.90) 
10.31* 
(5.19) 
13.48* 
(5.32) 
3.61 
(8.51) 
-1.61 
(2.01) 
-11.72+ 
(6.71) 
1.06 
(2.74) 
School (ξ3) -.02 
(.05) 
-.03 
(.06) 
-.08 
(.07) 
-.04 
(.09) 
-.00 
(.09) 
-.08 
(.16) 
.12*** 
(.03) 
.55*** 
(.11) 
-.04 
(.05) 
Protestant (ξ4) 3.64* 
(1.70) 
.11 
(2.24) 
4.68* 
(2.34) 
11.98*** 
(2.98) 
3.53 
(3.26) 
-2.36 
(5.09) 
5.74*** 
(1.15) 
12.17** 
(3.89) 
3.64* 
(1.67) 
Unemployment 
(ξ5) 
-.11+ 
(.06) 
.05 
(.18) 
-.29* 
(.15) 
      
Error 
Covariance 
         
IP & IN    18.88*** 
(Ψ14) 
11.21+D 
(Ψ25) 
11.21+D 
(Ψ36) 
13.76*** 
(Ψ71) 
-17.00***E 
(Ψ82) 
-17.00***E 
(Ψ93) 
IP & AS 18.88*** 
(Ψ41) 
11.21+D 
(Ψ52) 
11.21+D 
(Ψ63) 
13.76*** 
(Ψ17) 
-17.00***E 
(Ψ28) 
-17.00***E 
(Ψ39) 
6.63*** 
(Ψ74) 
15.52***I 
(Ψ85) 
15.52***I 
(Ψ96) 
R2 .10 .17 .43 .27 .38 .26 .32 .35 .57 
 
Note: N=79 countries.  The results are maximum likelihood estimates.   
          A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I coefficients are constrained to be equal. 
Goodness-of-fit statistics: χ2=74.78, d.f.=27, p=.00;  NFI=.85; PNFI=.25. 
***p < .001   **p < .01   *p < .05 (two-tailed tests)   +p < .05 (one-tailed tests) 
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Political trust, on the other hand, does not have a significant effect on social capital.  It is 
not too surprising, however, since the trust in political institutions such as parliaments, armed 
forces, and civil services does not necessarily encourage people to join various civic voluntary 
associations such as cultural and educational organizations.  Similarly, while punishment for 
defection from institutions is more guaranteed, individuals are more likely to escape from the 
punishment, thus trust in the political institutions may not generalize to less secured trust in 
fellow citizens.  The high level of political trust, as a result, may not transfer to more social 
capital in a society.  In other words, social capital is exogenous to political trust.   
So the three-wave reciprocal-effects causal model lends support to social capital theory 
and clarifies the relationship between social trust and political trust.  The causal flow exists and it 
runs from the former to the latter.  Social capital, including social trust, contributes to political 
trust.  The two types of trust can and should be distinguished in our analysis to study the sources 
of political trust.   
 
 
4.3 POLITICAL SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST  
– A MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS 
 
I argue that people trust institutions more when they believe they are politically trust-worthy.  As 
I discussed in the previous chapter, on average, I expect that institutions that are perceived as less 
corrupt and that have specific institutional designs are trusted more.  Specifically, countries with 
lower levels of corruption, longer democratic history, parliamentary governments, moderate 
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numbers of parties, and proportional electoral systems are expected to be associated with higher 
levels of political trust.   
Trust is a relational concept and it is shaped by the characteristics of both the truster and 
the trustee.  As we discussed in the previous chapter, on the trusters’ side, resources and values 
of individual citizens affect their trust in political institutions; on the trustee’s side, the economic 
and political performance and institutional settings of the system shape whether and how much 
people trust them.  Unfortunately, the existing research has predominantly focused on one side of 
the relationship, particularly the trusters’ side.   
In this dissertation, I will study both the object and the subject of political trust.  I hope to 
draw attention to the trustee’s side, and to focus on the performance and characteristics of the 
institutions.  As institutional settings change very slowly and gradually across time, their effects 
on political trust at the macro level are difficult to catch with single case studies focusing on 
individual level differences, research involving only a small group of countries, or longitudinal 
analyses.  Rather, the best way to maximize the variance in institutional settings and to capture 
its effects on political trust is to include as many countries as possible for cross-country analysis.  
Therefore, to study political trust as a relational concept, we need to examine not only 
individual-level characteristics such as individual resources and values, but also the institutional 
designs and performance of the systems where individuals are embedded.  In this chapter, I will 
use multi-level models to study the institutional effects and examine the hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter 3 about the contextual and individual-level sources of political trust.   
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4.3.1 Country and Individual Level Sources of Political Trust 
 
4.3.1.1 Country Level Sources of Political Trust 
The focus of this chapter is structural influences on citizen behavior.  I am most 
interested in the contextual level sources of trust in political institutions.  Specifically, I will 
study the effects of two groups of political variables at the country level: institutional settings 
and political performance.   
In Chapter 2 and 3, I discussed in detail the theoretical links between institutional settings 
and political trust.  I will first review the major hypotheses and present the data and 
measurements to test these hypotheses.  Then in the following section, I will test them with a 
hierarchical linear model, and discuss the empirical results.   
 
4.3.1.1.1 Institutional Settings and Political Trust – Hypotheses and Measurement 
A. Regime Types and Political Trust 
A fundamentally important yet widely neglected institutional feature is regime types.  I 
argue that democratic and non-democratic regimes present different levels of political trust.  
Even within democracies, experience and level of democratization also matters.  Overall, I 
expect that non-democratic regimes demonstrate higher levels of political trust because their 
governments often use media control and political education to mobilize regime support and 
public political confidence.  Within democratic countries, I expect that countries with higher 
levels of democracy present higher levels of political trust because democratic accountability and 
representation requires greater support from voters.   
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For a dichotomous measure of democratic and non-democratic regimes, I use Cheibub, 
Ghandi and Vreeland (2010)’s Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited dataset.  I refer to the 
Freedom in the World Index from the Freedom House for a continuous measure of the levels of 
democratization in different societies.  The index is the mean score of political rights and civil 
liberties.  Political rights are measured by questions such as open election, right to organize 
competing parties, and minorities’ participation in the decision-making process.  Civil liberties 
are measured by questions such as free media, freedom of religion, and protection from political 
terror.  
B. Party Systems and Political Trust 
Compared with fragmented party systems, I expect to find that two-party and moderate 
multi-party systems demonstrate higher levels of political trust because they allow effective 
channeling and translation of the public opinion into government policy.  The Democracy Cross-
National Dataset compiled by Norris in 2009 provides complete information on types of party 
systems classified from effective numbers of parliamentary parties for countries across the world.  
Specifically, party systems are classified into 4 categories: one party system, two party system, 
moderate multi-party system, and fragmented party system.  I recoded this into 2 categories: 
fragmented party system (0) and two party system or moderate multi-party system (1).   
C. Electoral Systems and Political Trust 
On average, democracies with proportional representation tend to demonstrate higher 
levels of political trust because they are associated with more electoral volatility.  For a 
classification of electoral systems, I will refer to the Electoral System Design Database published 
by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA 2004).  
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The database divides the electoral systems into different categories: proportional representation, 
plurality/majority, and mixed.  
D. Executive-Legislative Relations and Political Trust 
Parliamentary systems should present higher levels of political trust because of their 
flexible and adaptable institutional structures, efficient decision making, and fused executive 
power.  Also, they are more likely to use proportional representation (instead of plurality) that 
optimizes democratic representation and produces more political support.  I will refer to the 
Democracy Cross-National Dataset for a classification of the executive types.  
Using data from the 2005 World Values Survey, Figure 4.2 summarizes the average trust 
scores across institutional settings we discussed.  These descriptive figures show that different 
types of institutional designs demonstrate different levels of political trust.  First of all, regime 
types make a big difference in the level of trust in political institutions.  On average, the levels of 
political trust in democracies are much lower than in non-democratic regimes.  This result partly 
supports our regime type hypothesis at the macro level.  In Chapter 6, we will look into the case 
of non-democratic regimes like China, and study how authoritarian institutional settings affect 
political trust at the micro level.   
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Figure 4.2  Political Trust and Institutional Settings 
 
Source: World Values Survey 2005.  
 
Second, within democracies, levels of political trust differ across different institutional 
settings such as electoral systems, executive systems, and party systems.  Figures in Figure 4.2 
are only descriptive, and whether and how these institutional features affect political trust will be 
further discussed and examined in the multi-level analysis in the following section.   
 
4.3.1.1.2 Political Performance and Political Trust – Hypotheses and Measurement  
I specified two important indicators for political performance in Chapter 3: corruption 
and fairness.  Due to data availability, I will only discuss corruption in this chapter.  At the 
country level, I expect that on average, countries with less corruption will demonstrate higher 
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levels of political trust.  Corruption at the aggregate level will be measured by Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International, an international civil society 
organization against corruption.  It measures perceived levels of corruption and abuse of power 
in public sector in nearly 200 countries.  CPI covers both the administrative and political aspects 
of corruption. The measure indicates the perceived corruption on a recoded scale of 0-10 where 
10 means highly corrupt and 0 means very clean.  I use the 2001-2005 five year average of CPI 
in my analysis.   
 
4.3.1.1.3 Country Level Control Variables 
At the country level, I use the economic performance as a control variable.  This was 
measured by the logged GDP per capita and the growth rate of GDP per capita from the World 
Bank.  As discussed in Chapter 3, I expect that countries with better economic performance 
should demonstrate higher levels of political trust.  As this study includes countries around the 
world, I also include regions as another control variable.  Specifically, using Asia as comparison 
group, I include six region dummies: Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, South America, 
Oceania, North America, and Western Europe.  
 
4.3.1.2 Individual Level Variables 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Institutional Settings – Party Allegiance  
Institutional effects work at both macro and micro levels.  At the individual level, party 
allegiance affects the level of political trust.  Winners in electoral contests, i.e. voters who 
identify and support the parties that form the government, face a more friendly political 
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environment and have more incentive to maintain status quo, rather than challenge existing 
institutional settings.  Thus, winners tend to have higher level of trust in political institutions than 
losers.   
To measure party allegiance, I created a dummy variable by comparing the ruling parties 
in each country at the time of the survey with respondents’ reply to the WVS question “If there 
were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the 
number on this card. If you are uncertain, which party appeals to you most?”.   
 
4.3.1.2.2 Individual Level Control Variables 
To control for the economic and cultural hypotheses of political trust, I included a series 
of control variables at the individual level.  To consider two major political cultural hypotheses, I 
included two variables for social capital theories (interpersonal/social trust and civic engagement) 
and one variable for post-modernization hypothesis (post-materialist values).  Post-materialist 
values are measured by citizen’s priority of liberty (freedom of speech, participation in national 
and local governments) as compared to material and physical security (economic status, national 
defense, crime fighting) (Inglehart 1997).  Meanwhile, I also included a set of variables to 
control for individual social-economic status at the individual levels, including age, education 
level, sex, satisfaction of family financial situation.  
 
4.3.1.3 Cross-Level Interaction Effects 
In Chapter 3, we argued that the effects of party allegiance can be context dependent.  I 
hypothesized that country level institutional designs such as party systems and levels of 
democracy help explain the effects of party allegiance on trust across different countries.  
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Specifically, winners would be more trusting of political institutions in countries with two-party 
or moderate multi-party systems than in countries with fragmented party systems.  Meanwhile, 
levels of democracy should also increase the trust gap between winners and losers.  Winners are 
more trusting in more mature democracies than their counterparts in new democracies.  These 
interactions will also be tested in the multi-level model.  
Besides party allegiance, contextual level factors also work through other individual level 
variables to affect political trust.  The strength of contextual effects should differ across different 
social groups.  Political trust is the subjective evaluation of the political institutions, and it is 
reasonable to expect that citizens’ socioeconomic backgrounds affect how they judge and trust 
political institutions.  As discussed earlier, trust in political institutions is a rational decision 
based on institutional performance.  Education enables citizens to acquire and process 
information for more accurate assessment of institutions (“accuracy-inducing” function), and it 
affects what types of normative values citizens hold in the process of performance evaluation 
(“norm-inducing” function) (Hakhverdian & Mayne. 2012: 741).  Thus, people with higher 
levels of education are more likely to judge institutions based on their actual economic and 
political performance (rather than on their reported general image).   
 
4.3.2 Methodology (HLM) 
 
As discussed above, this study analyzes both the contextual and individual level sources of 
political trust.  Accordingly, I rely on data with a hierarchical structure: one unit of analysis 
(individual respondents) is nested within contextual units (countries).  While multi-level data 
provides rich information and allow us to take both levels of sources into account, they also 
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create some statistical challenges.  Taking the WVS data for instance, when polling data 
collected from different countries together for analysis, researches are risk violating the 
independent error terms assumption of OLS.  Thus, when using multi-level data, we need to deal 
with the non-constant variance across contextual level units and clustering of individual-level 
data within contextual units (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Luke 
2004; Rahn and Rudolph 2005).  In response to these statistical challenges, I will employ 
hierarchical linear models to account for variation both between and within countries.   
As specified below, our hierarchical linear model begins with the individual-level (Level 
1) structural model whereas country-level (Level 2) structural model captures the contextual 
effects.   
PTRij = β0j + β1jIPTRij + β2jPSMTij + β3jCVEGij + β4jAGEij + β5jEDUij + β6jFECONSATij + 
β7jSEXij + β8jWINNERij + γij                                              (Level 1 Equation) 
β0j = γ00 + γ01CRPTj + γ02DEMj + γ03GDPGRj + γ04EXESYSj + γ05ELESYSj + γ06PTYSYSj + 
γ07LnGDPPCj + u0j                                              (Level 2 Equation) 
In the above structural models, PTRij, the dependent variable, represents trust in political 
institutions for the ith respondent in the jth country.  The intercept β0j at Level 1 is modeled as a 
function of contextual level explanatory variables and a contextual level error term.  β0j 
represents the mean level of political trust in the jth country and it varies across countries.  u0j 
denotes the residual country-specific variation around the country mean after controlling for the 
specified country-level variables in Level 2 model.  Basically, I hypothesize that the between-
country variation in the levels of political trust is shaped by different countries’ institutional 
settings and aggregated levels of corruption, and within-country variation in the level of political 
trust is related to individual’s party allegiance.   
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In addition, I will test the above hypothesized cross-level interaction effects.  The 
equation below models the slope of party allegiance (β8j) as a function of country’s party systems 
(PTYSYS) and levels of democracy (DEM).   
 β8j = γ80 + γ81 PTYSYSj + γ82 DEMj                              (Cross-Level Interaction Equation) 
The equation below models the slope of level of education (β5j) as a function of country’s 
political performance (CRPTj) and economic performance (GDPGRj), 
β 5j = γ50 + γ51 CRPTj + γ52 GDPGRj                               (Cross-Level Interaction Equation) 
 
 The full hierarchical model substitutes Level 2 Equation and Cross-Level Interaction 
Equation into Level-1 Equation.  I will use HLM6.0.6 to estimate the full hierarchical model 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).   
 
4.3.3 Statistical Results and Discussions 
 
4.3.3.1 Analysis of Variance 
The first step of HLM is to run an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model to check 
whether there is statistically significant country-level variance in the levels of political trust.  
Table 4.3 describes to what extent country-level variance makes an independent contribution in 
explaining levels of political trust.   
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Table 4.3  Analysis of Variance for Political Trust 
 
Parameter Estimate 
Fixed Effects  
Constant -.018 (.067) 
Variance Components  
Country-level (τ00) .200† 
Individual-Level (σ2) .773 
ICC (Intraclass correlation ρ) 20.6 % 
 
Sources: 2005 World Values Survey.  
Note: Table entries are multilevel estimates of trust in political institutions.  
† χ2.43df = 16,763.17, p<.01. 
 
 
I find statistically significant variation in political trust at country level (the chi-square is 
16,763.17 with 43 degrees of freedom, p=.000).  Following Raudenbush and Bryk’s notations, 
we can calculate intra-class correlation (ICC) from the reported country-level variance and 
individual-level variance.  ICC calculates the ratio of country-level variance (τ00) to the total 
variance in our dependent variable (τ00 + σ2) and it tells us the relative importance of the country 
level of analysis.  In our case, ICC is 21%, meaning 21% of variance in political trust can be 
explained by the country-level variance.  As the political trust, our dependent variable, is 
measured at the individual level, it is no surprise that individual level variance account for most 
of the total variance (79%).  The results show that a significant portion of variance is explained 
at the country-level analysis and a multi-level model is indeed necessary in our case.  
 
 
4.3.3.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Table 4.4 summarizes the statistical results from the HLM estimations.  Model 1 includes 
all types of regimes, democratic or non-democratic, and I hope to study the effects of regime 
types and political corruption on political trust.  Model 2, 3, and 4 only include democratic 
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regimes and aim to examine the effects of democratic institutional designs and performance.  
Model 2 includes the individual level predictors only.  Model 3 presents the result from the 
random intercept model.  Model 4 reports results from a random intercept model with cross-level 
interactions.   
 
4.3.3.2.1 Findings at the Individual Level 
I included a set of individual level determinants mainly to control for the individual level 
sources of political trust, including individual economic resources and cultural influence.  
Results from Model 2 and Model 3 support my hypotheses.   
The most important finding is the significant effect of party allegiance, the institutional 
variable at the individual level.  Consistent with our expectations, voters who identify or support 
government parties are more likely to trust political institutions while losers demonstrate lower 
levels of political trust.  Though its effects are modest, party allegiance does significantly affect 
political trust at the individual level.   
Other individual level variables are only for control purposes and their effects are mostly 
as expected.  First, the two political culture hypotheses are supported by our analysis.  Both 
social trust and civic engagement are positively associated with the individual level of political 
trust, lending support to social capital theory.  Post-materialist values shaped people’s values and 
created many critical citizens who challenge authority and value individual autonomy, thus 
individuals with higher levels of post-materialist values are less likely to trust political 
institutions.   Second, political economy hypothesis also received supporting evidence.  
Individuals who are more satisfied with their family’s financial condition are more likely to trust 
political institutions.   
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Table 4.4  Determinants of Trust in Political Institutions 
 
 DV: Political Trust 
 All Countries Democracies Only 
Parameter Model 1: 
Random 
Intercept Model 
 
Model 2:  
Individual-Level 
Predictors Only 
Model 3: 
Random 
Intercept Model 
Model 4: 
Random 
Intercept Model 
with Interactions 
Individual-Level 
Factors 
    
Party Allegiance    .01***(.00)   .01** (.00)   .01* (.00) 
Family Economic 
Satisfaction 
  .08*** (.02)    .09*** (.02)   .09*** (.01)   .09*** (.01) 
Civic Engagement   .07*** (.01)    .08*** (.02)   .08*** (.02)   .08*** (.01) 
Interpersonal Trust  .10*** (.01)   .11*** (.01)   .11*** (.01)   .11*** (.01) 
Post-materialist 
Values 
-.03*** (.01)  -.04*** (.01)  -.04*** (.01)  -.04*** (.01) 
Age  .01 (.01)   .01 (.01)   .01 (.01)   .01 (.01) 
Education -.04** (.02)  -.05*** (.02)  -.05** (.02)  -.06*** (.01) 
Sex  .02*** (.00)   .01** (.01)   .01** (.01)   .01** (.00) 
Country-Level Factors     
Democratic Level      .21** (.09)   .20** (.10) 
Executive System     -.10* (.05)  -.11** (.05) 
Electoral System      .07 (.06)    .08 (.06) 
Party System     .16* (.08)    .16** (.08) 
Democracy dummy  -.23*** (.08)    
Corruption   -.24*** (.09)   -.21** (.10)  -.19** (.10) 
GDP/pc growth   .17*** (.05)    .15** (.07)   .15* (.07) 
Ln GDP pc   .18* (.10)    .16* (.09)   .16 (.11) 
Regions (not shown)     
Constant   .01 (.05)   .02 (.07)    .05 (.05)    .04 (.05) 
Cross-Level Interactions     
Party Allegiance  * 
Party System 
     .02** (.01) 
Party Allegiance * 
Level of Democracy 
     .04*** (.01) 
Level of Education * 
Corruption 
     .05*** (.01) 
Level of Education * 
GDP/pc growth 
     .02* (.01) 
Variance Components     
Individual Level (σ2) .730a .740b .739c .736d 
Country Level (τ00) .108 .178 .116 .119 
 
Sources: 2005 World values Survey. 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates of political trust (HLM 6.06).   
a χ2.31df = 7301.46, p<.01. 
b χ2.38df = 6,907.68, p<.01. 
c χ2.25df = 3,375.28, p<.01. 
d χ2.25df = 3493.82, p<.01. 
* p < .10.  ** p < .05.  *** p < .01 
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4.3.3.2.2 Contextual Effects 
The contextual level determinants of political trust are the focus of this chapter.  We find 
several country-level significant effects.   On the institutional performance side, people’s trust in 
political institutions is shaped by political performance of the countries they live in.  People 
express less confidence in countries with more widespread corruption.   
Of institutional designs, I am mostly interested in five institutional settings.  First, results 
from Model 1 shows that the types of regime make a difference in the levels of political trust.  
Non-democratic regimes tend to have higher levels of political trust than democracies.  Second, I 
specified four types of democratic institutional settings, and according to results from Model 3, 
three of them perform consistently with our hypotheses.  Within democracies, countries with 
higher levels of democratization are more likely to demonstrate higher level of political trust.  
Combined with the previous findings regarding democratic versus non-democratic regimes, I 
find that the manner people trust institutions is conditioned by the democratization experience of 
the countries they live in.  On average, non-democratic regimes tend to demonstrate higher level 
of trust than democracies; but within democracies, people are more likely to trust institutions in 
countries with higher levels of civic participation and protection of human rights.    
The other two significant institutional variables are party systems and executive systems.  
As expected, people are more trusting in two party and moderate multi-party systems than in 
fragmented multi-party systems.  This suggests that party systems remain an important mediating 
institution between citizens and the state, and a moderate number of “more broadly based and 
centrist” parties effectively aggregate interests and translate electoral choices into policy (Norris 
1999c: 224).  Executive systems also make a difference in political trust.  Regimes with 
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parliamentary systems show higher level of political trust than presidential systems.  This agrees 
with our argument that parliamentary systems have some institutional structures that encourage 
diversity, efficiency and stability, and therefore might attract higher level of political trust than 
presidential systems.   
Electoral system is the only institutional variable that does not show any significant 
effects on political trust.  Our multi-level analysis finds no evidence that political trust differs in 
majoritarian or proportional systems.  Economic performance, as measured by GDP per capita 
growth and GDP per capita, positively affect the levels of political trust.  People in countries 
with better economic performance are more likely to trust their institutions.   
 
4.3.3.2.3 Cross-Level Interaction Effects  
Model 4 includes cross-level interaction between party allegiance and country level 
institutional designs.  I want to find out whether the effects of party allegiance on political trust 
are similar across countries with different institutional designs.  I argued earlier that the effects of 
party allegiance on political trust are contingent upon institutional designs.  The results from 
Model 4 confirmed these interaction effects.   
In Model 4, I allowed the slope of the individual level effects of party allegiance to vary 
across countries, and regressed the slope on country-level institutional designs.   The coefficient 
for party allegiance is 0.01, meaning the gap between winners’ and losers’ levels of political trust 
is 0.01 when the institutional designs interaction with party allegiance is fixed at zero.  The two 
interaction terms between party allegiance and institutional designs are both statistically 
significant.   
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The interaction between party allegiance and party system is significant and positive 
(0.02).  The coefficient for party allegiance is 0.01, so the winners in fragmented multi-party 
systems are 0.01 points more trusting of political institutions than losers in similar institutional 
settings.  The positive interaction term between party allegiance and party system implied that 
with two party or moderated multi-party systems, winners are even more trusting of political 
institutions than losers (0.01+0.02=0.03).  Also, winners who live in countries with two-party or 
moderated multi-party systems are about .18 points more trusting than winners living in more 
corrupted countries (0.16+0.02=0.18).   
The interaction between party allegiance and levels of democracy is also significant and 
positive (0.04).  As coefficient for party allegiance is only .01, this significantly changes the size 
of the trust gap.  Winners are 0.05 points even more trusting than losers in more mature 
democracies (0.01+0.04=0.05).  Winners are 0.24 points more trusting in more mature 
democracies than winners living in less mature democracies (0.20+0.04=0.24).   
Now I turn to the cross-level interactions between citizens’ educational levels and 
countries’ institutional performances.  I allow the effect of institutional performance to differ 
across different social groups.  The regression coefficient for corruption on trust is negative (-
.19).  The cross-level interaction between corruption and level of education shows the extent the 
effect of corruption on trust differs across people with different levels of education.  Specifically, 
for people with lower level of education (with a score of 0), the effect of corruption on trust is -
.19.  The effect of corruption on trust changes to (-.19+3*-.05=) -.34 for people with higher level 
of education (a score of 3).  The level of education has a stronger effect on political trust for 
people with higher level of education than those with lower level of education.   
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The interaction effect between education level and economic growth is also significant.  
The regression coefficient for economic growth is significant (.15) and the interaction term is .02.  
The effect of economic growth on political trust is (.15+1.5*.02=) .18 for people with average 
level of education (with a score of 1.5).  For people with lower level of education (a score of 0), 
the effect of economic growth on political trust is .15 while the effect increases to 
(.15+3*.02=) .21 for those with higher level of education (a score of 3).  As we hypothesized, the 
level of education has a stronger effect on trust for people with higher level of education.   
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 also tell us the variance we can explain at each level of analysis with 
each specified model.  Using the σ2 estimates obtained, I calculated the percentage of individual-
level variance in political trust explained with Model 4 (4.8%).  Using the τ00 estimates, we 
calculated how much Model 4 can explain country-level variance in political trust (33.1%).  Our 
models do a better job explaining country-level variance than individual-level variance.  χ2 in our 
models are all highly significant. Overall, the models perform well and the statistical results meet 
our expectations.   
 
 
4.4 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter, I examined political trust using data from approximately 50 countries around the 
world.  I am interested in the political sources of political trust, and we explored the issue at the 
country level.  First, I found that the levels of political trust vary across the countries and 
continents.  Noticeably, East Asia demonstrates very high level of political trust on average.   
91 
Second, we examined the relationship between social trust and political trust with three-
waved cross-lagged panel analysis, and found that social trust, an important part of social capital, 
significantly contributes to political trust.  Political trust, on the other hand, does not affect social 
trust.  Contrary to some earlier research, I found that the causal flow is unidirectional from social 
trust to political trust.   
Last, and most importantly, I explored the political sources of political trust with 
hierarchical linear models, and found significant influences at both individual and country level.  
On the one hand, I found that institutional settings play significant roles in shaping the levels of 
political trust.  Individual level characteristics such as individual’s party allegiance affect how 
he/she trusts political institutions.  Meanwhile, people’s political trust is also shaped by the 
country-level characteristics.  Noticeably, democratic experience is one of the most important 
predictors of the levels of political trust.  Regime types significantly affect how people trust their 
institutions as people may demonstrate higher level of political trust as a result of authoritarian 
institutional arrangements and passive policization.  Within democracies, political trust is also 
affected by different democratic institutional settings, including democratic levels, party systems, 
executive systems, and party allegiance.  Moreover, the effects of institutional performance 
should not be discussed independently from individual party allegiance.  My results show that 
winners are generally more trusting than losers, and the gap in political trust between winners 
and losers is widened by economic and political performance.  On the other hand, I found that 
institutional political performance, as measured by political corruption, is one of the strongest 
predictors for the level of political trust.   
The multi-level analysis used in this chapter pays attention to both within-country and 
between-country variance in political trust.  Data from nearly 50 countries from the WVS in this 
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chapter emphasizes the institutional effects at both country and individual levels.  In the next 
chapter, I will shift my focus to East Asia, a region with a very high level of political trust and 
diverse institutional settings, and possibly a hard case for the effects of political corruption.   
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5.0 EXPLAINING POLITICAL TRUST:  
EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIAN DEMOCRACIES 
 
 
I study the effects of political performance and institutional settings on political trust in this 
dissertation.  In Chapter 4, I examined global data from around 45 countries across the world, 
focusing on the effects of institutional designs on political trust.  I found significant effects of 
both political performance and institutional designs on political trust at both individual and 
country levels.  In this chapter, I will focus on one region where political trust has been 
exceptionally higher – East Asia.  Whereas literature on political trust in East Asia is relatively 
scarce, the area is actually a great place to study the different determinants of political trust.  The 
existing scholarship has attributed the high levels of political trust in East Asia to either the 
unique Asian Values or the regional economic miracles, and the effects of political performance 
and institutional settings have rarely been studied.  It is necessary to go into the region and 
examine the political sources of political trust in East Asian societies.  To distinguish the 
different mechanisms of political trust between democratic and non-democratic societies, I will 
focus on East Asian democracies in this chapter, and study China and other non-democratic 
societies in the Chapter 6.   
This chapter starts with an examination of the levels and trends of political trust in East 
Asia.  Then, I will study the individual level sources of political trust in seven East Asian 
democracies, focusing on the effects of political performance.  The next part of the chapter 
employs multilevel analysis and adds country-level institutional effects into our analysis in 
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democratic country.  Last, I add non-democratic regimes into the multilevel analysis and study 
the political sources of political trust in all types of regimes in East Asia.   
 
 
5.1 POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST ASIA: LEVELS AND TREND  
 
We reviewed the patterns of political trust across the world in Chapter 4, and Asia demonstrated 
the highest level of political trust.  Within Asia, how do political trust distribute across countries 
and across institutions?  How do levels of political trust change over years?   
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Figure 5.1  Political Trust in East Asia, by Country (2005) 
Source: East Asian Barometer 2002 and 2005.  
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Using the latest data from the East Asia Barometer, Figure 5.1 displays the levels of 
political trust in 12 East Asian societies between 2002 and 2005.  Except Japan, the levels of 
political trust in most East Asian countries dropped from 2002 to 2005.  The average levels of 
political trust in the five key institutions in seven East Asian societies that were surveyed in both 
waves of EAB dropped slightly from is 1.55 in 2002 (out of 3) to 1.45 in 200517.  The levels of 
political trust in 2005 varied greatly across societies in East Asia.  South Korea demonstrated the 
lowest level of political trust (0.90) while Vietnam showed the highest (2.49).  On average, the 
non-democratic regimes appear to have higher levels of political trust than democracies do in 
East Asia.   
Figure 5.2 illustrates the levels of political trust by institutions.  The levels of political 
trust are evenly distributed among the five key institutions.  Between 2002 and 2005, political 
parties and parliament have consistently displayed slightly lower levels of trust among all 
institutions while civil service, national government, and legal system showed relatively higher 
level of trust in both waves of surveys.  Political Trust does not vary greatly across specific 
institutions, and this seems to point to our earlier claim that political trust, as measured by trust 
in political institutions, is a general phenomenon.  In the next section, I will return to this issue 
and examine the individual level sources of political trust in different institutions.   
 
 
17 Seven East Asian societies were surveyed in both the first (2002) and second (2005) waves of EAB: South Korea, 
Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Mongolia, Thailand, and Mainland China.  
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Figure 5.2  Political Trust in East Asia, by Institutions 
 
Source: East Asian Barometer 2002 and 2005.  
 
 
5.2 RECALL THE HYPOTHESES IN EAST ASIAN CONTEXT 
 
In the previous chapters, we discussed four theories that attempt to explain political trust.  The 
two major arguments in the existing literature come from political cultural theory and political 
economy theory.  However, this dissertation argues that institutional settings and institutional 
performance also play important roles in explaining political trust and they should not be left out 
from the current discussion.   
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I have developed some hypotheses based on these theories, some of which have been 
tested and discussed by the existing literature in different geographical context.  However, as 
discussed earlier, the majority of the scholarship of political trust has mostly focused in 
industrialized democracies, whether they are case studies or researches studying a group of 
countries.  Trust studies have been very limited outside Europe and North America, and non-
democratic countries have rarely been discussed.  This dissertation hopes to extend the analysis 
and fill the literature gap.  In Chapter 4, I examined the proposed hypotheses in nearly 50 
countries around the world with diverse institutional settings including both democratic and non-
democratic countries.  Evidence from the global data in Chapter 4 supports both the institutional 
designs hypotheses and the performance hypotheses.  In this chapter, I will test these hypotheses 
in East Asia, a much less studied region.   
Now we recall and reiterate our hypotheses in the East Asian context.  Researches often 
attribute the high levels of political trust to the economic miracles or the authoritarian “Asian 
Values” in the region (Wang 2005; Albritton, Bureekul, & Guo 2005;  Dalton & Shin 2006; 
Nathan 2007; Shi & Lu 2007).     
 
5.2.1 The Economic Growth Hypothesis 
 
At the country level, the extraordinary economic growth and improved individual well-being in 
many East Asia societies (e.g. China and Singapore) brought the public with great satisfaction 
with their life, contributing to their high levels of trust in governments on average; and the 
slowed economic progress in some other East Asian societies (e.g. Japan, South Korea) lead to 
the decreased levels of political trust (the Economic Growth Hypothesis).   At the individual level, 
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we are more concerned with the perceived economic performance.  People who are more 
satisfied with the government economic performance are more likely to trust political institutions 
than those who are not.   
 
5.2.2 The Asian Values Hypothesis 
 
The deeply rooted traditional cultural values that emphasize on respect and deference to 
authority in East Asian societies promote the public trust and confidence in the government 
institutions.  At the individual level, citizens who identify with the traditional authoritarian 
values are more likely to trust political institutions than those do not.   
 
5.2.3 The Political Performance Hypotheses 
 
While almost all the works on trust in East Asia pointed to the economic growth hypothesis 
or/and the Asian Values Hypothesis, this work draws attention to the political performance and 
institutional designs as sources of political trust in East Asia.   
Corruption is generally regarded as an economic evil, but the roles of corruption in 
economic development have been questioned in East Asia.  Most noticeably, the “East Asian 
Paradox”, the coexistence of high levels of corruption and economic growth in East Asia, has 
puzzled many economists and political scientists and inspired a series of interesting researches 
(Wedeman 2002; Kang 2002; Lim & Stern 2002; Chang & Chu 2006).  To explain this 
exceptionalism and explore the roles of corruption in the economic and political development in 
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East Asia, scholars have studied several regional factors including the unique state-business 
relationships (i.e. the mutual dependence between the state and the business) (Wedeman 2002), 
the hierarchical Asian Values that emphasizes deference, harmony, and reciprocity (Bardhan 
1997; Lipset & Lenz 2000), and the characteristics of electoral politics (i.e. personalistic 
elections and clientelism) in East Asia (Nathan 1993; Sidel 1996).   
If corruption may not be detrimental in East Asia as some studies pointed out, we need to 
carefully examine its roles when discussing the sources of political trust in the area.  Specifically, 
we proposed that people who perceive higher levels of political corruption are less likely to trust 
political institutions.  In this chapter, we will examine East Asia, a possible hard case, and test 
the hypotheses in this relatively new setting.   
Besides, we will also study the roles of the other aspects of political performance (as 
measured by perceived fairness and perceived responsiveness) in shaping the levels of political 
trust in East Asian societies.   
To test these hypotheses of political performance, I use the following questions to 
measure the three aspects of political performance.   
 
5.2.4 The Institutional Designs Hypotheses 
 
At the individual level, I am interested in the effects of party allegiance on the level of political 
trust in democratic countries.  I proposed that individuals who voted for the winning parties are 
more likely to trust government institutions than those who did not.   
At the country level, I am most concerned with the four institutional features in East Asia: 
democratic experience, party system, electoral system, and executive system. 
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5.2.4.1 Democratic Experience 
Non-democratic societies are expected to have higher levels of political trust than 
democracies.  Within democracies, societies with higher levels of democratization are expected 
to demonstrate higher levels of political trust than those with lower levels.   
East Asia has a naturally heterogeneous regime setting.  With the third wave 
democratization starting in late 1980s, several East Asian societies have experienced historic 
transformation towards democratization and their levels of democratization have greatly 
improved (Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Mongolia, South Korea, and Taiwan).  As Figure 
5.3 shows, on a scale of 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic), the levels of democracy, as 
measured by Freedom House Index, were evenly distributed across East Asian societies by 2005.  
East Asia has both non-democratic and democratic regimes, including countries with extreme 
scores at both sides of the scale.  Within democratic regimes, there are relatively new 
democracies like Thailand, consolidating democracies like South Korea and Taiwan, and 
established democracy like Japan.  This is an interesting setting to test the hypothesis of levels of 
democratization.   
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Figure 5.3  The Levels of Democracy in East Asian Societies 
 
Source: Freedom House, 1980 to 2005 
 
5.2.4.2 Party System  
In previous chapters, I proposed that in democratic countries, two-party and moderate 
multi-party systems should have higher levels of political trust than fragmented party systems.  
While party fragmentation and polarization varies across countries, the party systems have 
generally been weak and fragmented in East Asian democracies (Croissant 2002; Reilly 2008).  
Most major political parties in East Asia have shallow social base and thin organizational 
structure, and many are of recent creation and are leader-centered (Dalton, Chu, Shin 2008).  As 
Dalton, Chu, and Shin (2008) argue, the citizen-party linkage is weak in East Asia and this 
nature of political parties “may weaken the linkage between parties and citizens, as well as 
attenuate the usefulness of partisanship in structuring citizens’ political orientations” in East Asia.   
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5.2.4.3 Electoral System 
In recent years, electoral reform across East Asia brought a convergence of different 
electoral systems towards “mixed-member” electoral system models where part of the national 
level legislature is elected by proportional representation and part from local districts (Croissant 
2002).  However, unlike international norm where district and list element are often equal split, 
almost all the mixed-member systems in East Asian democracies are heavily weighted in favor 
of the district component of the system – making them “highly majoritarian in practice” (Reilly 
2008: 192; Croissant 2002).18  Thus, instead of referring to the hypothesis that focuses on the 
difference between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, I will focus on a unique 
characteristic of East Asian electoral systems – the personalistic politics.  
Researchers found that party systems in East Asian democracies often “do not have 
institutionalized programmatic electoral competition” (Dalton, Chu, and Shin 2007: 178).  
Instead, political parties are more likely to compete on valence issues, clientelism, and party 
leaders’ personal charisma.  Some studies argue that citizens may support corrupt politicians 
because the elections in East Asian democracies are candidate centered and personalistic (Chang 
& Chu 2006).  If this argument is right, we should expect to observe higher levels of political 
trust in electoral systems that are more personalistic or candidate centered.   
 
5.2.4.4 Executive System  
The executive systems range from presidential democracies to semi-presidential systems 
to parliamentary systems.  As I proposed in Chapter 2, levels of political trust in parliamentary 
democracies are expected to be higher than those in presidential democracies.   
18 In his study of 14 Southeast and East Asia countries, Croissant found that except Cambodia and Indonesia, all 
electoral systems in East Asia used in legislative elections can be classified as majoritarian systems.   
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5.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT  
 
I will test these hypotheses with data from East Asia Barometer (EAB) in 2002 and 2005.  The 
EAB is a comparative survey of citizens’ orientation towards politics and democracy in thirteen 
Northeast and Southeast Asian societies: Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.  
Under a common research design, face-to-face interviews were conducted in each country with 
standard questionnaire instruments in national probability samples.  So far, two waves of surveys 
have been conducted in 2002 and 2005.   
To test these hypotheses, we will use questions from the East Asia Barometer and other 
data sources.  To measure political trust, the dependent variable, I will use a question from the 
EAB: “I’m going to name a number of institutions.  For each one, please tell me how much trust 
do you have in them?  Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none 
at all?”  The institutions include the national government [in capital city], political parties, 
parliament, civil service, and the legal system.     
To test the hypotheses of political performance, I will use the following questions to 
measure the three aspects of perceived political performance.   For perceived corruption, “How 
widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government [in capital 
city]?  Would you say hardly anyone is involved (3), not a lot of officials are corrupt (2), most 
officials are corrupt (1), or almost everyone is corrupt (0)?”  For perceived fairness, “Please tell 
me whether you strongly agree (3), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (1), or strongly 
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disagree (0) with each of these statements.  Everyone is treated equally by the government.” For 
perceived responsiveness, “How well do you think the government responds to what people want? 
Is it very responsive (3), largely responsive (2), not very responsive (1), or not responsive at all 
(0)?”  
The hypotheses of institutional designs that I proposed work at two levels.  At the 
individual level, to study the effects of party allegiance, I created a dummy variable based on 
respondents’ reply to the EAB question “Which parties (or candidates for president if it was 
presidential race) did you vote for?”  Citizens who voted for the winning camp are coded as 
winners (1) and those who voted for losing camp are coded as losers (0).   
At the country level, I will use the following data to tap into four aspects of institutional 
designs in East Asia: democratic experience (regime types and democratization level), party 
system, personalistic voting, and executive system.   
For a dichotomous measure of democratic and non-democratic regimes, I will use 
Cheibub, Ghandi and Vreeland (2010)’s Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited dataset.  For a 
continuous measure of the levels of democratization, I will use the average figure of the past 5 
years of Freedom in the World Index from the Freedom House. 
To study party systems in East Asia, I will use the effective numbers of political parties 
(ENPP) data in East Asian democracies calculated by Reilly (2008).   
I will refer to Hicken and Kasayu’s (2003) data on Asian electoral system to capture the 
personalistic character.  Electoral systems with separate votes for both candidates and parties are 
considered less candidate centered (0), while electoral systems with singe votes for candidates 
are considered more personalistic (1).   
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I will refer to Norris’s (2009) Democracy Cross-National Dataset and Reilly’s (2007) 
survey on systems of government.  Presidential systems are coded as 2, semi-presidential 
systems 1, and parliamentary systems 0.  
I will include variables to control for the effects of Asian Values and economic 
performance.  Specifically, I will use GDP per capita growth rate and logged GDP per capita 
from the World Bank to measure the aggregate level of economic performance.  At the 
individual level, I will refer to a question from the East Asian Barometer for perceived economic 
performance: “How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country 
over the last few years? Is it much better (4), a little better (3), about the same (2), a little worse 
(1), or much worse (0)?” 
To tap into Asian Values mechanism, I will use a battery of questions from the East 
Asian Barometer: “Please tell me how you feel about the following statements.  Would you say 
you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?  1. Even if 
parents’ demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.  2. Being a student, 
one should not question the authority of their teacher.   3. When one has a conflict with a 
neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person.  4. For the sake of the 
family, the individual should put his personal interests second.”    
I will also include a set of standard control variables at the individual level: sex, 
education, age, income, and political interest.  Country dummies are also included in pooled 
analyses. 
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5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SOURCES OF POLITICAL 
TRUST IN EAST ASIA DEMOCRACIES 
 
5.4.1 Political Trust in Seven East Asian Democracies 
 
In this chapter, I will first focus on the individual level effects of political performance and 
institutional settings on political trust in East Asian democracies.  I will study the sources of 
political trust in non-democratic regimes in Chapter 6.  Table 5.1 presented the results from 
pooled and country-by-country analyses in seven Asian democracies.  Model 1 uses the pooled 
data set from seven democratic countries in 2005, and Model 2 uses pooled data set from five 
East Asian democracies in 2002.  The Philippines is the comparison country in both analyses.  
Model 1A through Model 1G are country-by-country analysis with 2005 data.   
My key interests are the effects of perceived political performance and party allegiance, 
and they both show strong predicting power.  First, perceived political performance significantly 
contributes to the levels of political trust.  The effects of the three aspects of political 
performance are all significant and go in the expected directions in both pooled analyses and 
country-by-country analyses.  Specifically, people who perceive government officials as corrupt 
are less likely to trust political institutions.  The effects of perceived fairness and perceived 
government responsiveness are also significant, and they are both negatively related to citizens’ 
levels of political trust.  Overall, all of the three aspects of political performance consistently and 
significantly affect political trust.   
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Table 5.1 Estimated Effects of Perceived Political Performance (Asian Democracies)  
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Second, party allegiance is also a strong predictor of political trust.  Controlling for other 
factors, citizens who support the winning parties are most trusting of the government institutions 
in both pooled analysis.  I run the country-by-country analyses to reinforce the confidence of the 
effects of political performance and party allegiance.  Except for South Taiwan and Thailand, 
people’s party allegiance is positively related to their trust in political institutions in the other 
five democracies.  These results from East Asia are consistent with my earlier findings from 
global data in Chapter 4, and the significantly negative effects from the possible hard case 
confirms the corrosive effects of political corruption.    
I also find support for both Asian values thesis and economic performance hypothesis.  
Generally, citizens who have higher evaluation of national economic condition and who are more 
influenced by Asian values are most likely to trust political institutions.  Statistical results, 
however, do not lend much support to social capital theory.  In pooled analyses, the effects of 
associational activism and interpersonal trust are significant and positive as social capital theory 
predicted, but they are not significant in all country-by-country analyses.   
Several comments can be made regarding the other control variables.  First, people who 
are more interested in politics are also more likely to trust political institutions.  Second, age and 
sex do not show significant effects on the levels of political trust.  Third, people with lower level 
of education, income, and urban experience are more likely to trust political institutions.  This 
partly confirms modernization theory.  However, all these effects are often not significant in 
country-by-country analyses.  Together, these results proved that political trust is a political 
phenomenon and better explained by political factors instead of personal or social factors.   
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5.4.2 Sources of Political Trust in the Five Political Institutions 
 
Political trust, the dependent variable, is the mean level of political trust in five key political 
institutions: civil service, national government, legal system, parliament, and political parties.  At 
the beginning of the dissertation, I argue that political trust is inter-correlated and does not vary a 
great deal across the five institutions.            
 To improve our understanding and further reinforce the confidence that trust in five 
institutions reflect a general political orientation, I will study the sources of trust in five specific 
political institutions that compose the political trust index.  In other words, I will run the same 
model specification of Model 1 with political trust in the five specific political institutions (i.e. 
civil services, national government, legal system, parliament, and political parties) as dependent 
variables to see whether the results would be different from political trust index model.   
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Table 5.2 Determinants of Political Trust in Five Key Institutions, 2005 
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Several patterns emerge from Table 5.2.  First, from Model3A to Model 3E, the empirical 
results are generally consistent with that of Model 1.  Political trust in national government is 
best explained with the model specification, while trust in civil services is relatively less well-
explained by the same independent variables.  Second, the effects of political performance 
remain about the same.  The significance and the direction of the effects and the magnitude of 
the coefficients for perceived political corruption, government fairness, and government 
responsiveness do not vary much across trust in the five different institutions.  Third, the effects 
of party allegiance, the institutional variable, are also consistent across trust in national 
government, parliament, civil services, political parties, and legal system.  Fourth, the 
coefficients of economic performance and Asian values do not change much across institutions, 
while the effects of the other control variables sometimes vary with different political institutions.  
Overall, I find that political trust is a general political orientation and the effects of political 
performance and party allegiance are consistent in different political institutions.   
 
 
5.5 MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST IN EAST 
ASIA 
 
I have studied the sources of political trust in East Asian democracies at the individual level.  I 
found that perceived political performance and party allegiance play very important roles in 
explaining political trust.  In this section, I will add the institutional designs variables at the 
country level to the current individual level model, and evaluate the relevance of different 
explanatory variables.  First, I will follow the individual level analysis in the previous section 
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and explore the effects of democratic institutional designs on political trust in East Asian 
democracies.  Then, I will expand my analysis to include non-democratic countries and study the 
effects of regime types on political trust.   
 
5.5.1 A Multilevel Analysis of Political Trust in East Asian Democracy 
 
First I run an ANOVA model to check whether there is statistically significant country-level 
variance in the levels of political trust.  Table 5.3 describes to what extent country-level variance 
makes an independent contribution in explaining the levels of political trust.   
The significant chi-square shows that there is statistically significant variation in political 
trust at the country level.  To get intra-class correlation (ICC) and find relative importance of the 
country level of analysis, we calculate the ratio of country-level variance (τ00) to the total 
variance in our dependent variable (τ00 + σ2).  ICC is 33% in this case, meaning national 
variations alone count for 33% of the variance in political trust in East Asian democracies.  This 
shows that a significant portion of variance is explained at the country-level analysis and a multi-
level model including country level explanations is indeed necessary.19   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 This result is consistent with Albritton, Bureekul, and Guo (2005)’s observation.   
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Table 5.3  ANOVA for Political Trust in East Asia (Democratic Countries Only) 
 
Parameter Estimate 
Fixed Effects  
Constant -.172 (.170) 
Variance Components  
Country-level (τ00) .291† 
Individual-Level (σ2) .604 
ICC (Intraclass correlation ρ) 32.5% 
 
Sources: 2005 East Asian Barometers Survey.  
Note: Table entries are multilevel estimates of trust in political institutions.  
† χ28df = 3903.33, p<.01. 
 
As I only included seven East Asian democracies in my analysis, one might reasonably 
question whether that would be sufficient for accurate estimation.  Indeed, a simulation study by 
Maas and Hox (2005) shows that small sample size at level 2 may lead to biased estimates of 
standard errors at the group level.  While researchers have different insights on what constitute as 
small sample size in multilevel analysis, many believe 20 cases or more are recommended for 
group level.20  However, the alterative, the usual non-multilevel model, is essentially a multilevel 
model with group-level variance set to 0 or infinity that introduces bias as well as causes 
incorrect standard errors.  For lack of a better alternative, multilevel analysis is still the best 
option we have.  I will use hierarchical linear model to study sources of trust at both contextual 
and individual levels.  However, when interpreting the statistical results, we should bear in mind 
that though regression coefficients at both levels and variance at individual level are accurate, 
group level standard error estimates can be biased.   
20 For instance, Snijder & Bosker (1999) consider multilevel analysis attractive when number of groups is larger 
than 10;  Kreft & De Leeuw(1998) hold that 30 is the smallest acceptable group number; Maax & Hox 2005 
even argue that 50 cases or more at the group level is considered sufficient for multilevel analysis.   
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Now we turn to Table 5.4 for statistical results from HLM estimations.  Model 4 and 5 
study the effects of democratic institutional effects on political trust in East Asian democracies.  
Model 4 only includes individual level predictors, and Model 5 reports results of a random 
intercept model.   
We studied the individual level explanations in the previous section, and in this section, I 
want to study the effects of democratic institutional designs while controlling for individual level 
sources of political trust.   
Several findings are worthy of discussing.  First, the individual level results of Model 4 
and Model 5 are generally consistent with the OLS results in Model 1 in the previous section.  
Clearly, at the individual level, people’s perceived political performance (corruption, fairness, 
and responsiveness) significantly contribute to their levels of political trust.  The HLM results of 
the individual level institutional variable, party allegiance, are also consistent with Model 1.  
Winners are more likely to trust political institutions than losers.  
Second, of particular interest are the effects of institutional designs at the country level.  
Most institutional variables showed significant effects in the multilevel analysis.   Most 
noticeably, democratic experience is positively related to the level of political trust in East Asian 
democracies.  On average, countries with higher levels of democracy showed higher levels of 
political trust, and newer democracies showed relatively lower levels of political trust.   Another 
significant institutional variable is party systems.  Party systems are negatively correlated with 
the levels of political trust in East Asia.   
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 Table 5.4  Multi-Level Determinants of Political Trust in East Asian Democracies 
 
 DV: Political Trust 
 Model 4:  
Individual Level 
Predictors Only 
Model 5:  
Random Intercept 
Model 
Parameter Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Perceived Corruption -.12*** .01   -.12*** .01 
Fairness .11*** .01   .11*** .01 
Responsiveness .14*** .01   .14*** .01 
Party Allegiance .09*** .01   .09*** .01 
Satisfaction with National Economy .10*** .01   .10*** .01 
Civic Engagement   .02** .01   .02*** .01 
Interpersonal Trust .03*** .01   .03*** .01 
Asian Values .06*** .01 .06** .01 
Political Interest .05*** .01    .05*** .01 
Sex   -.02** .00 -.03** .01 
   Age .00 .01 .00 .01 
Education -.05*** .01     -.05*** .01 
Income -.05*** .01     -.05*** .01 
Urban     -.02** .01  -.02* .01 
GDP/pc growth   -.04 .07 
Democratic Level      .26** .06 
Executive System    -.10*  .04 
Party System   -.14* .06 
Candidate Centered Electoral 
System * corruption 
  -.09 .05 
Constant -.04 .10 -.00 .05 
Variance Components     
Individual Level (σ2) .439  .439  
Country Level (τ00) .079 a  .013b  
χ2 649.8***  105.8***  
 
Sources: 2005 East Asian Barometers. 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates of political trust (HLM 6.06).   
                            * p < .10, ** p < .05,  *** p < .01 
 
 
           Countries with fragmented party systems are generally associated with lower levels of 
political trust than those with two or moderate party systems.   The effects of executive systems 
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are also significant.  Countries with parliamentary systems are associated with higher level of 
political trust than presidential systems.   The only institutional variable that does not perform as 
expected is electoral systems.  As Table 5.4 shows, HLM results did not find significant effects 
of personalistic voting on political trust.   
Third, we can calculate the variance explained at each level of analysis.  With reported σ2 
we obtained from Model 4 and 5, we find that our analysis explained 27.3% of variance at the 
individual level.  Using the τ00 estimates in Table 5.3 and 5.4, we calculate that Model 4 explains 
73% of country level variance partly due to composition effects, and adding four institutional 
designs variables helps explain an additional 23% of variance at the country level, leaving only 
5% of unexplained variance in Model 5.  
In sum, evidence from multilevel analysis supported that overall, democratic institutional 
designs at the country level are significantly related to the levels of political trust in East Asian 
democracies.  Meanwhile, controlling for all other variables, political performance variables such 
as perceived corruption, government fairness, and responsiveness also significantly contribute to 
citizens’ trust in political trust.   
 
5.5.2 A Multilevel Analysis of Political Trust in East Asia (All Countries) 
 
We should notice that the above analyses only included seven democratic regimes in East Asia.  
How do these conclusions hold when we include different types of regimes?  Fortunately, the 
East Asian Barometer also includes 5 non-democratic regimes: Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Vietnam.  Now I will include these societies in my analysis and test these 
hypotheses against all East Asian societies regardless of their regime types.  
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Table 5.5 ANOVA for Political Trust in East Asia (All Countries) 
 
Parameter Estimate 
Fixed Effects  
Constant .008 (.193) 
Variance Components  
Country-level (τ00) .451† 
Individual-Level (σ2) .619 
ICC (Intraclass correlation ρ) 42.1% 
 
Sources: 2005 East Asian Barometers Survey.  
Note: Table entries are multilevel estimates of trust in political institutions.  
† χ2.10df = 7388.05, p<.01. 
 
The highly significant chi square (7388 with 10 degrees of freedom, p=.000) in Table 5.5 
suggests significant variation between countries in their levels of political trust, making 
multilevel analysis necessary.  Adding non-democratic regimes into our analysis, the new ICC 
changed from 33% to 42%.  This tells us that as high as 42% of variance in political trust in East 
Asian societies can be explained by country level variance, indicating the importance of the 
country level analysis.   
The individual level model specifications are the same as Model 1 through Model 5.  
However, as I am interested in non-democratic regimes, country level institutional variables (i.e. 
the four democratic institutional designs variables) in Model 5 are no longer applicable in the 
new analysis.  Instead, I added three country-level variables into the analysis, including one 
institutional variable (regime types) and two variables for economic performance (logged GDP 
per capita and the growth rate of GDP per capita).  The results of the multilevel analysis are 
presented in Table 5.6.   
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Table 5.6 Multi-Level Determinants of Trust in Political Institutions (All Countries) 
 
 DV: Political Trust 
 Model 6:  
Individual Level 
Predictors Only 
Model 7:  
Random Intercept 
Model 
Parameter Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Individual-Level Factors     
Corruption -.08*** .01 -.08*** .01 
Fairness .11*** .01 .11*** .01 
Responsiveness .13*** .01 .13*** .01 
Satisfaction with Economic 
Development 
.09*** .01 .09*** .01 
Civic Engagement .02** .01 .02** .01 
Interpersonal Trust  .04*** .01  .04*** .01 
Asian Values .06*** .01 .06*** .01 
Political Interest .05*** .01 .05*** .01 
Sex -.02** .01 -.02** .01 
   Age .01 .01 .00 .01 
Education -.05*** .01 -.05*** .01 
Income -.05*** .01 -.05*** .01 
Urban -.02* .01 -.02* .01 
Country-Level Factors     
Democracy Dummy   -.23** .05 
GDP/pc growth   -.01 .07 
Ln GDP pc   -.31* .12 
Constant -.23** .09 -.12 .05 
Variance Components     
Individual Level (σ2) .439  .439  
Country Level (τ00) .071  .017  
χ2 560.33***  77.02***  
 
Sources: 2005 East Asian Barometers. 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates of political trust (HLM 6.06).   
                 * p < .10, ** p < .05,  *** p < .01 
 
Model 6 includes individual level predictors only, and Model 7 is a random intercept 
model and adds country level variables.  After including both democratic and non-democratic 
societies in East Asia, I find that the individual level results of the multilevel analysis (Model 6 
and Model 7) are consistent with Model 1 and Model 5 where only democracies are included.  
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Most importantly, all of the three political performance variables remain significant and in the 
same directions.  Generally, people who perceive less levels of corruption and higher levels of 
government fairness and responsiveness are more likely to trust political institutions.  Again, the 
evidence we obtained from multilevel analysis supports both the Asian values hypothesis and the 
economic performance hypothesis.   
Institutional designs also play a significant role in explaining political trust in East Asia.  
At the individual level, people who identify with the winning parties have higher confidence in 
political institutions.  At the country level, regime type is significantly related to the levels of 
political trust.  In East Asia, non-democratic countries demonstrate higher levels of political trust 
than democracies.   
Using σ2 and τ00 obtained from Model 6 and 7, we can estimate the explained variance at 
each level of the multi-level analysis.  Model 6 and 7 explain 29% of variance at the individual 
level.  After adding regime types and economic performance variables, Model 7 now explains an 
additional 12% of variance at the country level in East Asia.   Overall, including the five non-
democratic East Asian societies and adding regime types as country-level predictor, the new 
models perform well.  Statistical results supported our hypotheses of regime types, political 
performance, and party allegiance.    
 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter studies the effects of political performance and institutional designs on 
political trust in East Asia, a setting where political trust has been much less studied and where 
the political sources of trust have rarely been examined.  I started with individual level analysis 
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in seven East Asian democracies.  To examine the effects of corruption on political trust and the 
possible East Asian exceptionalism, this part of the analysis focuses on the effects of political 
performance.  Controlling for the effects of the most prominent hypothesis of Asian values and 
economic performance, the pooled OLS and country-by-country analysis all confirm the 
corrosive effects of perceived corruption on people’s trust in political institutions in East Asia.  
The effects of perceived corruption as well as the other two political performance variables (i.e. 
perceived government fairness and responsiveness) are all significant in explaining the level of 
political trust.  Specifically, people who perceive lower levels of corruption and higher levels of 
government fairness and responsiveness are more likely to trust political institutions.  Moreover, 
these effects hold in the multi-level analyses.  
To account for the significant variance of the levels of political trust at both the 
individual and country levels, I use multilevel analysis to examine political trust in East Asia.  
When adding country-level predictors to the analysis of political trust in East Asian democracies, 
I am most interested in four institutional designs: level of democracy, party systems, executive 
systems and candidate-centered electoral systems.  Three of these institutional characteristics are 
proven important when explaining political trust in East Asian democracies.  On average, 
countries with higher levels of democracy, two or moderate multi-party systems, and 
parliamentary systems demonstrate higher levels of political trust.  Results from individual level 
analysis and multi-level analysis also support the significant effects of party allegiance, another 
institutional variable.  Generally, winners, people who support the winning camp, trust political 
institutions more than losers.   
Most analyses in this chapter focus on the East Asia democracies.  In the last part of the 
chapter, I extended my analysis to include both democratic and non-democratic societies in East 
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Asia.  Evidence from multi-level analysis showed that regime type is a strong predictor for the 
levels of political trust in East Asia.  Combining with my earlier findings within East Asian 
democracies, I find that overall, non-democratic countries show higher levels of political trust 
than democracies; while within democracies, countries with higher democratic levels 
demonstrate higher levels of political trust.  Why do people in non-democratic societies trust 
political institutions?  Or, how do non-democratic governments in East Asian maintain their 
levels of political trust?  To shed light to these questions, the next chapter will turn to China, the 
largest non-democratic country in the world.   
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6.0 POLITICAL TRUST IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES:  
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I examined the sources of political trust with both global data and Asian 
data.  Evidence from Chapter 3 and 4 shows that compared with democracies, non-democratic 
countries generally enjoy higher levels of political trust.  This may seem counter-intuitive given 
the repressive nature of the regimes and the lack of accountable institutions and representative 
decision-making processes in non-democratic countries.  The contrast of the levels of political 
trust in different types of regimes triggers some interesting questions: Why do people trust 
institutions in non-democratic countries?  What are the sources of political trust in non-
democratic regimes?  Is this high level of political trust an artifact out of political fear?  To what 
extent do cultural, economic, and political factors affect political trust in non-democratic 
countries?  Is political trust different or comparable across different types of regimes?    
To answer these questions of political trust, we need to go into non-democratic countries 
and study the public attitude there.  Public opinion researches have been limited in non-
democratic countries.  Fortunately, the EAB provided detailed and valuable information in some 
non-democratic East Asian societies.  In this chapter, I will focus on China, the largest non-
democratic country in the world today, and study why Chinese people trust their political 
institutions.   
This chapter starts with the issue of survey data validity in China.  Then, I will study the 
major possible sources of political trust in China: institutional mobilization, perception of 
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political corruption, economic performance, and authoritarian values.  I will also study and 
compare political trust in the other four non-democratic societies in East Asia: Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Singapore, and Hong Kong.  The last part of the chapter studies the trust gap in 
institutions between central and local levels in China.   
 
 
6.1 THE VALIDITY OF SURVEY RESEARCH RESPONSES IN CHINA   
 
As I use survey data to study political trust in authoritarian regimes like China, I may face a 
potential question that has been raised from time to time towards survey research in authoritarian 
regimes – the validity of survey research and social desirability bias.  This is a legitimate 
question to ask.  According to the theory of “preference falsification”, individual may express 
socially acceptable preferences (in our case, political support) that are different from what they 
genuinely want (discontent in this case) when articulating preferences (Kuran 1987, 1995).  This 
is particularly the case in authoritarian societies, where the regimes do not hesitate to suppress 
unauthorized and divergent political opinions and respondents may not reveal their true feelings 
by refusing to answer or giving norm-seeking responses (Shi 1993, 1997; Manion 1994; Tang 
2005; Ren 2009).  Thus, before we proceed with statistical analysis in the following chapters, we 
need to make sure that survey data collected in China reflects the true feeling of respondents.  I 
use three methods to check the validity of the survey research responses.  
First of all, political fear does not seriously contaminate our survey responses, 
particularly with regards to the level of political trust.  China has undergone some significant 
changes since the economic reform in the 1980s. The modernization process not only made 
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people economically better off, but also greatly improved people’s education level and exposed 
them to more diverse media.  As state penetration decreases and societal autonomy increases, the 
effects of political fear on surveys have greatly faded.  Shi and his colleagues (Chen & Shi 2001; 
Shi 2006) have explicitly tested the effects of political fear on the level of political trust with 
national samples.  Their results revealed that the levels and magnitude of respondents’ political 
fear have declined dramatically from 1993 to 200221.  Moreover, they also showed a negative 
rather than positive relationship between political fear and political trust, the key variable in this 
dissertation.  In other words, political trust reported by survey respondents is not a proxy of 
political fear.  
Second, we can study the “don’t know” answers in the survey responses (Shi 2001; Ren 
2009).  Rather than giving an exact trust score, respondents can lie, or they can refuse to answer 
or answer “don’t know” to conceal their true opinion.  First, I compared the rate of nonresponse 
in the 2005 EAB data with that of the 2005 WVS.  If respondents refuse to answer or answer 
“don’t know”to conceal their true opinion, the 2005 survey’s level of nonresponse should be 
high.  However, the actual average nonresponse level for the common institutions in the 2005 
EAB survey is lower than China’s level in the 2005 WVS, and China’s nonresponse level in the 
2005 WVS is lower or comparable to that of the major democratic countries (details not shown).  
Second, we can examine whether respondents give “don’t know” answers because they want to 
conceal true opinions, because they truly do not know, or because they do not care.  Ren (2009) 
found that level of education effectively reduces the number of “don’t know” answers in surveys 
in China.  Respondents as well as countries with higher levels of education report significantly 
21 Shi (2006) investigated two questions in the survey: one asked respondent whether she worried that someone 
might snitch on her if she criticizes the government, and the other asked whether the respondent was worried that 
someone might snitch on her if she criticizes the party and national leaders.  The percentage of people who reported 
themselves as at least “somewhat” afraid if criticizing the government or the party and national leaders has dropped 
from over 40% to around 20%.  
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less “don’t know” answers than those with lower levels of education.  Besides, Ren (2009) also 
found that political interest plays a crucial role in the level of “don’t know” answers.  People 
who lack interest in politics or survey questions tend to give more “don’t know” answers.  
Compared with education and political interest, political fear plays a much weaker role on the 
level of “don’t know” answers.  Thus, people give “don’t know” answers more as a result of 
apathy and cognitive incapability than because of political fear.  
The third method to check for political fear includes one indicator in multivariate analysis 
to control for political fear: the presence of the third party adult in the interview besides the 
interviewer and interviewee.  The East Asian Barometer Surveys not only asked about the 
presence of the third party during the interview, but also specifically asked the identity of the 
third party – whether she is the spouse, the parent, the neighbor/passer-by, the government 
official, or others.  If political fear exists, the respondent should be more concerned and less 
likely to reveal her true feelings when there is a third party during the interview.  I will use third 
party presence as a proxy to control for political fear in my analysis.  
 
 
6.2 SOURCES OF POLITICAL TRUST IN CHINA 
 
6.2.1 Trust and Political Institutions in China 
 
The first striking feature of political trust in China is its exceptionally high levels.  As I discussed 
in Chapter 4 and 5, data from the WVS and the EAB both show that the average level of political 
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trust is one of the highest in the world.  However, within China, how do Chinese people trust 
different institutions?   
To examine the patterns of political trust within China, I refer to data from China.  I draw 
heavily on the China Survey 2002 and 2008 of East Asian Barometer series.  The 2008 survey 
contains a national random sample of 5,098 respondents in 29 provinces.  The 2002 survey has a 
sample size of 3,183.  Regarding political trust, the survey includes people’s attitudes toward 10 
institutions: the national government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), People’s Liberation Army (PLA), people’s courts, police, local 
government, civil service, television, and newspaper.   
To sort out the relationship among the 10 institutions, I use factor analysis, a statistical 
method that identifies and groups the highly correlated variables into factors by examining the 
correlation matrix among them. Factor analysis helps generate factors to group the institutions by 
how strongly they are correlated with each other.   
In Table 6.1, factor analysis examines the internal correlations of the 10 institutions and the 
results show that they belong to three groups or factors. The first group includes the national 
government, the CCP, the NPC, and the PLA.  These are the key and decision-making 
institutions of the state.  The national government is the central executive bureaucracy of the 
political apparatus.  The CCP is a distinct institution from the government in principle; but in 
reality, the two institutions’ structures are often parallel at various levels and their roles are 
interconnected in China (Manion, 1999).  The NPC lies at the center of the legislative process in 
China, encompassing constitutional enacting and amendment powers and other legislative 
powers.  However, the CCP still maintains effective control of the NPC in China.  The PLA is 
the world’s largest military force and it is under the command of the Central Military 
127 
Commission (CMC) of the CCP and the state.  These four institutions are the most important 
institutions in the Chinese political apparatus.   
 
Table 6.1  Factor Analysis of Trust in Political Institutions in China 
 
 Component 
 1 2 3 
National Government .798 .202 .089 
CCP (party) .851 .128 .123 
NPC (parliament) .850 .184 .145 
PLA (armed forces) .637 .171 .129 
Legal System .156 .795 .116 
Civil Services .208 .762 .193 
Police .171 .787 .207 
Local Government .177 .816 .081 
Newspaper .159 .239 .888 
Television .193 .174 .897 
Eigenvalue 2.681 2.707 1.754 
 
Source: EAB – The China Survey, 2008.  
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
          Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
 
Compared with trust in the above central political institutions, the second group that 
emerged from factor analysis is trust in relatively peripheral and less political institutions.  These 
institutions include people’s courts, police, local government, and civil service.  The third group 
is trust in traditional media, including television and newspaper.  These are traditional media, 
also the most popular types of media in China.   
I have identified three types of political trust—trust in central institutions, in peripheral 
institutions, and in media.  This dissertation is most concerned with the first 
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two types of political trust. In the following sections, I will first compare the levels of trust in 
these different institutions and then identify the sources of the first two types of political trust.  
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Figure 6.1  Political Trust by Institutions in China 
 
Source: EAB- the China Survey, 2002 and 2008. 
 
Figure 6.1 reports the patterns of public trust in the 10 institutions in China in 2008 and 
2002.  On a scale of 0 to 3, Figure 6.1 shows the average levels of trust in different institutions in 
China.  First, in 2008, public trust is the highest in the four central institutions (with an average 
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level of 2.60) and the lowest in the 2 media institutions (average 1.69).  The average level of 
trust in the four peripheral institutions is the medium (1.92).  Noticeably, the levels of trust in the 
central institutions are extremely high and consistent (ranging from 2.5 to 2.6) across the four 
institutions.  The variation in peripheral institutions is relatively large, ranging from 2.1 (people’s 
courts) to 1.7 (civil services).  The traditional forms of media are the least trusted institutions in 
China in 2007.   Second, public trust decreased from 2002 to 2008 across all 10 institutions.  
However, the levels of public trust in central institutions have remained the highest across time.  
The average levels of trust in traditional forms of media decreased most between two waves 
(from 2.4 to 1.7).  Third, there is a large gap between the levels of trust in national and local 
government in China in both 2002 and 2008.  The national government enjoys the highest level 
of political trust, while the levels of trust in local government are among the lowest among all 
institutions in China.  This gap sharply contrasts with the pattern we observed in the established 
democracies where local governments usually enjoy higher levels of political trust than national 
governments.  I will return to this issue later in this chapter.   
 
6.2.2 Political Sources of Political Trust in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Why is there a high level of political trust in authoritarian regimes like China?  Why do Chinese 
people trust political institutions despite the lack of real elections and democratic accountability?  
How does the Chinese government maintain a high level of political trust?  How effective are 
these institutional means and how do the Chinese people respond to these means?  Is the reported 
political trust mainly an artifact out of fear and indoctrination?  Or is it also shaped by similar 
factors as we observed in the democratic regimes?  What are the sources of political trust in 
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China?  To what extent do these different factors affect the public trust in institutions?  I will try 
to study these issues in this section. 
 
6.2.2.1 Hypotheses  
I will examine the following sources of political trust in China: authoritarian 
indoctrination and mobilization, political performance, economic performance, and traditional 
values.  I will focus on the two political explanations.   
 
6.2.2.1.1 Institutional Mobilization and Resistance 
The first political explanation for the high levels of trust in China is that the Chinese 
government uses institutional means of indoctrination to mobilize political support.  The public 
attitudes, including their trust in political institutions, are shaped by the positive and negative 
information they are exposed to (Miller, Goldenberg, and Erbring 1979; Patterson 1993; 
Hetherington 2005).  In democratic regimes, media serve as a watchdog, and they are usually 
more adversarial and critical.  Thus, media consumption is negatively related to the levels of 
political trust in democracies.   
In authoritarian countries, however, the government controls information through several 
institutional means.  The most frequently used means of mobilization are media control and 
political education.  Political mobilization was most intensive during socialist years, and the 
socialist generation should demonstrate higher levels of political trust than the later political 
generations in China.  Even today, political meetings are held regularly in work units and schools 
where people get together to study the latest documents issued by the central government and the 
party.  Studies show that exposure to political communication promotes popular acceptance for 
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the mainstream political norms embedded in the communication (Miller, Goldenberg, & Erbring 
1979; Geddes & Zaller 1989; Chan 1997; Patterson 1999).  Thus, I expect that in contrast to 
what we observed in democratic countries, factors such as media exposure and interest in politics 
make the Chinese people susceptible to regime influence and promote their trust in political 
institutions. 
Media serve as the mouthpiece of the authoritarian governments (Chen & Shi 2001; 
Kennedy 2009).  Authoritarian governments use media as a tool to manipulate and control the 
public attitudes towards authority and nurture the public trust.  The media reform in China has 
decreased the state control over news content (Stockmann 2007).  Although these changes are 
limited and the government still retains considerable media control, the reform greatly 
encouraged diversity of political information accessible to the public.  The increased information 
diversity is best exemplified by the bloom of internet forums and the power of the Chinese 
netizens.  People discuss politics and publish grapevine news online that the official media like 
television and newspaper are not allowed to report, often before the authority hears the news or 
has time to respond.  The internet also makes it possible for some people to access alternate 
sources of information from abroad.  The media consumers distinguish between different types 
of media.  For instance, research shows that the urban Chinese people prefer reformed 
newspapers that are relatively more distant from the government line (Stockmann 2007).  Thus 
we may expect that the traditional forms of media that sell propaganda, including TV and 
newspaper, encourage the public trust; whereas new forms of media that are relatively away 
from the government line, such as internet and phone messages, decrease people’s political trust.   
To test the mobilization hypotheses, I include four variables: media exposure, media 
types, political generation, and political interest.  Media exposure is measured by the question, 
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“How often do you follow news about politics and government?”.  Media type is a dummy 
variable asking respondents their main source of information about politics and government.  
Traditional forms of media including television, newspaper, and radio are coded as 1, and the 
new forms of media including internet, cell phone short message, and personal contact are coded 
as 0.  People of the socialist political generation should demonstrate higher level of political trust 
than the Cultural Revolution generation and post-reform generation.   
While the authoritarian governments use propaganda and political education to mobilize 
political support, the public resists these indoctrination means to different extents.  As Geddes 
and Zaller (1989) argued, political support in authoritarian regimes depends on both the public’s 
exposure to pro-government messages and probability to accept or resist them.  In this analysis, I 
include two variables to tap the public resistance: education levels and urban experience.  I 
expect that these variables encourage people’s independent thinking and decrease their trust in 
institutions.   
 
6.2.2.1.2 Political Performance 
Another important yet often ignored political source of trust is the political performance.  
Existing research has mainly attributed the political support in China to either the very fast 
economic growth or the traditional Confucius culture (Shi 2001; Wang 2005; Yang & Tang 
2010). Though political performance should theoretically contribute to political trust, explicit 
and clear political discussion is missing from the current analysis in China.   
Corruption is one of the most important indicators of political performance, and it is a 
highly salient problem in China.  The Chinese government views corruption as one of the 
greatest threats to communist rule today (Manion 2004).  The Chinese people are also very 
133 
concerned about the issue of corruption.  Manion (2006: 304) reported that corruption “has 
ranked at or nearly at the top of every public opinion poll as the most urgent problem confronting 
the country”.   
The national importance judgment, i.e. the public evaluation on the most important 
problems the government should address, can produce priming effects by priming the public to 
focus the performance evaluations in given domains, thus affecting the political trust (Edwards, 
Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Hetherington & Rudolph 2008).  Thus I expect that corruption, an 
issue of high saliency in China, should affect the level of political trust in China.  Similarly, the 
perception of government responsiveness and fairness should promote the public trust in political 
institutions in China.  The relationship between political performance and political trust in China 
will be systematically examined in the following section.  I include three variables to tap political 
performance: perceived corruption, government fairness and responsiveness.   
 
6.2.2.1.3 Other Sources of Political Trust 
While I am most concerned with the political sources of political trust, I will control for 
the effects of economic performance and traditional values on political trust.  Performance 
theories emphasize the rational side of political trust.  Citizens trust institutions based on their 
assessment of economic and political performance of the institutions.  The Chinese people will 
trust institutions when they are satisfied with the economic performance of the government.  I 
use the public satisfaction with national economic development to measure economic 
performance.  Cultural theories focus on the effects of culture and values on political trust.  
Confucianism emphasizes deference to authority and hierarchy, which promotes the trust level as 
a whole in China (Shi, 2001).  At the individual level, Chinese people identify with 
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Confucianism to varying extents, contributing to the variation of political trust within China.  
Besides authoritarian values, I also include civic engagement and interpersonal trust to tap social 
capital.  As discussed earlier, I also include two variables to control for political fear: the 
perceived political freedom and the third party presence during the interview.  
 
6.2.2.1.4 The Interaction Effects of Resistance Factors  
Resistance factors (i.e. education and urban experience) promote people’s critical 
thinking, work against the government mobilization process, and decrease political trust in 
authoritarian countries.  They not only directly influence political trust, but also interact with 
other variables and shape how others affect trust.  Specifically, I will study their interactions with 
mobilization and performance variables.   
First, I expect that citizens will assess institutions differently depending on their 
education levels.  Education enhances citizens’ capacity to access and process information, 
which helps them to evaluate institutions more rationally and accurately.  Specifically, people 
with higher levels of education are more likely to value institutional performance and distinguish 
between official and new sources of media.  The effects of political generations on political trust 
may also differ among people with different education levels.  Second, urban experience 
broadens citizens’ horizon and changes the way they perceive political institutions.  Urban 
citizens are exposed to more diverse information and media options, and they are more likely to 
distinguish between official and new sources of media when evaluating institutions.  I will also 
study these mediating effects of resistance factors in the following analysis.  
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6.2.2.2 Modeling Political Trust in China 
Table 6.2 reports the OLS estimations of the sources of political trust in China, showing the 
effects of political performance, mobilization and resistance on two types of political trust while 
controlling for cultural and economic factors and political fear.  I am most interested in the two 
political sources: the political performance and institutional mobilization variables.   
Overall, political performance significantly contributes to the level of public trust in both 
the key political institutions (i.e. national government, CCP, NPC, & PLA) and in the peripheral 
institutions (i.e. local government, people’s courts, civil service, police).  People who perceive 
government as transparent, fair, and responsive are more likely to trust political institutions.  For 
trust in the peripheral political institutions, the perceived corruption is the single strongest 
predictor, and responsiveness and fairness are both among the strongest predictors.  Compared 
with other sources, the effects of the three perceived political performance variables are also the 
strongest for trust in the key political institutions.   
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Table 6.2 Determinants of Political Trust in China 
 
 Model 1A:  
Trust in Key  
Political Institutions 
Model 1B:  
Trust in Peripheral  
Political Institutions 
 b se β b se β 
Political Performance       
Corruption -.08*** (.01) -.12 -.24*** (.02) -.30 
Fairness  .11*** (.02)  .12  .14*** (.02)  .12 
Responsiveness  .19*** (.02)  .23  .21*** (.02)  .21 
Exposure to Institutional Mobilization       
Political Interest  .00 (.01)  .00 -.02 (.02) -.02 
Media Exposure  .02** (.01)  .05 -.02* (.01) -.04 
Official Media: TV, radio, newspaper  .24*** (.05)  .10  .13** (.06)  .04 
New Media: internet & grapevines 
(comparison group)  
      
Reform Generation -.05* (.03) -.05 -.08** (.03) -.06 
Cultural Revolution Generation -.02 (.03) -.02 -.07** (.03) -.05 
Socialist Generation (comparison group)       
Resistance Factors to Mobilization       
Education Level  -.07*** (.02) -.08 -.05** (.02) -.05 
Urban Experience  .04 (.03)  .03  .03 (.03)  .02 
Economic Performance       
Economic Development Satisfaction  .10*** (.02)  .12  .07*** (.02)  .07 
Cultural Values       
Civic Engagement -.01 (.04) -.00  .05 (.04)  .02 
Interpersonal Trust  .04** (.02)  .04  .04 (.03)  .03 
Authoritarian Values  .06*** (.08)  .06  .07*** (.02)  .07 
Political Fear       
Political Freedom -.06*** (.02)  .05 -.12*** (.03)  .09 
3rd Party Presence -.05** (.02) -.04  .00 (.03)  .00 
(Constant) 1.31*** (.10)   .98*** (.12)  
Adjusted R2  .21    .28   
N   2288     2288   
 
Source: EAB- the China Survey, 2008. 
Notes: ***p < 0.01.  **p < 0.05.  *p < 0.1. 
 
The institutional mobilization means by the Chinese government turn out to be mostly 
effective.  First, the effects of media on political trust are mixed.  One of the most intriguing 
effects, and one that varies dramatically by trust types, is the effect of media exposure.  People 
who follow more political news are more likely to trust the key political institutions; however, 
people who follow less political news show higher levels of trust in peripheral institutions.  The 
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totally opposite effects of media exposure on the two types of political trust are not surprising if 
we take the media reform in China into account.  As we discussed earlier, the deregulation and 
commercialization of media in China has loosened the state control over media content.  Media 
are allowed to discuss or even raise political issues that do not threaten the fundamental regime 
stability.  However, the media reform is limited as the state still maintains control over the 
official media forms and over the content and target of the political discussions.  As a result, 
people hear different voices mainly on issues concerning the peripheral institutions.  Today, the 
key political institutions remain seldom challenged in the traditional forms of media in China.  In 
other words, the media enjoys more freedom to comment or even criticize peripheral institutions 
than the key political institutions.  Thus, the media exposure to political news may increase the 
trust in the key political institutions but decrease the trust in peripheral institutions.    
Media reform also produces different degrees of freedom in different types of media, as 
demonstrated in the contrasting effects of the different forms of media on the levels of political 
trust.  Traditional media (including television, newspaper, and radio) promote the Chinese 
people’s trust in political institutions, while the new forms of media such as internet and 
grapevine rumors decrease the public trust in political institutions.  This is consistent with our 
expectations as the traditional media are much more pro-government whereas the new media 
forms enjoy less state control and more freedom.  On the one hand, the rapidly development of 
internet in China brings hope of greater freedom to the public and more challenges to the 
authoritarian regime.  On the other hand, we should notice the strong positive effects of the use 
of television, newspaper, and radio on the trust in key political institutions, which confirms the 
effectiveness of the government propaganda.   
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Political trust varies across political generations.  The intensity of institutional 
mobilization has decreased through years.  As expected, people of the socialist generation 
demonstrate higher levels of political trust than those of the reform and the Cultural Revolution 
generations.  Political interest, however, does not show any independent effect on political trust. 
While indoctrination and mobilization were largely successful in China, the effects of 
resistance to mobilization are evident as well.  The eroding effects of education levels on 
political trust are strong and consistent with what has been observed in democratic societies.  
People with higher level of education are more critical towards political institutions.  Urban 
experience, however, does not show any significant effects on the two types of political trust in 
China.   
The statistical results partly supported cultural theories.  People who identify with the 
traditional values are more likely to trust political institutions.  However, social capital theories 
do not receive any support as neither interpersonal trust nor civic engagement variables showed 
significant effects on political trust.  Overall, I find more support for institutional performance 
theories than for cultural theories.  Both the political performance and the economic performance 
of institutions demonstrate significant explanatory powers for political trust.   
Lastly, the effects of political fear on political trust are significant but limited.  The 
perceived political freedom is positively rather than negatively related to the level of political 
trust, indicating that political trust is not a proxy for political fear.  The presence of the third 
party during the survey interviews has an independent effect on trust in the key political 
institutions, but not on trust in the peripheral institutions.   
To deal with the possible endogeneity problem caused by inclusion of independent 
variables that may be heavily affected by socioeconomic status, I also run a “clean” version of 
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analysis that excludes “political interest” and “economic development satisfaction”.  The main 
results of the analysis remain the same (details not shown). 
Table 6.3 reports the interaction effects between resistance factors and other variables.  
To highlight the interaction effects, I only listed variables involved in interaction terms.  Results 
show that the two resistance factors interact with and condition the effects of mobilization factors 
and performance factors on trust in both key political institutions and peripheral institutions.   
First, for trust in key political institutions, the effects of official sources of media on trust should 
increase with a person’s level of education.  Specifically, for people with lowest level of 
education (with a score of 0), the preference of official or unofficial sources of media makes no 
difference in how they trust institutions.  However, for people with highest level of education 
(with a score of 3), the effect of official media on trust is (.09+10*3=) .39, meaning exposure to 
different forms (official versus unofficial sources) of media significantly changes their levels of 
political trust.   More education also dramatically increased the effects of institutional 
performance on trust in key political institutions.  Specifically, the effect of satisfaction with 
national economic development on trust is .09 for people with lowest levels of education, and 
this effect doubles (.09+.03*3=.18) is -.07 for the least educated, and the effect almost triples (-
.07+3*-.04= -.19) for the most for people with highest levels of education.  Similarly, the effect 
of perceived corruption on trust educated.   For trust in key political institutions, the interactions 
between education and political generations and between urban experience and media sources 
are irrelevant.  Overall, the R square improved from .21 in Model 1A to .22 in interaction model 
in Model 2A.  
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Table 6.3 Interaction Effects of Resistance Factors 
 
 Model 2A:  
Trust in Key  
Political Institutions 
Model 2B:  
Trust in Peripheral Political 
Institutions 
 b se β b se β 
Corruption -.07*** (.01) -.11 -.23*** (.02) -.29 
Economic Development Satisfaction  .09*** (.02)  .11  .06*** (.02)  .06 
Official Media: tv, radio, newspaper  .09 (.11)  .04  .34** (.14)  .11 
New Media: internet & grapevines 
(comparison group)  
      
Reform Generation -.03 (.05) -.02 -.06 (.06) -.05 
Cultural Revolution Generation -.05 (.05) -.04 -.05 (.06) -.04 
Socialist Generation (comparison group)       
Education Level  -.13* (.07) -.15 -.13 (.09) -.12 
Urban Experience -.17 (.16) -.12  .33* (.19)  .19 
Interaction       
Official Media * Education   .10* (.05)  .12  .18** (.09)  .07 
Official Media * Urban  .22 (.17)  .15  .37** (.19)  .21 
Corruption * Education -.04* (.02) -.04 -.07** (.03) -.07 
Economic Satisfaction * Education  .03** (.01)  .07  .05** (.02)_ .08 
Reform Generation * Education -.07 (.05) -.10 -.04* (.02) -.04 
Culture Revolution Gen. * Education -.07 (.04)  .08 -.03 (.05) -.03 
Control Variables (not shown)#       
Adjusted R2  .22    .30   
N   2288     2288   
 
Source: EAB- the China Survey, 2008. 
Notes: ***p < 0.01.  **p < 0.05.  *p < 0.1. 
            # Variables in Table 6.2 included in the analysis but not shown.  
 
Second, the general pattern of interaction effects in trust in peripheral institutions is 
mostly consistent with that of trust in key institution.  Education significantly increases the 
effects of both political and economic performance on trust in peripheral institutions.  Urban 
experience and education level both significantly interact with media sources and boost its effect 
on trust in peripheral institutions.  Unlike the model of trust in key political institutions, there is 
significant and positive interaction effect between political generations and education on trust in 
peripheral institutions.  Trust difference between different political generations is larger for 
people with higher levels of education.  Overall, R square of the interaction model, .30, 
represents an improvement over .28 from Model 1B.   
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6.3 TRUST IN OTHER NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN EAST ASIA 
 
In this section, I will examine and compare the sources of political trust in five non-democratic 
societies in East Asia: China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam.   
Figure 6.2 shows the democratic levels of the four non-democratic regimes in 2005, around when 
the second wave of EAB was taken.  According to the Freedom in the World index, in 2005, 
China was the least democratic regime in Asia, followed by Vietnam, Cambodia, and Singapore.  
Following the FIW categories, China, Vietnam, and Cambodia are considered “not free”, while 
Singapore is “partly free”.  Hong Kong was not included in Figure 6.2 due to data availability, 
but its democratic level should be close to that of Singapore.22  
We study the sources of political trust in the above five societies, following the models in 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3.  Some variables are omitted because they were not asked in all societies 
in the survey.  For comparative purposes, our dependent variables are the mean levels of trust in 
the five key institutions: civil services, national government, legal system, parliament, political 
parties.   
22 According to Democracy index that measures the democratic levels in 167 countries, Hong Kong rates very close 
to Singapore.  Democracy index, by Economist Intelligence Unit, is a comprehensive index based on criteria of five 
categories: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and 
civil liberties.  The Democracy index has been largely consistent with Freedom in the World Index.   
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Figure 6.2 Democracy Index for 4 Non-Democratic Asian Societies 
 
Source: Freedom House, 2005 
Note: FIW Index ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 means completely free and 7 means not free at all. 
 
Table 6.4 reports the results of sources of trust in the five non-democratic regimes in East 
Asia.  The second column in each model includes interaction effects.  Results of the models 
highlight the importance of political performance.  The three perceived political performance 
variables consistently show strong predicting powers in all five non-democratic regimes.  
Perceived economic performance is another important source of political trust.  Asian values that 
emphasize hierarchy and harmony also contribute to political trust.  However, the institutions 
when they experience satisfactory institutional performance – both political and institutions 
when they experience satisfactory institutional performance – both political and economic 
performance.  To maintain public trust in political institutions, the non-democratic regimes 
should work on improving their political performance, rather than emphasizing economic 
performance only.   
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Table 6.4 Sources of Political Trust in Five Non-Democratic Asian Societies 
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Table 6.4 (Continuted). 
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The influence of political mobilization is limited and mixed.  Mobilization variables 
show different effects in five regimes.  Mobilization effects are evident in countries with 
extremely low levels of democracy (China, Vietnam, and Cambodia), where people with higher 
levels of political interest and preferences for official media show higher levels of political trust.  
In societies with higher levels of democracies (Singapore and Hong Kong), these variables have 
no significant effects on political trust.  Meanwhile, resistance factors generally work against 
mobilization.  Their corrosive effects on trust are both direct and indirect (by interacting with 
other variables).  The strongest interaction effects are between education and institutional 
performance, showing that the effects of perceived political and economic performance on 
political trust increase with a person’s level of education.  The effects are consistent across 
countries, and they are consistent with our earlier observation at country level (Chapter 4).  
 
 
6.4 THE INVERSE TRUST GAP IN CHINA  
 
Another interesting observation about political trust in East Asia is the trust gap between central 
and local government.  If we recall the levels of trust in different political institutions in Figure 
6.1, we will notice that the Chinese people trust central government much more than they do 
local governments.  In other words, if we define the trust gap as deviation of local trust from 
central trust, we observe a large positive trust gap in China.   
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Table 6.5 Relative Trust in Local Level and Central Level Institutions in China 
 
 Trust Center (%) Trust Local (%) Neither (%) Total (%) 
CCP 91.02 7.01 1.96 100 
Court 90.59 7.59 1.82 100 
People's Congress 91.07 7.22 1.7 100 
Government 90.99 7.3 1.72 100 
  
     Source: China Values and Ethics Survey, 2004; Table 1 from Yang (2004). 
  
This gap is even clearer when asked in a relative term.  Using 2004 China Values and 
Ethics Survey, Yang (2004) found that the vast majority of the Chinese people choose the central 
institutions and only less than 10% chooses the local level or none of the above when asked 
whether they trust the local CCP, the court, the people’s congress and government or those at the 
central level more (Table 6.5).  This is consistent with some other studies in China (Li 2004; 
Tang 2010).   
Figure 6.3 presents the trust gap between central and local governments in twelve Asian 
societies.  The trust gap is positive in three Asian countries: China (.83), Vietnam (.23), 
Singapore (.21); and the gap is negative in eight societies: Hong Kong (-.01), Mongolia (-.02), 
Indonesia (-.11), Cambodia (-.15), Thailand (-.15), Korea (-.21), Taiwan (-.21), Japan (-.26), and 
the Philippines (-.38).  The trust gap seems only positive in some non-democratic societies.  In 
other words, people trust local governments more than central governments only in democratic 
societies in Asia.  This observation seems to echo what has been observed in some established 
democracies (Jennings 1998). 
147 
 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Philippines
Japan
Taiwan
Korea
Thailand
Cambodia
Indonesia
Mongolia
Hong Kong
Singapore
Vietnam
Mainland China 
Series1 Series2 Series3Trust in National Government Trust in Local Government Trust Gap
 
 
Figure 6.3  Trust Gap in East Asia 
Source: EAB 2005.  
 
How do we explain the large positive trust gap in China?  Why are levels of trust in 
national government so much higher than in local government?  To answer these questions, we 
need to study the sources of political trust in local institutions.  Research on local trust has 
largely been omitted from the trust literature, and the lack of suitable data is a major reason 
(Rahn and Rudolph 2005).  To study the sources of political trust in both local and central 
governments in China, I will refer to the EAB-China 2008 data in this section.   
148 
Why do Chinese people trust the central government more than local governments?  An 
important reason for the low trust in local institutions is that many people regard the local 
institutions as having “capacity” to enforce the center’s “intentions” (Li 2004).  Field work in 
rural China shows that many villagers trust the good intentions of the Center, while they doubt 
local capacity to enforce it at local level (Li 2004).   
The distinction between capacity and intentions is a result of both cultural influences and 
institutional means.  First, the Confucian values that have influenced the Chinese culture for 
thousands of years have a tradition of believing in the divinity of the emperor.  As a result of the 
Confucian influence, the Chinese people blame corrupt officials for what goes wrong but exclude 
the emperor from accountability systems (Pye 1996; Li 2004, 2012).  In its modern form, local 
institutions resemble corrupt officials and the central institutions resemble the emperor.  While 
the Chinese people may blame the local institutions for things that go wrong, they still have faith 
in the good intention of the central government.   
Second, the perceived performance of the local institutions may not be as satisfactory as 
their central counterparts.  On the one hand, local institutional performance is more visible if 
institutions do not live up their promises and propaganda.  On the other hand, research shows 
strong positive relationships between educational attainment and experience and predicted career 
rank (Landry 2008).  We may expect relatively lower education levels and experience in local 
officials.  As a result, people may perceive less satisfactory performance of the local institutions.   
Third, the media also plays an important role in shaping public trust towards different 
levels of institutions.  As discussed earlier, the media may enjoy more freedom discussing and 
criticizing local institutions.  Propaganda works best for the central government.  As people are 
exposed to more critical views of local institutions, they are more likely to hold different 
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opinions and have less confidence in local institutions.  Overtime, media criticism of local 
governments erodes public confidence (Landry & Stockmann 2009).   
In Table 6.6, I study the sources of central and local trust with the same set of 
explanatory variables.  Three findings are worth discussing.  First, performance factors, both 
political and economic, play the most important role in explaining trust at both levels.  While 
both traditional values and institutional performance shape political trust in the expected 
directions, performance factors are more significant contributors to political trust in China (cf. 
Shi 2001; Chen 2004; Yang & Tang 2010).  Fortunately, the EAB-China survey specifically asks 
respondents how they perceive the institutional performance of both central and local levels.  
The results show that people trust different levels of institutions based on their perceptions of the 
institutional performance at the corresponding levels.  At the central level, the Chinese people 
trust institutions when they are satisfied with the political and economic performance of national 
institutions.   
Specifically, people who perceive more fairness and responsiveness and less corruption 
in national government and better national economic development are more likely to trust central 
government.  At the individual level, people who perceive more fairness and responsiveness and 
less corruption in local governments and better family economic conditions are more likely to 
trust local government.   
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 Table 6.6  Sources of Trust in Central and Local Governments in China 
 
 Model 4: Trust in National 
Government 
Model 5: Trust in 
Local Government 
 b s.e. β b s.e. β 
Political Performance       
National Corruption -.24*** .02 .31 -.04 .03 -.04 
Local Corruption -.02 .02 .03 -.28*** .03 -.30 
Fairness .09*** .03 .09 .06* .03 .05 
Responsiveness .14*** .03 .15 .22*** .03 .18 
Economic Performance       
Satisfaction with National Economy .11*** .03 .11 .02 .03 .02 
Satisfaction with Family Economy .00 .02 .00 .08*** .03 .07 
Cultural Values       
Authoritarian Values .03* .01 .02 .11** .06 .06 
Civic Engagement .04 .05 .02 .04 .06 .02 
Interpersonal Trust .12*** .03 .10 .13*** .04 .08 
Institutional Mobilization       
News Access .03* .01 .05 -.03* .01 -.04 
Traditional Media Type .19*** .07 .07  .13 .09 .03 
New Media Type (comparison group)       
Political Interest  -.01 .02 -.01 -.02 .03 -.02 
Resistance Factors       
Education Level -.06** .02 -.06  .00 .03 .00 
Reform Generation -.04* .01 -.04 -.14** .05 -.09 
the Cultural Revolution Generation -.03 .04 -.02 -.08* .04 -.05 
Socialist Generation (comparison group)       
Urban Experience .04 .04 .03 -.10** .05 -.05 
Political Fear       
Political Freedom -.02 .03 .01 .19*** .04 .12 
3rd Party Presence -.04 .03 -.03 -.00 .03 -.00 
Constant 1.89*** .15  .78*** .21  
Adjusted R2 .240   .243   
N 1445   1445   
 
Source: EAB- the China Survey, 2002 and 2008. 
Notes: ***p < 0.01.  **p < 0.05.  *p < 0.1. 
 
 
The second important feature is the opposite effects of media on different levels of 
political trust.  I examined the effects of media access and media types on political trust.  First, as 
we discussed earlier, the media enjoys greater critical freedom towards local institutions and 
affairs, and criticism of local officials and affairs is not uncommon on internet or even in official 
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media.  On the one hand, people who have more media access are exposed to different opinions 
about local institutions, and they are less likely to trust local governments.   People who are 
exposed to more political news are more likely to trust the central government due to limited 
media freedom towards central institutions.  Second, different types of media have different 
effects on trust in national government.  People who prefer traditional types of media (such as 
television and newspaper) to new media (such as internet) are more exposed to propaganda and 
are more likely to trust central government.  However, media types have no independent effect 
on local trust since both official media and new media have more balanced reports on local 
governments.   
Lastly, the results show that resistance factors have different effects on the different 
levels of political trust.  Education has an eroding effect on national government, but no effect on 
local government.  Compared with younger political generations, the socialist generation has a 
much higher level of local trust while the effect of political generations on central trust is 
relatively limited.  Urban experience decreases local trust but has no effects on central trust.   
 
 
6.5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
This chapter studies the sources of political trust in non-democratic regimes in East Asia.  I focus 
on the case of China, the largest authoritarian country in the world.  The first part of the chapter 
discusses the major institutions in China and the levels of trust in each institution.  I identified 
three types of political trust in China:  trust in key political institutions, trust in peripheral 
political institutions, and trust in media.  This dissertation focuses on key and peripheral political 
152 
trust.  Survey results show that political trust in China is high across different institutions, 
particularly in the key political institutions.   
The next part of the chapter attempts to explain political trust in China, as well as in other 
Asian non-democratic societies.  I examined the major arguments in existing literature and 
focused on two political sources of trust in China: the political performance and the authoritarian 
political mobilization.  Statistical results show strong predicting powers for both of the political 
explanations.  First, contrary to the findings of some previous works, I found that political trust is 
more legal-rational based than traditional based trust in China.  Institutional performance, both 
political and economic performance, is the most important source of political trust in China.  
Although traditional values significantly affect the levels of political trust, their effects are 
limited compared with the effects of perceived performance.  Thus, the high level of political 
trust in China is not merely a product of traditional Chinese values, but more of a rational choice 
based on institutional performance.  In this sense, political trust in China is comparable to that in 
western democratic societies.  Studies of non-democratic regimes in East Asia confirmed the 
importance of perceived political performance.   
Second, trust in China is also different from that in democratic societies due to its 
institutional mobilization sources.  The effects of institutional mobilization are significant but 
become complicated as a result of media reform.  This is best demonstrated by the media effects.  
First, access to political news promotes levels of trust in key political institutions but decreases 
levels of trust in peripheral political institutions.  Second, people with more exposure to 
traditional forms of media are more exposed to government propaganda, and they are more likely 
to have higher levels of political trust; while access to unconventional types of media increases 
exposure to different voices, which, in turn, decreases the level of political trust.  The effects of 
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mobilization and indoctrination are evident in non-democratic regimes where the levels of 
democracy are extremely low.   
Next, I studied the trust gap between central and local governments in China.  Unlike 
many democratic societies, China shows higher level of trust in central government than in local 
governments.  I identified three reasons to explain the different levels of trust in central and local 
governments: the Confucian values that emphasize deference and respect to the authority, the 
difference in the perceived political performance at different levels of government, and the media 
effects.  Whether intentionally designed by the central government or not, the trust gap between 
central and local governments boosted public trust in the central government in China (cf. Li 
2012).   
This chapter finishes my inquiry into the sources, especially the political sources, of trust 
in institutions in East Asia.  I found that political performance is a very strong predictor for 
political trust, both for democratic and non-democratic countries.  Regime types make a 
difference on the levels of political trust.  In democratic societies, democratic institutional 
settings have significant effects on the levels of political trust at the country level.  In non-
democratic societies with extremely low levels of democracy, institutional mobilization is 
effective in boosting the levels of public trust in political institutions.   
The question following the above discussions is what are the consequences and 
implications of political trust.  In the concluding chapter, I will examine the consequences of 
political trust, summarize the main results of the dissertation, and discuss the policy implications.   
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This dissertation explores the political sources of political trust.  The previous chapters have 
studied the issue at different levels.  So far, the data and statistical results have supported the 
major hypotheses I proposed in the first part of the dissertation.  In this concluding chapter, I will 
first review and summarize the major findings of the previous chapters.  Then, I will take a step 
further and examine the consequences of political trust.  Lastly, I will discuss the implications of 
the study and suggest the directions of future research.   
 
 
7.1 THE MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
At the beginning of the dissertation, I argued that political performance and institutional 
arrangments significantly influence levels of political trust at both national and individual levels 
(Chapter 2).  Specifically, I studied three aspects of perceived political performance: corruption, 
government fairness, and responsiveness.  Regarding institutional arrangments, I am most 
concerned with the effects of regime types.  Within democratic societies, I examined the effects 
of different executive systems, electoral systems, levels of democracy, party systems, and party 
155 
allegiance.  With authoritarian societies, I focused on the effects of political mobilization and 
media reform on trust.   
To study the political sources of trust in institutions, I examined approximately 50 
countries across the world (Chapter 4), and then focused on 12 East Asian societies (Chapter 5 
and 6).  I will briefly summarize the major findings of the dissertation in this section.  
First, the levels of political trust vary significantly across individuals, countries, as well 
as regions.  Overall, we observe the highest levels of political trust in Asia.  Most of the existing 
research of trust has focused on individual level explanations.  However, sharp difference in trust 
levels across countries indicates that structural level factors and political context shape individual 
attitudes such as political trust and they should be incorporated into our analysis of political trust.  
Thus, multi-level analysis that combines both individual and country level predictors is the most 
appropriate model for explaining political trust (Chapter 4 and 5).   
Second, at the country level, institutional arrangements have significant effects on the 
levels of political trust.  The most important institutional factor is regime type, as non-democratic 
regimes have much higher levels of political trust than democratic regimes on average.  Unlike 
previous research on trust, this dissertation includes both democratic and non-democratic 
regimes and studies how different political factors shape political trust in different regime types.   
Within democratic regimes, I studied four types of democratic institutional settings, and 
analysis using global and Asian data both confirmed that three of them have significant effects 
on trust (Chapter 3, 4 and 5).  First, countries with higher levels of democratization generally 
display higher levels of political trust because the democratic principles of accountability and 
representation require greater support from voters.  Second, compared with fragmented party 
systems, two-party and moderate multi-party systems are often associated with higher levels of 
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political trust because they promote effective channeling of public opinion to government 
policies.  Third, compared with presidential democracies, parliamentary systems tend to present 
higher levels of political trust as some of their institutional structures encourage diversity, 
efficiency and political stability, attracting more political trust.  Overall, institutional designs 
including the democratization levels, party systems and executive systems all significantly affect 
the levels of political trust.   
Third, at the individual level, institutional features also influence the levels of political 
trust.  In democratic societies, voters who identify and support the winning parties have more 
incentives to maintain the status quo rather than challenging existing institutional settings.  Thus 
winners have higher levels of political trust than losers.  The effect of party allegiance on 
political trust in democratic regimes is strong and robust across different models (Chapter 4 and 
5).   
In authoritarian regimes, the government uses institutional means such as media control 
and political education to manipulate public attitudes and mobilize political support (Chapter 6).  
Thus, unlike in democratic societies, media exposure shows strong mobilization effects and 
significantly promotes the levels of political trust.  However, reform and modernization 
processes bring resistance forces in authoritarian societies, as demonstrated in the eroding effects 
of the new forms of media and education levels on political trust.  Overall, the government 
mobilization in authoritarian regimes is successful, but with deepening reform processes, their 
effects become more and more limited.   
Fourth, political performance proves to be one of the strongest predictors of political trust 
across different types of regimes (Chapter 4, 5 and 6).  At the country level, societies where 
political corruption is prevalent have lower levels of political trust.  In contrast, societies with 
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lower levels of corruption show higher levels of political trust.  At the individual level, people 
who perceive government as less corruptive and more responsive and fair are more likely to trust 
institutions than those who do not.   
The strong effects of political performance on political trust are robust.  Using 
hierarchical linear models, I first tested the hypotheses with global data, and the statistical results 
supported my argument (Chapter 4).  Then, I tested the hypotheses in East Asia, a region where 
the paradoxical coexistence of corruption and economic miracles may challenge the detrimental 
effects of political corruption on economic and political development (Chapter 5 and 6).  Again, 
the data from 12 East Asian societies (both pooled OLS of East Asian societies and country-by-
county analysis) confirmed that the corruption decreases levels of political trust.  The negative 
effects of corruption and positive effects of perceived government responsiveness and fairness 
hold true across different models.   
Fifth, the political sources of political trust, including political performance and 
institutional settings, showed significant effects on political trust.  To best explain political trust, 
I controlled for the effects of the two most discussed predictors, economic development and 
cultural values.  The results generally supported their roles on trust.  The effects of economic 
performance on political trust seem to be stronger than cultural values, supporting performance 
theories.  However, throughout different analyses in the dissertation, while economic 
performance and cultural values shape political trust, the roles of political performance and 
institutional settings on trust proves consistently strong and significant.  I also studied political 
trust by different political institutions, and the results stand robust across trust in different 
institutions (Chapter 5).   
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 7.2 THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TRUST 
 
So far, the dissertation has examined different political sources of the political trust.  The 
question follows is “does it matter?”  In this section, I take a step further and study the impact of 
political trust on people’s political behavior and attitudes.  Specifically, I am interested in how 
political trust affects political participation and democratic values in democratic and non-
democratic regimes.  I will focus on the following democratic values and behaviors:  
 
7.2.1 The Consequence for Support for Democracy  
 
Political trust may have different consequences on citizens’ support for democracy in different 
types of regimes.  In democratic societies, trust promotes the public acceptance of democratic 
values and ideals, which in turn, increases the support for democratic regimes (Rose, Mishler & 
Haerpfer 1998; Mishler & Rose 2005).  In contrast, political trust in non-democratic societies 
may facilitate the public support for undemocratic alternatives.    
To measure democratic support, I use the following questions from the WVS: “I'm going 
to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of 
governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or 
very bad way of governing this country? (1) having a strong leader (2) having experts make 
decisions (3) having the army rule (4) having a democratic political system.” 
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Table 7.1  The Effects of Political Trust on Democratic Support 
 
 Dem. Non-dem 
 b(s.e.) Beta b (s.e.) Beta 
(Constant) -.387 
(.041)  
 2.548 
(.099) 
 
Political Trust .129*** 
(.016) 
.044 -.078*** 
(.025) 
-.031 
Income .005*** 
(.002) 
.018 -.011*** 
(.003) 
-.033 
Political Interest .050*** 
(.004) 
.068 .046*** 
(.007) 
.062 
Post-materialist 
Values 
.200*** 
(.011) 
.091 .039* 
(.020) 
.017 
Sex -.010 
(.007) 
-.007 .004 
(.012) 
.003 
Age .017*** 
(.002) 
.040 .010** 
(.004) 
.020 
Education .023*** 
(.002) 
.078 .018*** 
(.003) 
.056 
Interpersonal Trust .057*** 
(.008) 
.038 .121*** 
(.016) 
.068 
Level of Democracy .160*** 
(.004) 
.209 .010** 
(.004) 
.025 
GDP per capita (ln) .116*** 
(.005) 
.151 -.111*** 
(.010) 
-.112 
Adjusted R2 .147  .022  
n 33884  12998  
 
Source: WVS 2005.  
Notes: ***p < 0.001. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. 
 
 
Table 7.1 summarizes the OLS results for the effects of political trust on democratic 
support.  Controlling for individual level and country level factors, political trust shows a 
significant effect on democratic support.  The directions of the effects are opposite in different 
types of regimes.  The results are consistent with our expectations.  Trust in political institutions 
promotes democratic support in democratic societies but decreases democratic support in non-
160 
democratic societies.  I also used EAB data to test the effects of political trust on support for 
democracy as a form of government, and the results remain the same (details not shown).  
 
7.2.2 The Effects on Political Participation 
 
Political trust may also have a role in political activism.  I will study the effect of political trust 
on both conventional and protest participation.  On the one hand, people who do not trust 
institutions are less likely to participate in the conventional political process.  For comparison 
across different types of regimes, conventional participation is gauged by organization activism, 
measured by the number of voluntary associations the respondents belong to.  The organizations 
can be political, economic, or social.   
On the other hand, it is believed that political cynicism increases protest participation 
(Seligson 1980; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982).  High level of political trust prevents protest 
and violence, both of which create political instability.  To measure protest activism, the WVS 
2005 asked the respondents “Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some 
different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, 
whether you have actually done any of these things (2), whether you might do it (1) or would 
never, under any circumstances, do it (0): A signing a petition; B joining in boycotts; C attending 
lawful demonstrations D join unofficial strikes. 
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 Table 7.2  The Effects of Political Trust on Political Participation 
 
 Organizational Participation Protest Activism 
 Dem.  Non-
Dem. 
 Dem.  Non-
Dem. 
 
 b (s.e.) Beta b (s.e.) Beta b (s.e.) Beta b (s.e.) Beta 
(Constant) .396 
(.010) 
 -.335 
(.022) 
 -1.469 
(.033)  
 -1.054 
(.090) 
 
Political Trust .092*** 
(.004) 
.114 
 
.049*** 
(.006) 
.071 -.096*** 
(.012) 
-.036 -.221*** 
(.021) 
-.109 
Income .006*** 
(.000) 
.075 
 
.007*** 
(.001) 
.074 .004*** 
(.001) 
.016 -.020*** 
(.003) 
-.073 
Political Interest .023*** 
(.001) 
.112 
 
.026*** 
(.002) 
.130 .148*** 
(.003) 
.226 .125*** 
(.006) 
.208 
Post-materialist Values .044*** 
(.003) 
.073 
 
.026*** 
(.005) 
.040 .262*** 
(.009) 
.133 .131*** 
(.017) 
.067 
Sex .011*** 
(.002) 
.030 
 
.017*** 
(.003) 
.044 .034*** 
(.006) 
.028 .051*** 
(.011) 
.043 
Age .000 
(.001) 
.002 
 
-.007*** 
(.001) 
-.051 -.012*** 
(.002) 
-.032 .003 
(.004) 
.008 
Education .008*** 
(.000) 
.096 
 
.014*** 
(.001) 
.160 .039*** 
(.001) 
.146 .024*** 
(.003) 
.088 
Interpersonal Trust .031*** 
(.002) 
.072 
 
.011*** 
(.004) 
.022 .052*** 
(.006) 
.038 .018 
(.014) 
.012 
Level of Democracy .025*** 
(.001) 
.115 
 
.030*** 
(.001) 
.280 .134*** 
(.003) 
.192 .032*** 
(.004) 
.091 
GDP per capita (ln) -.053*** 
(.001) 
-.247 
 
.029*** 
(.002) 
.108 .104*** 
(.004) 
.146 .141*** 
(.009) 
.181 
Adj. R2 .130  .164  .282  .179  
n 38961  14794  36872  10641  
 
Source: WVS 2005.  
Notes: ***p < 0.001. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. 
 
Again, the statistical results confirmed our expectations.  As Table 7.2 shows, the effects 
of political trust on both forms of political participation are significant, ceteris paribus.  The 
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effects are positive on organizational activism and negative on protest activism.  Specifically, 
holding all the other factors constant, people with higher levels of political trust are more likely 
to join political, social and economic organizations.  Meanwhile, the more trust people have in 
political institutions, the less likely they would sympathize with or take part in protest politics, 
holding other variables constant.  Comparing the four models in Table 7.2, we find that political 
trust has similar effects on political participation in both types of regimes.  Results using EAB 
2005 largely confirmed the effects in East Asian societies (details not shown).  
 
7.2.3 The Impact on Voluntary Law Compliance 
 
Successful exercise of legal authority is based on actors from both sides of the line:  the coercive 
enforcement mechanism by the authority and the trust in the law’s legitimacy by the citizens 
(Scholz 1998).  Although governments may be able to implement the law with coercion, 
voluntary compliance and cooperation of citizens promotes stability and order with much less 
costs and risks (Tyler 1998).  People trust institutions because they have higher confidence in the 
legitimacy of the law, thus they are more likely to obey the laws, allowing effective governance 
without the need to refer to coercion (Easton 1965; Norris 1999).  We should expect political 
trust promotes legal compliance.   
 The 2005 WVS contains four questions that can measure voluntary law compliance:  (1) 
Claiming government benefits; (2) avoiding a fare on public transport; (3) cheating on taxes; (4) 
someone accepting a bribe.  Respondents put their attitudes for each situation on a 0-2 scale. The 
scores for four questions are added and recoded to form a factor index with 0-1 scale where 0 
means that it’s always justified and 1 denotes never justifiable.   
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 Table 7.3 The Effects of Political Trust on Voluntary Law Compliance 
 
 Dem. Non-dem. 
 b (s.e.) Beta b (s.e.) Beta 
(Constant) -1.469 
(.033)  
 -1.054 
(.090) 
 
Political Trust .096*** 
(.012) 
.036 .221*** 
(.021) 
.109 
Income .004*** 
(.001) 
.016 -.020*** 
(.003) 
-.073 
Political Interest .148*** 
(.003) 
.226 .125*** 
(.006) 
.208 
Postmaterialist 
Values 
.262*** 
(.009) 
.133 .131*** 
(.017) 
.067 
Sex .034*** 
(.006) 
.028 .051*** 
(.011) 
.043 
Age -.012*** 
(.002) 
-.032 .003 
(.004) 
.008 
Education .039*** 
(.001) 
.146 .024*** 
(.003) 
.088 
Interpersonal Trust .052*** 
(.006) 
.038 .018 
(.014) 
.012 
Level of Democracy .134*** 
(.003) 
.192 .032*** 
(.004) 
.091 
GDP per capita (ln) .104*** 
(.004) 
.146 .141*** 
(.009) 
.181 
Adjusted R2 .282  .179  
n 36872  10641  
    
Source: WVS 2005.  
Notes: ***p < 0.001. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. 
 
As we expected, political trust significantly and positively affects voluntary law 
compliance.  The more people trust political institutions, the more likely they will comply with 
the law and play within the system.  However, compared with other variables, the effects of 
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political trust on voluntary law compliance are modest in democratic societies.  In contrast, the 
effects are particularly strong in non-democratic regimes.   
 
 
7.3 IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Political trust is important for both democratic and non-democratic regimes.  It ensures that 
government can operate effectively, make decisions without resorting to coercion, and retain 
certain leeway in times of insufficient short-time performance.  As discussed above, political 
trust has significant consequences on political values and behavior in all types of regimes.  On 
the one hand, in democratic societies, political trust increases democratic support, promotes 
organizational activism, decreases unconventional participation, and contributes to voluntary 
compliance with the law.  In other words, political trust may help improve the quality of 
democracy.  Thus, the “trust crisis” in many democratic societies today should raise serious 
concerns, and democratic countries need to take measures to boost the declining levels of 
political trust.   
On the other hand, in non-democratic societies, although political trust promotes 
conventional participation and voluntary law compliance, and discourages unconventional 
participation, it also increases support for regime types other than democracy at the same time.  
Thus, although it seems that the gains are greater than losses, it is too quick to conclude that the 
extremely high levels of trust are good for the prospect of democracy in non-democratic societies.  
As Norris (1999: 27) pointed out: “Too much blind trust by citizens and misplaced confidence in 
leaders, for good or ill, can be as problematic for democracy as too little.”  The consequences of 
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political trust in non-democratic societies are partly dependent on its nature: whether it is highly 
rationally based, whether it is greatly induced by propaganda, or whether it is mainly a result of 
traditional hierarchical values.   
To better understand the nature of political trust, this dissertation has focused on the 
political sources of political trust that have been less studied.  I found that institutional settings 
and political performance significantly contribute to levels of political trust.  These findings have 
important implications for both democratic and non-democratic regimes.   
First, institutional settings have important implications for both political studies and 
public policy making.  Theoretically, it is important to incorporate institutional settings into 
analysis of political attitudes such as political trust.  To better understand individual political 
attitudes, we should also try to understand the political settings the individuals are embedded in.  
For public policy makers, especially for those in new and consolidating democracies where 
institutional choices and reforms are still under debate, these findings may shed some light.   
Second, institutional performance, not only economic, but also political performance, is 
the key to deal with the “trust crisis” for established democracies.  In this dissertation, I studied 
various sources of political trust including institutional settings, economic performance, political 
performance, and cultural values.  Compared with other variables we have examined that have 
significant effects on political trust, political performance is the most manageable aspect to 
improve and it is relatively easier to achieve in the short run.  Thus, for established democracies 
suffering from declining trust and new democracies with extremely low levels of trust, 
governments should focus on improving the political performance of the institution.  The specific 
measures include combating political corruption and promoting government fairness and 
responsiveness.   
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Third, results from China, the largest authoritarian country today, show that political trust 
is not just a product of political mobilization and strong Confucian values.  Rather, it is legal-
rational based and comparable to trust in democratic countries.  Future changes in political trust 
in China highly depend on institutional performance.  While traditional hierarchical values are 
difficult to change in the short term, the modernization process may contradict and modify them 
gradually and promote political independence (Inglehart, 1999).  Meanwhile, government control 
of the media is expected to erode with more convenient and flexible modern communication.  
Thus, political mobilization and traditional values are both likely to play a less significant role in 
political trust in the future. As a result, government performance, which directly and significantly 
influences political trust, is likely to play an even larger role in the future. 
In the short run, the Chinese government can still safely rely on traditional values and 
propaganda to promote or maintain political trust and system support. However, the findings of 
this study suggest that performance plays a major role in determining people’s trust in 
institutions. Hence, the most reliable way to maintain political trust lies in the continued 
improvement of institutional performance.   
Meanwhile, political performance is no less important than economic performance for 
authoritarian regimes.  For China, political performance also has larger room for improvement 
than economic performance.  Thus, for the Chinese government, to maintain political trust and 
support, they should not only focus on economic performance, but also start improving the 
political performance of institutions.  
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